CHAPTER 9 Caleb Huse Incurs Some Debts

On the outbreak of war, Caleb Huse was asked to come to Montgomery to confer with General Gorgas on ordnance matters and, accepting a commission as captain, Huse proceeded to go to Europe early in April 1861 to buy arms and cannon for the South. He was equipped with a letter of credit for £10,000 on Fraser, Trenholm & Company of Liverpool, arranged through Confederate States Treasurer Memminger. According to General Gorgas later, The appointment (of Huse) proved a happy one for he succeeded, with very little money, in buying a good supply, and in running my department in debt for nearly half a million sterling, the very best proof of his fitness for his place, and of a financial ability which supplemented the meagerness of Mr. Memminger’s purse.
The young munitions buyer had some adventures and one or two narrow escapes during his travels, but he accomplished his mission to an astonishingly satisfactory degree. He made the Enfield Rifle the standard Confederate arm, aided in obtaining a factory for its production, contracted with English factories for their output, and turned up in the government arsenals and the private storehouses of the Continent a variety of good arms at reasonable prices which he shipped to the South. His method of running the Ordnance Department into debt was partly through issuing warrants for cotton. Though ultimately worthless, these notes of and over Huse’s signature sold for a time at a premium in the French banks. A typical cotton warrant read like a long-winded banknote:

The Government of the Confederate States of America hereby engage to deliver to the bearer within forty days after presentation of this warrant at the Treasury of the said Confederate States (follows a sum in pounds weight, f.e.), two millions and sixty eight thousand (2,068,0001 pounds weight of cotton of the description and quality called and known in the usual Liverpool classification as Middling Orleans or the equivalent in value of any other description of cotton at the option of the Government . . .

The Confederate Government further agreed to deliver the cotton suitably baled to port, excepting suchport as may be in the hands of the enemy.
The warrants were exchangeable for other warrants issued by Huse on other terms, or specifying the sizes of bale as required by the man from whom Huse had bought guns. Each warrant was endorsed by Confederate Commissioner John M. Mason, As commissioner of the Confederate States of America I approve the above warrant given by Major C. Huse on behalf of the Government of the Confederate States of America. J. M. Mason.

Background of Huse 

For Huse to be given such authority at the ripe old age of 31, it must be realized that he was a man of unusual talents. A native of Massachusetts, he had been given a leave of absence from the United States Army upon leaving West Point to take a position as superintendent of the University of Alabama. The reason why a West Pointer was called South to oversee school in Huse’s case was the same reason why William Tecumseh Sherman took his job about the same time with the University of Louisiana: student discipline was almost at an end at the University, as Huse stated. While military drill was taught at many schools and colleges, more as a glamorous militia company attraction for the sons of rich families, the Alabama University trustees intended to hold the students in check under military discipline as was done at West Point. The University of Alabama was a military college so far as concerned discipline, said Huse.
Wrote Huse long afterward, when he had retired and in the winter of his life was living at his home, The Rocks, on the Hudson, just south of West Point, I was given a colonel’s commission by the Governor of the State, with two assistants, one a major, the other a captain. Tents, arms and infantry equipments were purchased of the United States Government, and a uniform similar to that of the West Point cadets was adopted. The students were assembled on the first of September (1860), and a camp established on the University grounds. Drills were inaugurated at once, and regular camp duties were required and performed.
Huse, who was to do as much as any man for the Lost Cause, was not beloved by his boy soldiers. A mutiny was planned, and some of the lads, backed by their families, were determined to run him out of the state. Northern-born, he was looked upon as a damnyankee—this man who spent four years equipping troops commanded by some of these very same Yankee-hating cadets. Huse would have resigned under other circumstances, but he refused to be backed down. He returned to camp and nothing more was heard of the incipient mutiny. Though he makes no mention of exactly what happened, since the camp was under military discipline there is a moral certainty that Huse sent out a squad of the guard, arrested the ring-leaders of the mutiny, confined them to quarters, and may even have administered some of the more common punishments of the days such as having them bucked and gagged, or put to work shovelling manure in the horse barns. Maybe the cadets were persuaded to accept Huse as a sort of Southron by adoption, but feeling was high with the election of Lincoln just two months off and loud talk of secession was around. Under Huse, however, life went on quietly at the University, which is what life was supposed to do there, in the eyes of the faculty and trustees who had installed him as their Colonel. Accompanying this quiet life was a drain on the funds of the college, since buying muskets and shakos cost money, and these disbursements were extra to the budget. The only hope of obtaining money to meet increased expenses was through a legislative appropriation.
It was proposed to take the cadets to Montgomery to be reviewed by the Governor and the Legislature, but at first this was strongly vetoed. At last, with misgivings, the faculty permitted Huse to take the boys by boat to Montgomery and its fleshpots and alcoholic temptations. As Huse delicately put it, . . . even the well-meant hospitality of the citizens, which was sure to be generous, would cause trouble. To everyone’s surprise except perhaps drillmaster Huse, the boys behaved. They carried their own blankets, evidently going off to the legislature in full field equipment. In Montgomery, they paraded before the Governor and legislature in a grand review, in perfect order, crossed belts clayed to chalky whiteness, their U.S. muskets, probably 1842 percussion arms, burnished to ice-brilliancy, bayonets in glittering line abreast. In the evening after the review, a committee of the legislature called upon Colonel Huse to determine what he wanted. His answer came quickly: An annual appropriation so long as the military organization was maintained at the University.
Yankee Huse and a cousin of a noted New Hampshire abolitionist, who was on the committee, then proceeded to steamroller a bill through the legislature. The next day the rules were suspended and the bill to appropriate funds for Huse’s cadets rushed through all its readings, passed to the senate for concurrence that was little more than voluble agreement, and the Governor signed it. Two days after arriving in Montgomery, the Tuscaloosa cadets marched home with
money to keep the institution going. Formed without especial thought of war, cadets from Southern schools became a training cadre that spread throughout the Confederate military establishment, producing much of the generalship for which the Southern forces were noted. The boys from Tuscaloosa did their part.
Huse’s leave of absence from the United States Army was dated to terminate in May, 1861. So critical had the situation become that in February he received a notice revoking his leave, directing him to report for duty to Washington. I replied that my leave was granted with the understanding that I was to resign at its expiration, and as I saw no reason to alter my determination, Huse recalled, I offered my resignation. There was no expectation on my part that my future would be any other than such as my position as professor in the University of Alabama would occasion. Huse tendered his resignation and it was accepted by February 25. Almost as soon as this news leaked south, a telegram was sent by the new Confederate States Navy Secretary Mallory to Huse, telling him to come to Montgomery and take a commission for active service. He received this message April 1, 1861 and started without delay to the Capital.
Nowhere does Huse elaborate upon his feelings about slavery, the problem of States’ Rights, or other matters so important in the secession move. He was a Northerner, yet he seemed to identify himself fully with the fortunes of Alabama and the South. Barely had he received indication that his United States commission was void, than he left to take up an analogous commission from the Rebel Government.
In Montgomery he was taken to Davis’ Secretary of War Leroy Pope Walker, who told him: The President has designated you to go to Europe for the purchase of arms and military supplies; when can you go? Huse had spent six months in Europe in 1859, but outfitting a company of cadets had been his biggest purchase to date. Nevertheless he replied At once.
He preferred to return home to prepare for the journey, and ten days were granted him. When he returned to Montgomery to report to General Gorgas he found no orders for him and no money, though this latter was not strange since he could not imagine from what source the new Confederate States could at that time have derived revenue. Treasury Secretary Memminger provided him with funds to get to New York, for it was fastest to depart from this port, main stop of the fast steam packet boats which made regular crossings with passengers, mail, and high-value cargoes. In New York, Huse was to receive money for the journey.
He spent a day in the office of President Jefferson Davis, as the latter received callers and answered mail. Between visitors, the two discussed Huse’s mission. Davis referred to Huse as Major, advancing him one rank from his United States Army grade of captain when he was an instructor at West Point. Exactly how familiar with the arms in the strongholds of Europe Davis may have been is unknown; but it was under his
supervision as Secretary of War that Captain Alfred Mordecai made his survey of foreign small arms in 1854-5. It is possible that Davis knew a great deal about the then-new arms of the other nations, for he must, as Secretary of War, have had some familiarity with them to properly evaluate the trials of arms which the Ordnance under Colonel Craig had conducted. There were enough officers for field purposes, but Davis needed specialized men. Huse was one.

Huse Goes to New York

The young major traveled north through Charleston, to study the effect of the bombardment on Sumter. Its relatively undamaged condition caused him to speculate on the reason why Anderson surrendered. In his opinion, nothing could have more decisively split the country and forced men to choose sides than this decision by the United States to give up the big square fort in Charleston Bay. At Baltimore, Huse passed through on the day men who had been injured in the great riots were being buried. No rail travel was possible north of that city, so he hired a carriage to take him to York, Pennsylvania, just over the Maryland line. At last, diverting his route to go to Havre de Grace instead, he and other travelers managed to get across to Perryville by flatboat (the ferry steamer having gone to take troops to Annapolis). Though no scheduled trains were running, Huse was in luck; a long troop train came thundering into the station and as the Union soldiers got off, Huse learned that those travelers who wanted to go to Philadelphia could get on. From Philadelphia he took the cars to South Amboy and then to New York by ferry steamer. On this crossing he came face to face with a noted person of his home town, Hon. Caleb Cushing. Huse did not expect to be recognized and was shocked when Cushing with a smile boomed out: Good morning, Mr. Huse, you are with the South, I understand.
Momentarily frightened, Huse recalled that Cushing had strong Democratic feelings and so risked disclosing his identity: Yes, sir, what chance do you think the South has? he responded.
Cushing summed it up tersely: What chance can it have? he said, the money is all in the North, the manufactories are all in the North, the ships are all in the North, the arms and arsenals are all in the North, the arsenals of Europe are within ten days of New York, and they will be open to the United States Government, and closed to the South, and the Southern ports will be blockaded. What possible chance can the South have?
Huse could not risk any further debate; raising his hat politely he looked Cushing squarely in the eye and said, Good morning, Mr. Cushing.
The two never met again, yet Cushing lived to recognize in the young major the figure who, acting in England for the Confederacy, negated all the claims to superiority that Cushing attributed to the North. He had no money, but he sold cotton still in Southern warehouses and pledged his young Government’s faith for further credit. To supplement existing Southern factories of which Caleb Cushing was unaware, he contracted with the largest private armory in Europe which could make No. 1 standard interchangeable Enfields. For the ships, his colleagues in the Navy Department bought cruisers, outfitted them, and terrified the shippers of the North so that for a time the United States flag all but disappeared from the seas. Large numbers of good small arms had been transferred to the Southern state arsenals before the war, and the supply was by no means as unbalanced as Mr. Cushing supposed. The arsenals of Europe proved to be just as far from Wilmington, North Carolina, and the Bermuda headquarters of the blockade runners, as from New York. And as for arsenals being closed to the South, the Northern agents having so much ready money and being so lavish in their spending had taken many of the older arms for United States troops, while Huse had to play it cautiously and buy only the very best for the least money he could contrive to pay. Huse, typical of the tiny group of some half dozen men, never more, responsible for disbursing over $22 millions of Confederate funds in Europe, proved that the South had a damn good chance. While it may be apocryphal to claim that the South wore itself out whipping the Yankees, there were plenty of times—witness the New York stock market fluctuations—when the issue was in doubt.
Major Huse had been told to go to the Bank of the Republic in New York, where he would find letters of credit for his trip. On arriving at this bank, he was immediately brought inside and the shades pulled down; fearfully the bank officer asked, What do you want? Outside, mobs of angry New Yorkers ranged the streets, attacking any Southern sympathizers they found. Huse realized that not only was he in jeopardy, but he risked the safety of the bank by even being there. And no letters from Montgomery had arrived to establish his status. He left the bank quietly and passed over to the office of Trenholm Brothers.
The Trenholm banking interests were, and are, widespread. The main office at the time was that of John T. Trenholm, in Charleston, South Carolina. In New York, Trenholm Brothers & Company flourished, handling cotton remittances and money affairs in general for Southern merchants in the New York market. Abroad, in Liverpool, Fraser, Trenholm & Company served the cotton growers’ financial needs. War Secretary Walker and Navy Secretary Stephen J. Mallory had arranged for the South’s foreign finances to be channeled through this one firm.
Somewhere in the welter of scrap paper which remained after the War exists a treasure-trove for the historian, the Trenholm papers. Neither the Liverpool managers nor the Liverpool Public Library have knowledge of these Confederate Civil War records, though the Librarian indicated recently (1959) that several enquiries had been received about them. The present Mr. Trenholm of New York has no information, though he knows generally that his family’s firm

Accenting finest available for the money, Southern buyer Huse took best of older British muskets (short sea-service shown top, and detail) and best Enfields. Hand-made Pryse & Redman, middle, is 1859 sergeant’s rifle, has unmarked lock. Bottom is Enfield carbine engraved London Armoury Co. with Southem-association JS-Anchor stock stamp. Carbine was found in Tennessee. Both Enfields take sword bayonet with iron-trimmed leather scabbard.

had dealings with the South. And the Trenholm papers in the National Archives fall short of expectations. For, every disbursement which Caleb Huse made abroad was by draft or voucher upon Fraser, Trenholm & Company. From these records the names of sellers of arms, nature of arms purchased, and even totals procured, as well as shipping lines or forwarding agents, insurance agents, and all other payments, should be available. The records are nowhere to be found. But the first entry in them, so to speak, is the $500 Huse obtained in New York.

On to England

He went to Trenholm Brothers and asked for the senior partner, Mr. Wellsman. To his dismay, Wellsman had received no word of his coming from Montgomery, and had no authority to extend him any funds. But Huse had traveled with a man also named Wellsman, a sympathetic Southerner, from Baltimore to Havre de Grace, and he gave Mr. Wellsman a personal message, for the traveling Wellsman was the Trenholm Brothers officer’s father. Huse acknowledged his status as Confederate officer traveling to Europe to buy arms, and Wellsman, alarmed for Huse’s safety, advanced him $500 in gold to travel to Canada. You must not think of sailing from New York, Wellsman told Huse. The excitement is very great and if the crowd discovers who you are they will hang you from a lamp post.
The personal message had been enough to establish his credit with Wellsman, and with $500 for immediate trip expenses, Huse journeyed on into Canada, found he could not ship immediately at Montreal, and risked re-entering the United States to eventually find a passage from Portland, Maine. While on the trip, at dinner his table mate, a sea captain returning to his ship at Liverpool, casually remarked I believe you are going to Europe to buy arms for Jeff Davis. Huse had become somewhat accustomed to remarkable statements by seeming strangers and delayed answering, meanwhile chewing on a piece of potato. Then, pokerfaced, he responded, If he wanted arms he would be likely to select a man who knew something about arms. Nothing more was said but Huse was convinced this innocent (as it later proved) question was an example of telepathy.

Dealing with the London Armoury Company

  At last in London, the Southern arms man put up at Morley’s Hotel, on Trafalgar Square. Described as a favorite hotel for Americans, the location had some benefit for Huse. It was up the street from Whitehall, so Government decisions could be obtained (if obtainable at all) by a few minutes’ walk from the hotel. And farther along at the end of Cannon Street, beyond the Tower, lay London Bridge, and the offices of the London Armoury Company (Limited), 36 King William Street, London Bridge. Not far from there in Bermondsey on Henry Street L. A. Co. promoter Robert Adams had built the new factory for his company in what may

Crisp lock fitting is seen about cone seat of early percussion British sea service musketoon. Gun is model arm transformed from flint, was in Liege gunmakers’ museum as a sample for many years. Huse bought similar guns.

have been a former railway shop. The Henry Street address was later spoken of as the Railway Arches and since the land was bought from the South Eastern Railway Company it is probable that a standing building was used. Huse was aware that this firm had purchased before the War a plant of gun-stocking machinery from the Ames Manufacturing Company of Chicopee Falls, Massachusetts, and was producing Enfield rifles on the interchangeable plan. The Ames equipment represented the acme of woodworking machinery for that day and the major had hopes the rest of the firm’s production might be of this top quality. The next day after getting settled in the hotel Huse visited the armoury offices. His orders at the time were simply to purchase 12,000 rifles and a battery of field artillery (8 guns), and to purchase one or two guns of larger calibre as models.
On entering the Superintendent’s office at London Armoury, as Huse recalled, I found there the American engineer (W. F. McFarland) who superintended the erection of the plant. I had known him in Chicopee. Suspecting he might be an agent for the purchase of arms for the United States Government, I asked him bluntly if he was, and added, ‘I am buying for the Confederate Government.’ Such a disclosure of my business may seem to have been indiscreet, but at that time I thought it my best plan, and the result proved that I was right . . .
“As he had entered the office first, it was in order for me to outstay him, which I did. On his leaving, I asked for a price for all the small arms the Company could manufacture.
The major intended, if possible, to secure the entire output of L. A. Co., but Superintendent Robert Adams, revolver inventor, said he could not give a firm price until the next day; nor could the president of the firm, probably Archibald Hamilton, merchant, of Sinclair, Hamilton & Company (who supplied the South with many accessory warlike stores, belts, harness and equipments), say more.
The President took the matter before the directors— Robert Adams, Richard Ashton (merchant), Archibald Cockburn (merchant), William Dray (manufacturer and engineer), George Fry (solicitor) and John Shorter (merchant). The decision was that the Directors felt they ought to give their present customer the preference over all others. Huse tenaciously refused to give up, even more convinced now that his competitor was the Ames Manufacturing Company engineer, working either for the United States or for the State of Massachusetts, buying arms.
McFarland, who had momentarily thwarted Major Huse’s efforts, had come over from Ames, in Chicopee Falls, to superintend the installation of the United States-made machinery at the London Armoury Company works. The Confederate buyer’s visit to the London Armoury Company offices was late in May, 1861, and he discovered that McFarland had contracted to take 100 Enfield rifles a week, for a period of three months, for Massachusetts.
McFarland was acting under direction of George Schuyler, who in turn was awaiting instructions to contract for more. Meanwhile, a British Government order was taking the balance of the company’s production, which in total was about 1,300 rifles a month. Those Huse sought to buy, apparently getting the okay from the London Armoury Company management to the quantity of 10,000, complete with bayonet, scabbard, extra nipple, snap-cap, and stopper, for £3/16/6, or about $19 FOB London. The price was a little higher than Gorgas had authorized him to go, but the major felt the necessity of arming the Confederacy is so great that the increased cost was worth it.

Huse Arranges to Buy Enfields

Major Edward C. Anderson, C.S.A., Huse’s assistant, wrote on August 11, 1861 to War Secretary L. P. Anderson, describing their purchases:

Sinclair, Hamilton & Co. obtained Enfields for Huse. Southernprovenance guns in author’s collection include 1863-date Birmingham-proved Long rifle and Ml853 spring-band short rifle. Latter was taken from CS soldier by father of man from whom obtained by author. Gun has had repairs (detail), with front band of iron Prussian type and ramrod from Thouvenin rifle. Southern Cross of Honor is associated memento.

When Captain Huse first arrived in England, he met General Fair, late United States Minister to Belgium, and satisfied himself that nothing for immediate service could be obtained from that country. General Fair was certain from personal enquiry that all the establishments at Liege had more than they could do for several months. As the general had made direct inquiry with the view of obtaining arms for the State of Alabama, and as it was known that all through Europe the Liege manufacturers had the reputation of furnishing arms of the worst possible quality, it was deemed best not to give any further attention in that direction for the present.

It was found that the $150,000 which was at first remitted would be well spent in England. Steps were accordingly taken with that end in view. Nothing ready-manufactured was to be found. The attempt to contract with the London Armoury Company failed, as you were informed in a previous dispatch, from Captain Huse, the British Government declining to consent to an extension of time for the completion of their own contract. The principal manager of that company, Mr. Hamilton, of the firm of Sinclair, Hamilton & Company, is a merchant of the highest respectability, and is acquainted with every gunmaker in England.

The connection was fortunate. Hamilton agreed to obtain as many rifles as he could get in England, taking a commission of 2 Vi per cent on the purchase price for his trouble. Huse and Anderson were happy with the arrangement, since it left them free for other work and Hamilton was well suited to obtain these guns. They were in the hands of many gunmakers all over England, and recognizing the skill of their adversaries —said Alexander, the agents purchasing for the United States . . . were men quite well informed in their trade —the Confederates were content to let Hamilton work for them.
The London Armoury Company proprietor did quite well: By February, 1863, a total of 70,980 long Enfield rifles, 9,715 short Enfield rifles, 354 carbine Enfields, rifled, and 20 small bore Enfields had been shipped by Huse to the Confederacy. Other British arms completing the list included 21,040 British muskets, and 2,020 Brunswick rifles. The Enfields were current manufacture guns for the most part, the 20 smallbore guns almost certainly the Kerr target and Volunteer .45 caliber rifles of the Enfield pattern, which were a proprietary design of the London Armoury Company.
Between August, 1861 and March, 1862, Huse busied himself elsewhere, but kept in touch with the London Armoury Company. Their British Government contract was still going on, but nearing its completion. I have requested (Hamilton) not to apply for a renewal of it until I can receive instructions from the War Department, and have also requested him to tender to me a proposal for supplying 50,000. I have not received his formal reply, but it will be in substance as follows: The price to be the same as to the British Government, which I think is 60 shillings, say $15; rifles to be delivered in London, payment on delivery.
“It will be necessary in case the contract is made to organize a corps of inspectors of the work as it progresses from the forgings to the finished rifle. I have no doubt that I could secure the services of the same men now acting in the same capacity for the British War Department. In case the General Government or any of the State governments found it necessary to procure a greater number of rifles in England than this company could furnish, the same inspectors would be available for receiving other rifles, and the standard of quality in the minds of these inspectors would be the highest possible.
Involved in these statements, plus Huse’s word that he did contract with London Armoury Company for rifles, we find several important facts possibly aiding us to identify Confederate rifles. An obvious point is that some London Armoury Company rifles of 1863, all of 1864, and some of 1865, and so dated on the lockplates, would be Confederate States bought and shipped rifles.
A second point of interest follows the first. Since a corps of inspectors was necessary, the probability is that Huse’ expectations were carried out, and that the British Government inspectors remained at work for the Confederacy. If so, their workmens’ marks would have been the same stamps, a cypher of a crown over a number. Considering that in between the termination of the British contract and the beginning of the Confederate contract, some time in late summer or early fall of 1862, the United States agent Marcellus Hartley was able to get some thousands of London Armoury Company arms, all inspected by the same parties, we now arrive at a collectors’ puzzle. How can one determine the Confederate London Armoury Company Enfields from others? William Albaugh feels that Major Anderson obliquely referred to some method of distinguishing these several arms at a glance.
Anderson, writing to War Secretary L. P. Walker from London, August 14, 1861, refers to a sum of money he had which would allow him to buy some muskets being offered. Anderson’s letter contains a direct reference to Enfield rifles, stating that arrangements are in progress for buying a large number. He then introduces the subject of $100,000 received from the Governor of Georgia to be used for purchasing arms for that State. Says Anderson, This will enable me to take up many muskets which are at this time being offered, a large portion of which, I am inclined to believe, were ordered for the United States Government, but which, for the want of funds in hand, they are unable to obtain from the manufacturers. Some of these guns now in our possession have their viewers’ marks upon them, indicating that they had been inspected and accepted by their agents. Of course we subject them to the ordeal of our own standard of excellence.
Anderson did buy guns for Georgia, feeling that every firearm shipped to a Southern state strengthened The Cause just that much.
Now, in trying to puzzle through this thing, just what did Anderson say? His grammar is a little confusing. Albaugh, in publishing this letter passage (CS or US, The American Arms Collector, January 1958, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 21, 22), commits a little historical sin, interjecting by way of explanation something which is not in the text. He quotes the critical sentence as . but which, for the want of funds in hand, they (the Yankees) were unable to obtain from the mfgrs.” By elucidating the passage this way, Albaugh makes the following references to their inspectors’ marks suggest that there was some United States inspector’s mark on each gun.
But how many men did the North have officially inspecting these guns?
And equally important, how many guns could any one man inspect in a day, sufficient to justify his put-

Killed in the attack of May 19, 1864, Confederate soldier of Ewell’s Corps lies in the pockets-robbed indignity of death. His Long Enfield has been artfully laid across his leg. Northern supplies by that date were steady, and apparently it was not necessary to salvage his rifle at once.

ting a stamp on it? Bores would have to be swabbed out, locks taken from the stock, inletting examined to see no hidden cracks existed, and at least one or two other detail studies made with each and every gun, before an inspector could place his reputation and his pocket book in jeopardy on untried goods by putting his stamp on them.
Albaugh also conjectures that this passage meant that, as a corollary, Anderson also had some private inspector’s mark on the guns, so he could tell which ones were Confederate. But all this is conjecture, and removed from the text of this fairly interesting letter. Read the letter passages quoted carefully, deny the interjection of the Yankees which cannot be admitted into evidence as there is no foundation for this particular interpretation, over any other interpretation, and see now what we arrive at.
First, Anderson is not referring to Enfield rifles which were so much in demand, virtually unobtainable, and which at that time he was arranging (he hoped) to procure by contract. He specifically mentions Enfields and in the next passage states muskets. As an officer on Ordnance duty, writing to the secretary of his home War Office, who was vitally interested in whether Anderson was finding muskets or nice modern rifles, Confederate purchaser Major Anderson wrote rifles when he meant rifles, and muskets when he meant muskets.
Hence, any particular markings involved must be sought for on British muskets. It will be remembered that up to February, 1863, just 21,040 British muskets had been bought by Huse & Anderson for the Confederate Government. But the number was in an accounting of government, not state funds. Probably, therefore, the $100,000 from Georgia was spent in a purchase of possibly 10,000 additional muskets found in the market.
Flint muskets would not have been taken by the Confederate agents, even for Georgia. The inference is that the smoothbore percussion musket known as the Model 1842, bar lock like later Enfields but caliber .735-inch, pin-fastened stock with brass nose cap, was the type bought. Furniture is brass, and instead of the stock and barrel being joined by round pins, flat ones or keys were used. Now, Anderson speaks of the guns having their viewers’ marks upon them, which clears the situation not at all. For, does their refer to the Yankees, as Albaugh assumes, or does it refer merely to the guns themselves, subjectively? Quite possibly Anderson was familiar with the individual inspectors, whose government-type stamps, a crown over a number, would appear on the guns. But these muskets had, after all, been manufactured several decades before (in 1851 the first British Minie rifle was adopted) and would have been viewed and inspected at the time. Anderson continues, saying these marks showed the guns had been accepted by their agents. While this without a doubt means Yankee agents, it does not necessarily mean Yankees themselves. Hence, the marks may be indistinguishable from those stamped by the same man inspecting for another purchaser or government, upon similar guns more or less at the same time. For consider this: right before his supposititious remarks about their marks and their agents, Anderson opens his remarks about the muskets which are available, by saying very conditionally that a large portion of these guns, I am inclined to believe, were ordered for the United States Government. He is far less positive than Albaugh concerning Anderson’s reference to the viewers’ marks.
Albaugh also infers from Anderson’s statement Of course we subject them to the ordeal of our own standard of excellence, that there was some particular mark and inspection given these guns by the Confederate buyers and that, if such mark were known, we could identify Confederate guns. Unfortunately, it is an Enfield and a Kerr revolver which Albaugh pictures, each bearing a mysterious JS over anchor stamp. Remember, in context, the comments Anderson made seem to refer only to muskets of which he ultimately procured, some for Georgia, and do not refer to any other firearm. In order to make the remarks refer to Confederate guns generally, it is necessary to read into Anderson’s letter statements and inferences which are not there and, acting on that free basis, I now wonder if perhaps Anderson’s observation of our own standard of excellence is not just a facetious remark to War Secretary Walker in a moment of glum humor—both men knew how desperate was the need for arms and though the Confederates showed their uniform preference for the Enfield and only Tower or London Armoury Company Enfields at that, the comment seems to express a snobbishness about accepting guns which Anderson did not really feel.
It has been thus necessary to go into the question of marks pro and con because of the importance of the matter to the historian and arms collector. Stamps such as csa, c.s.A., cs and c.s, csn, and the JS-anchor are found on weapons with Confederate use proved or assumed. Since one such gun which came to our attention recently is a Lefaucheux second model pinfire revolver, with the solid frame running all the way forward under the cylinder instead of the curious LF design with an L frame on the barrel breech, and since this construction was introduced sometime after the Confederates stopped buying arms, the presence of a large CS stamp on the frame is highly suspect.
The CS has been used on Prussian muskets, also, and we feel improperly in some instances by unscrupulous dealers who blundered ahead on the assumption that the South used anything they could get their hands on. History proves this is not entirely true so far as procurement goes, and it is questionable if the CS marks would have been punched on later in the War when hands were short at the various Southern arsenals. As the majority of Potsdam muskets were pur-

Lorenz 1855 rifle by Pirko, Viennese gunmaker, in collection of Museum of Historical Arms in Florida is stamped VA/& and CSA/&. Museum director Marvin Hoffman doubts authenticity of markings. Made in 1860, gun is numbered 1836.

chased by the scavenging Northern traders, while the South from the first emphasized the Enfield and only secondarily took on the Austrian Lorenz rifles, most other junk muskets with CS or CSA on them are rightly suspect.
Huse’s work with the London Armoury proved highly successful; Enfields became the standard pattern arm of the Confederate States forces—Army, Navy, and Marines.
Cryptically, as he described the quelling of the students’ mutiny, Huse did not disclose how he achieved his object. There is a hint in his mentioning the delay in correspondence by packet boat; inferentially, McFarland had only inquired about long-time contracts, and had not been able to get a reply. Meanwhile, he had placed an order for 10,000 Enfields; but Huse wanted the rest. He persuaded President Hamilton that a month was a long time to wait for a tentative answer from the authorities of the North. Within a few days he reported, I succeeded in closing a contract under which I was to have all the arms the Company could manufacture, after filling a comparatively small order for the United States agent. Definitively establishing, without equivocation, who the London Armoury worked for between 1861 and 1865, Huse states This Company, during the remainder of the war, turned all its output of arms over to me for the Confederate Army.
It was the London Armoury Company that, occupying a status akin to official armorers for the Confederacy, supplied the South with its best guns. Emphasis was on the No. 1 quality interchangeable Enfield rifles of the Railroad Arches make, and the Kerr revolvers.

The Kerr Revolver

The Confederate single action Kerr is of .44 or .450 caliber, called 54-bore. A smaller size, 8(Vbore or .36 caliber, was also made in limited numbers. Auguste Francotte of Liege was the licensed fabricator and communicant of Kerr and made at least one .36 revolver, marked 1 and clearly of Liege make with full proofs. But the majority were London Armoury guns, and were stamped on the barrel forward of the London view and proof marks, left top quarter flat, with a tiny
l.a.c. The frame, to which the barrel was hinged at bottom front, is stamped on the left with an oval london/armoury. The back-action sidelock, detachable from the revolver frame and set into the handle, is engraved by hand with the words London armoury co. and on the same right side of the frame below cylinder, with kerr’s patent and a number. This number, which appears also on the side of the cylinder and is hand engraved, is a mark of final acceptance as it is engraved after all polishing immediately before bluing. The actual serial number of fabrication in the Kerr revolver series is stamped on the front face of cylinder, on the frame flat below cylinder, under the barrel strap over top of cylinder, and in the handle in the lock mortising. On one JS-Anchor specimen the engraved number is 9239; the actual stamped serial number, by which pieces were reassembled after being

Southem-association Kerr revolver may have been one imported directly but full story is not yet known. JS-Anchor is stamped on grip and gun was used by Southern man in war. Marked Kerr’s Patent 9239 but factory parts No. 813.

Often assumed to be double action guns that don’t work. Kerrs are usually single action with a trigger that moves to rear of guard for creepless let-off. Caliber is .450 but .36 Kerrs are known. Some were made in Liege.

taken apart for finishing and then returned from the polishers, is H 813, the H stamped separately from the 813 which from its regularity on the several parts appears to have been stamped in some kind of a jig. The wood under the lock is also stamped H, but with a bladed tool (screw-driver?) punched three times. On the front side of the handle, immediately at tip of the frame tang, is stamped the initials JS over an anchor.
The identical stamp appears on other Kerr revolvers, and at the rear of the trigger guard tang of a London Armoury .577 carbine in the author’s collection, which was bought from a dealer who picked it up in Tennessee. The iockplate, usually on London Armoury Company guns bearing that imprinted cypher, is hand engraved by the same man who marked the Kerr revolver cited, with London Armoury. On the bayonet stud soldered to the side of the barrel, the number 416 is stamped; that number appearing to be the same 1 as is stamped on the Kerr revolver H 813. The carbine barrel is Liege made and proved, over-proofed with London marks.
Although the Kerr revolver was adopted by Portugal, marks denoting Portuguese issue are not now recorded by collectors. It is possible the JS-anchor mark is some Portuguese stamp. But the finding not only of Kerr revolvers, but of Enfield London Armoury carbines from the Border States’ backwoods with the same stamp, a stamp in a location denoting final acceptance by the chief inspecting officer, seems to confirm the Southern use of arms so marked. The inference that the JS-anchor is a Southern mark and not the stamp of some other purchaser is argued by a few experts; if so, it may have stood somehow for John Slidell (Confederate Commissioner in Europe) or James Seddon, in honor thereof more than any indication either had personally inspected the arm.
While this is pure speculation, the possibility that the H series of Kerr revolver serials were made for Caleb Huse is quite likely. The engraved numbers are not, as usually supposed, actual serial numbers. They are numbers recorded in the firm’s books in terms of sale; that is, Adams and Beaumont-Adams revolvers, as well as Kerrs of both calibers and both single and double action, could probably be found in the books with brackets or groups of numbers assigned to be engraved. The stamped metal serial number was for the manufacturing staff to keep track of the current batch of Kerr revolvers; the engraved serial number was in the series of entire Kerr output and ran consecutively without regard to model, a practice common to London gunmakers, Holland, Westley Richards, and Rigby among others. The stamped number is a clue to the quantity made in the batch, lot, order, or contract. It is also a clue as to the ratio of engraved Kerr revolvers to the total output only, regardless of model changes.
Externally the difference between single and double action is hardly visible. The single-action model has the trigger farther forward in the guard, and the rear flange of trigger is more deep in the guard; the DA type is more nearly centered in the guard. Internally, the SA Kerr is designed to keep the trigger, when cocked, in close touch with the hammer to give a crisp and creepless let-off. The rear sight is a huge V in the frame and the front sight a monster brass stud Vs -inch diameter screwed into the top of the barrel, so the emphasis on fine trigger action seems a little absurd. A hook attached to the trigger on the same pivot as the pawl drops over a stud on the tumbler and, as the tumbler

Enigmatic J-S Anchor. Some experts think that is a Portuguese stamp, others argue that it is a Southern mark, and not the stamp of a purchaser.

is raised when the hammer is thumb-cocked, the trigger flange is drawn back to contact the sear and give a crisp let-off. Incorrectly reassembled, it is possible to assume that somehow the loop is part of a double-action lifting device, reversed, but this is not so.
The Kerr revolvers were made under British patents No. 2896, December 17, 1858, and No. 242, January 26, 1859. Both calibers were five-shot, five-groove, rifling counter-clockwise, barrel 5Vi inches. Lockplate, hammer, and loading lever were casehardened; the other parts were blued, and the grips of one-piece walnut coarsely checkered. The center-hung loading lever had a side-springing catch, and the lever like a blade fitted between two sidewise studs under the barrel, avoiding Colt’s British patent of 1849.

Sharp Dealers

Though he sought only first class arms, Huse ran into the usual quota of trade sharpies. The French were especially glib in their offerings of inferior quality arms. Back home the din of Bull Run still echoed in the ears of North and South. Though the charge of Colonel Arthur Cummings, commanding the 33rd Virginia which took the Federal battery that was trying to enfilade Jackson, was the turning point of the engagement, the victorious Southern forces did not win because of superior weapons. Of Virginia units, the Hampshire Riflemen from New Creek was a pre-war regiment, well equipped. But the Independent Grays, for example, from Moorefield, Hardy County, had old, altered muskets and flint rifles from Harpers Ferry, possibly the Ml803-1814 pattern of half-stock heavy

Author’s Jeff Davis rifle. When former President of Confederacy was captured he had a carbine in his luggage of identical pattern as this but shorter barrel, one ramrod pipe. Sight graduated to 1,000 yards, cal. .69 rifled. Davis’ gun now at Springfield Armory Museum. Liege arms museum identifies this pattern incorrectly as boar hunting rifle and another specimen more correctly as Carbine of the Guard of Viceroy of Egypt. Takes Yataghan bayonet having two raised lugs pierced for fitting to bayonet studs on muzzle.

.54 round ball rifle. The Potomac Guards, from Springfield, Virginia, had the same equipment; the Shenandoah Sharpshooters only flintlock muskets. Mustered into the Stonewall Brigade, they were opposed that June 21 by the 14th Brooklyn Zouaves and 1st Michigan, which poured a deadly volley into us. Flint muskets were not the right sort of armament for the South, but Huse found different opinions abroad.
The French agent for the Confederacy wanted to buy flintlocks in Paris, justifying it by saying that U.S. Minister Dayton had bought 30,000 flintlocks in France. Actually, Dayton had bought percussion arms, mostly in Belgium. According to J. B. Jones’ A Rebel War Clerk’s Diary, the French statisticians alleged there was no greater mortality in battle using percussion and rifled arms, than from using smooth bore muskets. This may be owing to the fact that a shorter range is sought with the latter, opined Jones, but the fact was that the liars were figuring; figuring, that is, how to dump a few tons of flint muskets on the pressed Southern buyers without the need to transform these weapons to percussion. There was great need: We are not increasing our forces as rapidly as might be desired, for the want of arms, Jones wrote on September 6, 1861, None have been imported yet. Huse evidently bought none of these flint muskets.

Belgian Muskets

Among Huse’ purchases were Belgian rifled muskets. General U. S. Grant had not thought much of these and described the equipment of his forces up to the fall of Vicksburg, when 31,600 prisoners, 172 cannon, and
60,000 muskets, many of them new Enfields, were taken by the Federals.
Up to this time our troops at the West, wrote Grant in Century Magazine, September, 1885, had been limited to the old United States flintlock, changed into percussion, the Belgian musket imported early in the War (almost as dangerous to the person firing it as the one aimed at) and a few new and improved arms . . . The enemy (Confederates) had generally new arms, which had run the blockade, and were of uniform caliber. After the surrender, I authorized all colonels whose regiments were armed with inferior muskets to place them in the stack of captured arms, and to replace them with the latter.
Writing of Life in the Confederate Army, A. P. Ford noted that the South had old-fashioned Belgian rifles, probably the most antiquated and worthless guns ever put into a modern soldier’s hands. But they were all our Government had (aside, perhaps, from the Enfields the Vicksburg defenders possessed?). These rifles could not send a ball beyond 200 yards, and at much shorter range their aim was entirely unreliable.
Yet as late as December of 1864, Belgian muskets were issued to Captain G. L. Buist’s Palmetto Guards artillery unit. Four howitzers were reorganized as infantry with their Belgian muskets.
Belgians were issued to Company I, 14th Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry, by March 1862, if a tintype of Private Elisha Stockwell in Sees The Civil War is to be believed. Though it could be a prop of the photographer’s studio, it most likely is Private Stockwell’s own Belgian musket, evidently a .69 Minie rifle with back action lock and short elevating leaf rear sight. We were armed with Belgian rifles, said Stockwell. They were heavy, but good shooting guns; at least some of them were, when carefully loaded. I saw an Indian of Company F come into camp while here with all the squirrels he could handily carry, all shot in the head. They were gray and fox squirrels. Company F was a big part Indian, and good skirmishers. We had Enfield rifles at Vicksburg, and Springfields the last year and eight months. I liked them the best. I fetched my whole outfit home with me, gave six dollars for it. Even more enthusiastic about the Belgian arms was a ragged Confederate at Fredericksburg who during the burying truce snatched up a brand new Yankee Belgian musket. A bluecoat officer remonstrated with him for stealing arms under a flag of truce. Without dropping the new musket or slowing down, the Reb looked the Yank slowly over and coldly said, Never mind, sir! I’ll shoot you tomorrow and get them bootsl Capture or cargo, the South found use for the worthless Belgians.
A Liege rifled musket, .69 back action lock with elevator rear sight to 800 yards, has been seen by the author bearing CSA mark. The rear band on this specimen was loose, possibly from another musket. The barrel channel was crudely chiseled out; whether the gun had been rebuilt at some Southern arsenal or not was a question of the moment. The tang of the barrel
was stamped 63. On the flat side of the nipple bolster, neatly in 1/16-inch letters, CSA could be read with the C uppermost, the A near the wood. The legitimacy of this mark was neither argued for, nor against; the owner simply did not know. Unfortunately, while the practice of stamping CSA on an otherwise unimportant old musket vastly enhances its value to the collector, the habit seems more recent than historic. Factories producing for the Confederacy in the South, as opposed to state production, might and sometimes did stamp their guns CS or CSA. On imports, the mark is suspect.

Coastal Steamers Bought Abroad

Besides speculative blockade runners, the Confederate Ordnance Department bought steamers; Huse purchased the Columbia, R. E. Lee, the Merrimac, and the Eugenie. Gorgas locally obtained the Phantom. From September 30, 1862 to September 30, 1863, these steamers in addition to heavy goods and uniforms, Blakely guns, and explosives, carried through the Anaconda four times as many small arms as were produced at the Richmond, Fayetteville, and Ashevillev armories. In this Southern fiscal year, 113,504 small arms were imported, making the total of small arms imported to that time about 350,000, including the
100,000 Austrian rifles Huse obtained in Vienna.
These ships were shallow draught coastal steamers, not ocean-going freighters. Their task was to run from Nassau, Havana, or one of the other nearby foreign ports to a Confederate port. Formerly, munitions had been shipped via sailing schooners, but the affair of the Stephen Hart ended that. She was American built, but sold to an English house and sailed under the British flag. Still, the proof she was loaded with Confederate war materiel was so overwhelming that the courts declared her, vessel and cargo, forfeit. After that incident, steamers exclusively were used. The outward voyage had little risk, for cargo and vessel usually belonged to bonafide British owners, and were not contraband of War subject to capture and forfeiture by a prize court. But once, a few brass buttons marked C.S.A. were enough to taint the cargo of a ship loaded with otherwise innocuous groceries and clothing, the Springbok, and the whole ship was condemned as contraband. As Huse recorded:

To get supplies from The Islands to the main land required sea-worthy steamers of light draught and great speed . . . Some . . . had been private yachts, as for example the Merrimac; [there were two Merrimacs]; some were engaged in trade between British ports, as the Cornubia; some were taken from the Channel service between England and France, as the Eugenie; and some were built for opium smuggling in China. Later in the war, steamers were built expressly for the service . . .”

His orders had been brought separately to England in the shoe sole of a German traveling on business for the Confederacy, and Huse was enjoying his cloak-anddagger assignment. He preferred the cloak and went easy on the dagger. The Fingal carried the first cargo

Muzzle of Jeff Davis rifle has odd bayonet lugs. One bayonet possibly fitting this gun is shown by Albaugh; at a South Carolina gun show recently a complete cased hunting rifle taking same pattern bayonet but smaller, and a rusty original bayonet, were offered for sale. Possibly Huse bought a few that the Viceroy of Egypt did not take. Carbine shown is marked Windisch a Nimes, but is Liege made and proved; has hit man target at 300 meters with .69 Minie.

through the blockade, fruits of his labors, and it was necessary to send into Savannah, Georgia, the port for which her chief officer Commander James D. Bulloch had sailed, a set of secret signals in advance. Otherwise, if the Fingal did not give the right recognition signs, the heavy shore batteries would blast her out of the water. The messenger, traveling separately, carried a packet of cigars. One was special; said Huse,

These [signals] were secreted by removing the wrapper of a well-made cigar and carefully replacing it, after rolling the paper containing the signals upon its body. I myself did this bit of cigar work. On arriving off Savannah, Commander Bulloch displayed his signals, which were immediately answered, and he piloted his ship into the harbor with which he was familiar.

Another time, Huse was tempted into an act of piracy, when he got wind of a cargo of Austrian rifles loading at Hamburg for the North. These were Marcellus Hartley’s purchases and Huse would dearly have loved to capture them. The Nashville, a Charleston-toNew York packet boat, had been bought by the Confederate States Government and outfitted as a cruiser, Captain Pegram, commanding. Though she would have made a ridiculous showing against such mighty vessels as the Hartford or the thunder-gunned monitors, she did fly the flag of the Confederate States in Southampton.
Huse had been approached with a cash offer from some people who had either knowledge or interest in a British ship carrying the Austrian guns from Hamburg to New York. If Huse would deposit £10,000 in the Bank of England, in favor of unspecified persons, he could then take out a tug with a gun aboard, and fire a shot across the bow of the British ship. Her captain would have orders to stop her and allow Huse to order her to Charleston as a surrendered vessel. The scheme was not impossible, had Huse held a privateer’s commission, and he asked Confederate Commissioner Yancy for a letter of marque and reprisal, thinking also that his status as an officer in the C.S. Army might cover him under international law if he tried it. But Pegram arrived at Southampton and Huse had to leave London to pay him a courtesy call at the docks. The
scheme was temporarily suspended and the Austrian guns set sail for New York.

Huse Purchases Vienna Arsenal Surplus

Huse’s great coup was the first of his career in Europe, the purchasing of the surplus at the Vienna Arsenal. He had been there in 1859 as a military visitor, with a letter of introduction from the United States War Department. His return was reluctant for, as he put it, he at first considered the getting of anything from an Imperial Austrian Arsenal as chimerical. He continues:

But my would-be intermediary (Moses & Company) was so persistent that, finally, I accompanied him to Vienna and, within a few days, closed a contract for 100,000 rifles of the latest Austrian pattern, and ten batteries, of six pieces each, of field artillery, with harness complete, ready for service, and a quantity of ammunition, all to be delivered on ship at Hamburg. The United States Minister, Mr. Motley, protested in vain. He was told that the making of arms was an important industry of Austria; that the same arms had been offered to the United States Government and declined, and that, as belligerents, the Confederate States were, by the usage of nations, lawful buyers. However unsatisfactory this answer may have been to Washington, the arms were delivered, and in due time were shipped to Bermuda from Hamburg. Mr. Motley offered to buy the whole consignment, but was too late. The Austrian Government declined to break faith with the purchasers.

I confess to a glow of pride when I saw those sixty pieces of rifled artillery with caissons, field forges, and battery wagons, complete—some two hundred carriages in all—drawn up in array in the arsenal yard. It was pardonable for a moment to imagine myself in command of a magnificent part of artillery. The explanation of Austria’s willingness to dispose of these batteries is that the authorities had decided on the use of gun cotton in the place of powder; and the change involved new guns, although those sold to me were of the latest design for gunpowder. I believe gun cotton was given up not long after.
Though Huse’s Austrian rifles from Vienna, described as of the latest pattern were of the Lorenz model, he obtained other Austrian-pattern guns from
the Liege fabricants. This is revealed by an examination made by Confederate States Ordnance Major Smith Stansbury, in St. George, Bermuda. Stansbury was the commanding officer of the Confederate States Bermuda Ordnance Depot, and under his direction was the shipping house of John Tory Bourne, British commission merchant. A series of letters by Stansbury to Gorgas and Bourne in their excerpts reveal the nature of the guns on hand:

St. Georges, Bermuda, July 25, 1863

. . . We have on hand here (as previously advised) about sixty thousand Austrian muskets, which, judging from the samples I have seen, are also condemned arms, and to us utterly worthless.

July 29, 1863

... the Venus can be loaded from the Miriam with Austrian muskets, which are so much needed at home. After some difficulty, I had one of the cases opened yesterday, and was permitted to inspect one gun. They are new and clumsy muskets, apparently of the manufacture of Liege, but the case examined was in excellent order . . .

                                                     * * *

August 11, 1863

. . . You direct that the boxes be opened, and the arms oiled before shipment. This I fear will be impossible.

* * *

August 14, 1863

... in relation to Texas cargo ... we have on hand 584 cases of arms, Austrian muskets, which arrived by the Miriam, and which are in excellent order . . .

That these were Consol-Augustin lock muskets is suggested by the following, relating to the ship upon which it was proposed to ship the Austrian muskets in response to a demand by Texas for arms:
August 18, 1863
Col. J. Gorgas.
Colonel:
Unless we receive a supply of percussion caps before the Ella and Annie is ready to leave for Texas, I shall with the

At Vienna Arsenal Huse struck jackpot, bought 100,000 Lorenz rifles virtually from under Hartley’s nose. Store rooms 600 feet long contained vast racks of rifles made for armies of Austro-Hungarian Empire in turbulent era of history.

Basic Southern Lorenz rifle had block sight, was dated on lockplate omitting initial "I,” with Austro-Hungarian crown at rear of hammer. Maker’s name is often on top of barrel at breech. Front band-stock tip is distinctive. Ramrod shown is incorrect replacement; original has hole in head for torque peg to be used in twisting out a stuck bullet, and brass belt to protect rifling while ramming ball.

concurrence of Major Walker detain her for two or three days.
It is distracting to think that the arms and ammunition sent by her may be almost useless, without a supply of caps.
SMITH STANSBURY, Major P. S. I am very glad to inform you that the Austrian rifles, which were on hand when I arrived, have turned out much better, than the samples I inspected led me to suppose.
With careful cleaning by the soldiers, most of them will, I hope, turn out effective weapons.

Bulloch Also Buys Arms

Buying and collaborating with Huse in Europe were Commander James D. Bulloch, the Confederate States naval representative in England, and Captain James H. North, CSN. Bulloch had been instructed to obtain ships, cannon—at least one Armstrong breechloading gun with pivot carriage for each—and in addition to general stores such as shoes, jackets, pants, certain small arms:
1.000    navy revolvers
100.000    rounds fixed ammunition
500.000    percussion caps
1.000    navy carbines
100.000    rounds of fixed ammunition
500.000    percussion caps
Bullet moulds, wipers, spare parts for above
1.000    navy cutlasses
Under certain conditions, C.S.N. vessels of War were designated as cargo carriers. A fast screw steam sloopof-war, the McRae, 830 tons, armed with one 9-inch pivot gun and six 32-pdrs, 152 men, under command of Lieutenant Huger, was due to arrive in London in early August, and carried a number of despatches for North and Bulloch. They were instructed to purchase at once 10,000 good Enfield rifles, or rifled muskets with bayonets, without regard to prices, and send them in the McRae on her return trip. Additionally, 2,000 muskets were wanted for the Navy, and powder, put in large casks like hardware.
If the McRae could not be loaded in a British port with this freight, Navy Secretary Mallory suggested that Bulloch arrange to have it lightered aboard outside the zone, or if that failed, ship it to Nassau, New Providence, to the Confederate States shipping agent Henry Adderly, for and on account of a supercargo on board, who should be some discreet man having our interest at heart. Mallory’s instructions were mellerdramatic but vital: Powder in kegs could be shipped in large casks like hardware, as could pistols and Enfield rifles also, apart from their stocks. But the stocks should go in the same casks with their barrels.
Bulloch set about buying guns. None of the leading gun factories were in a position to take contracts, except upon a very long time, and I was forced to adopt the plan Captain Huse fell into, of employing a commission house here familiar with the gun trade and directors in the London Armoury Company to contract for the sea service rifles my orders called for, with the small makers in Birmingham and elsewhere. One of the directors of the London Armoury Company was Archibald Hamilton, of Sinclair, Hamilton & Company and it was doubtless this firm which aided Bulloch in his early purchases. One hundred sea-service rifles with cutlass-bayonets attached were contracted for. While these may have been 33-inch short rifles, the mysterious JS-Anchor carbines would also fit the bill. These arms are short, 24-inch Enfield pattern guns, .577 caliber, with 24-inch barrels and folding leaf shortrange rear sights. Such arms were also issued to the British artillery. Identification of these arms is uncertain, but the coincidence of names and facts leads to some possible or reasonable conjectures; suppositions which may be tracked down as fact if enough pieces of the puzzle can be put together.
Bulloch’s revolvers were probably 1,000 obtained from London Armoury, of the Kerr pattern. These in the London Armoury Company series or registration number bracket of 9,000 have the cryptic JS-Anchor mark inside the curve of the handle, which has been noticed on Confederate-Association Kerrs. This same mark is seen on the stock of an Enfield 24-inch twoband musketoon, artillery carbine, or, if equipped with cutlass bayonet, sea-service rifle, in the author’s collection. As previously stated, the meaning of the initials is
not known. But there was a London commission merchant with these initials, acting in consonance with a Birmingham gun maker, J. D. Goodman. The firm was known as J. Scholefield, Sons & Goodman, and their agent in the Confederate States was Archibald McLaurin of New Orleans (Fuller misspells the name Schofield). This worthy was detained by General Ben Buder upon the latter’s occupation of the city, and on July 10, 1862, made a sworn statement concerning his activities there in the arms importing trade. In June, 1861, 200 rifles had been shipped by J. Scholefield, Sons & Goodman, to McLaurin but were diverted to Havana. He sold 100 to the “Confederate Guards, deliverable in Havana; these were captured by the United States. About March, 1861, McLaurin also received (at Havana) a sample Wilson’s breech-loading rifle.
It is possible that not Archibald Hamilton, but J. Scholefield was the arranger for Bulloch of the seaservice arms and the Kerr revolvers being made under contract for the Confederate States Navy, and that the stamp of their house signifying ships’ chandlers and naval stores, was the otherwise inexplicable JSAnchor. Such arms could have been made available in the summer of 1861 to Huse and to Bulloch due to the breakdown of their sales outlet in New Orleans, the interned Mr. McLaurin, who (while languishing in a Federal prison) could no longer be expected to receive any shipments from them. JS-Anchor Kerr revolvers tabulated include: No. 2266 (ad. of James Tice in Shotgun News, December 15, 1961), No. 3801 (Albaugh, Confederate Arms, p. 34); and No. 9239 (a private collector, on loan to the author). In Fuller & Steuart, Confederate Firearms, is pictured a Kerr listed as Used in the Confederate Army, No. 9224. A Kerr in the 10,000’s, also single action like No. 9239, is engraved Bank of England, and has a dovetail large blade foresight. The Albaugh-pictured gun and that in Fuller have triggers the front edges of which just come to the back edge of the trigger guard base; the trigger flange at rear is scant of the deep-curved profile of the single action guns; it is thought these are double action though no mention is made in either book.
But of all the guns, the Fuller pistol has one unaccountable feature: the screw for the loading lever pivot (all enter from the frame right side) is located near to the front curve of the frame (others are in the middle of the frame flat area) and there is less space forward of the cylinder for loading and fouling; the Fuller pistol No. 9224 bullet cut-out is to the rear of a line drawn vertically across the axis and touching the edge of the frame front at the hinge; the others have bullet cuts exactly on that line. The frame end at hinge of the Fuller gun is more rounded than the specimens noted as JS-anchor guns, and there is a difference in shape of the loading lever split lug under barrel.
The significance of these major manufacturing differences between Fuller’s Confederate Association Army Kerr revolver and others made the same day (if closeness of registration numbers is any indication) also of C.S.A. usage, is not known. Sufficient to say that Kerr revolvers from the 3,000’s to the 9,000's are known of Confederate association; one in the 10,000’s is Bank of England, suggesting the end of fabrication for the South, but there is too little understood on serials of known Confederate Kerrs to reveal a full pattern. Probably the registration numbers run consecutively as Kerrs were manufactured, but that batches went to the mysterious JS for stamping with his mark, and thence to the Southern Confederacy. Other batches were withdrawn for commercial or military contract sale, as to the Government of Portugal. Inconclusive, it is hoped these cerebrations will help some student of Confederate States arms to find the missing pieces on the incomplete but interesting story of the Confederate Kerr revolvers, for certainly some of Major Huse’s purchases were delivered!

The Adams Revolver

London Armoury Company was not exclusively of interest to Confederates. Its revolvers of the Adams design, and those made by the preceding company identities, Deane, Adams, and Deane, and Robert Adams, were rather widely distributed in the North and in Dixie before the war. The first weapon, the Adams revolver, were made in pocket, Navy, and dragoon sizes, while the Adams-Beaumont design was made under license in the United States by the Massachusetts Arms Company of Chicopee Falls, for the Adams Revolving Arms Company of New York. A few in .36 caliber were bought by the United States Government officially, while the small .31 caliber pistol was of limited popularity as an officer’s or gentleman’s sidearm.
The Army officer who first brought the Adams’ revolver to Uncle Sam’s attention was Major Alfred Mordecai of the Ordnance Corps. On his trip abroad in 1854, he purchased an Adams revolver made under license by Auguste Francotte, in Liege. Carefully he drew a sketch of the Adams double action which made it possible to fire five shots as quickly as the trigger could be pulled.
The Deane and Adams revolver differs from Colt’s well known pistol, chiefly in the mechanism, by which the simple pulling of the trigger causes the chambered breech to revolve, and cocks and discharges the piece at the same time, said Mordecai. The workmanship of the pistol is very good, and the arm appears to have met with much favor; but it still wants the test of actual service, and it may be doubted whether it is expedient to arm any part of the troops with a weapon which can be discharged with such exceeding facility and rapidity. It is understood that some of these pistols have been ordered by the Ordnance Department, for trial in our service. At present, they are sold at about 2/3rds of the cost of Colt’s revolver.
The Adams revolvers ordered by the United States Government were not foreign-made guns but Massachusetts Arms Company revolvers. While one is known listed as marked Ames Arms Company, Chicopee
Falls, Massachusetts, (United States Cartridge Company Collection catalog No. 694) the average specimen found is stamped on the top flat of the frame with “Manufactured by/Mass. Arms Co./Chicopee Falls
in three lines. The frame is also marked on the right side Patent June 3, 1856, and on the left siue Adams Patent May 3, 1858. The loading lever is marked Kerr’s Patent April 14, 1857.
This particular model of revolver made in Massachusetts has two readily visible differences from the Beaumont-Adams of 1856 which was made in London.
First, the handle is checkered toward the bottom but has a smooth area of wood near to where it joins the frame. The handle, to the practised eye, is more curved, less backward-slanting, than the regular Adams.
In addition, a major improvement has been made in the Adams flat-framed revolver, by the addition of a flange plate on the left side behind the percussion cones. Adams, first large-scale maker of the revolver in Britain, was prevented by Sam Colt’s London patent from making a revolver frame which shielded the user from flash-back if an adjoining charge should go off when the barrel charge was fired. This hazard occurred sometimes with Colt’s arms, notably with an issue of revolving breech carbines to the Marines in 1841 during the Florida War with the Seminoles. The cylinders had been made from undersized bar stock, jumped up and brazed to close up the fissures. This malpractice produced a cylinder somewhat honeycombed, and fire from one shot could communicate through to the next chamber. This also could occur if a revolver had lain long with powder in the chambers, loaded or uncleaned. Corrosion might pin-hole the cylinder web enough for a second shot to go off. But with the British revolvers an even more common accident might set off adjoining shots. The accident is so easily made that personal experience, in which the author nearly lost the sight of his shooting eye, would condemn the whole class of flat-framed British revolvers as unsafe for shooting, for the firing cap can flash over and by sympathetic detonation or actual fire set off the next shot.
The Adams, and British revolvers which followed it, rotate the charges from left to right. Consequently, those chambers to the right of the bore are empty; those to the left, still loaded. Often it is necessary to pinch the percussion caps slightly to make them fit tightly, if caps of the exact size are not on hand. Further, the shoulders between the nipples are not as high nor the cones as deeply set as Colt’s. In shooting a Webley .450, very similar to the Adams Beaumont of the United States trials, the author had the misfortune to see a great orange blossom of flame proceeding back from the left chamber, being left-handed and shooting using his left eye. There was no time but to close the eyes, and this he did, taking the full force of the stinging gas and tiny brass particles in the face. The brass worked its way out of the many tiny cuts but some burning powder tattoo marks still linger about eye and nose.
The discharge happened so rapidly that the barrel bullet was thrown by excessive recoil out of line a foot, striking the top of the target carrier at about 10 yards, and bending into an L. The chamber which discharged threw the ball forward, jamming it against the side-plunger loading lever. The next in line to the left, and the one beside the barrel to the right (starting with a full cylinder) were both heavily washed and eroded with powder gas. That no other shot discharged, quite conclusively proved that charges did not go off because of flash across the muzzles of the chambers, as so many modern day shooters apprehend. But that caps can be flashed if pinched and the priming exposed seems proved.
Regardless of the general literature of the period, this hazard must have been recognized by either an official of Massachuetts Arms Company, or of the Government. Taking the Adams regular flat frame, a milling cut was made to receive the base of an angle iron, the upstanding edge of which was curved slightly to match the cylinder profile. This flange was enough to do what the heavy round bosses do at the back of the Colt frame: protect the shooter in case of accident. As only 600 of this type were procured by the United States, and an unknown number but (evidently few) made for commercial sale in both Navy and the pocket sizes, this is the safest, and among the scarcest, of the Adams pistols. Caliber .36 was chosen for the United States trial guns, although the same frame in England carried a .450 cylinder. Traditionally, double action in the United States Service is associated with naval boarding parties, and these guns may have served for this purpose in the war. In addition, Adams pistols were purchased by both North and South during the war, direct from England.
No specific markings have been noted on Adams guns which might in any way suggest Confederate States or United States use. General Stonewall Jackson had an Adams cased set; the U. S. guns were routed through Schuyler, Hartley & Graham of New York. On November 11, 1861, 120 Adams revolvers, double action, were purchased from them by the United States at $18 each. The same type of goods, to judge by the price of $18, again was purchased December 3,
1861, billed as 93 Adams pistols English self-cocking. But on December 13 they delivered a bundle of Christmas cheer consisting of: 7 Adams revolvers, 12 Adams revolvers self-cocking, and 16 Kerr’s patent revolvers, all at $18 each; and 26 Beaumont’s revolvers at $19. The Adams revolver is believed to be the original model, which was double action only, having a spurless hammer. But, as S. B. Haw indicated in The Adams Revolver (Army Ordnance, January-February 1938), quite a bit of work was done during the same period [transition era of 1854-55 when the Beaumont selective single or double action was introduced] in changing over a number of the old selfcocking model to double action, the main features of Beaumont’s lock design making this relatively simple. These conversions can be identified easily—the presence
of a hammer with a thumb piece together with a butt of the earlier type on the same gun being the most obvious clue. Haw used the words double action when he really meant, single as well as double or selfcocking action.
These first type Adams arms, probably the big Adams Dragoon .50 caliber, with hammer spur SA feature, are thought to have been the S.H. & G. plain 7 Adams revolvers. The more common spurless hammer Adams, using double action only, is listed as self cocking. The Kerr revolvers presumably are not JS-Anchor guns—or are they? Beaumont’s revolvers are the late type Beaumont-Adams, mechanically identical to the guns manufactured under Adams patents by Massachusetts Arms Company. But on December 24, they delivered 115 Adams revolvers, double action, at $18; on January 20, 1862, 25 Adams revolvers, self-cocking, at $18; on February 17, 1862, 144 Adams revolvers at $18; March 1, 60 Adams revolvers at $18; March 11, 22 Adams Eng. revolvers at $18, and on March 14, 25 self-cocking revolvers at $18. The last shipment of Adams revolvers taken by the United States from Schuyler, Hartley & Graham, was 24 Adams revolvers at $18 April 23, 1862. The coincidence of price suggests all these arms were very much the same pattern of gun and, in spite of the dollar extra paid for Beaumont revolvers, when itemized separately, we tend to think these were the more common Beaumont-Adams revolver Model 1856.
Marcellus Hartley, with an eye for fancy goods, made a point of stocking the Maiden Lane store in New York with these arms in fancy cases, elaborately engraved and fitted with solid silver or German-silver flasks, moulds, and accessories. One of these BeaumontAdams fancy arms (mistakenly identified as a Tranter) is pictured in Albaugh’s book, as having been presented to General J. B. Magruder, C.S.A., and is so marked.
There is a distinct probability that this arm was obtained in New York by a Rebel sympathizer directly from Hartley’s store and smuggled South—either overland, or bounced by ship from New York to Bermuda or New Providence, and then into a Southern port.

Arms Smuggled South

This system of transshipment was one which Caleb Huse, General Gorgas, Secretary Mallory, and Commodore Bulloch had worked out to a fine art. Their two key men were Major Smith Stansbury of the Confederate States Ordnance Department and a local St. George’s, Bermuda, commission merchant, John T. Bourne. Nassau also was an important transshipping point, but Federal cruisers by August of 1862 had made things pretty hot for potential blockade runners, and Huse shifted his shipments to St. George’s. In the warehouses of Bourne, of W. L. Penno and J. W. Musson, cases marked merchandise or hardware loomed high, neatly stacked as only chests holding 20 rifles or muskets can be stacked. Combustibles there were, enough stored to blow that wharfside section of town off the map.
From these reserves kept high by shipments from Huse, Stansbury was able to make shipments on the blockade runners in response to the demands of General Gorgas. But the system was not perfect, and through the years the increasing power of the U. S. fleets, as one coastal city after another fell to the boys in blue, gradually shut off the supplies. There was soon to come an end to Major Huse’ buying spree. Huse himself summed up the scope of activities in his Memoirs:
During the first two years, the captures were so infrequent that, it may be safely stated, never before was a Government at War so well supplied with arms, munitions, clothing, and medicines—everything, in short, that an army requires—with so little money as was paid by the Confederacy. The shipment from England to the Islands in ordinary tramp steamers; the landing and storage there, and the running of the blockade, cost money; but all that was needed came from cotton practically given to the Confederate Government by its owners.
The supplies were, in every instance, bought at the lowest cash prices by men trained in the work as contractors for the British army. No credit was asked. Merchants having needed supplies were frankly told that our means were limited, and our payments would be made by cheques on Fraser, Trenholm & Co., Liverpool, an old established and conservative house. The effect of such buying was to create confidence on the part of the sellers, which made them more anxious to sell than we were to purchase. When the end came, and some of the largest sellers were ruined, I never heard a word of complaint of their being over-reached or in any manner treated unfairly.

In Defense of Huse

Huse steered a delicate course through the conflicting interests of such firms as Fraser, Trenholm, or S. Isaac, Campbell & Company. He kept them happy, in spite of the final collapse of the Confederacy. During the height of the buying when he handled million of dollars almost without possibility of searching accounting, he apparently played the game straight. He refused subsidiary compensation for his work, saying his commission in the Confederate Army was enough.
Major B. Ficklin, upon his return to the South from a tour of duty abroad, reported to Seddon on January 3, 1863 that he was convinced from things he had seen and heard, that the gun-buying Major was robbing the Confederate Government in a most shameful manner. He admitted he could not prove this in court, but he felt it his duty as a Confederate citizen to report what he had heard. But Huse had such powerful and respected people on his side as Mason and Slidell. The latter in writing to Confederate States financier McRae in Paris, February 14, 1864, described Huse as being animated by an anxious desire to perform most scrupulously and consistently, the duties entrusted to him. Huse may have achieved this reputation with Slidell when that gentleman’s colleague, James H. Mason, communicated some of Mason’s astonishment at being faced down by Huse in a firm but courteous manner some months before. As Huse recalls it, their interview went like this:

Mr. Mason . . . had, for forty years been a prominent member of the United States Senate, and seemed never to be unmindful of the presence and importance of the HonourableJames H. Mason of Virginia ... I saw but little of Mr. Mason . . . There was in Mr. Mason no magnetism to attract young men, and I do not remember ever to have asked his advice or opinion. In this he presented a strong contrast to all the other Commissioners. Mr. Slidell was as old a man and as experienced in public affairs as Mr. Mason, but he was a genial companion to younger men, and I consulted him quite . . . freely.One morning I received a note from Mr. Mason’s secretary, asking me to call at Mr. Mason’s lodgings. I lost no time in obeying the summons, and Mr. Mason lost no time in coming to business.Major, he said, I have sent for you to request you to inspect some army supplies that some of our English friends are sending over under a contract with the War Department. Without a moment’s hesitation, I replied, Mr. Mason, I will inspect the contract, and if I approve, I will inspect the goods.I cannot convey an adequate idea of the man’s astonishment. It was too great for him to express himself immediately. He was standing in front of the grate. Taking a package of finecut from his pocket, and removing from his mouth an immense quid which he threw into the grate, he replaced it with a fresh wad and, looking at me, said, Do you know who I am? Whom do you look upon as your superiors?Instantly, but very quietly, I replied, I believe you are the Honorable James M. Mason, Confederate States Commissioner to England.Yes, he replied, and in a very few days I shall be Minister of the Confederate States to the Court of St. James. 1 then said, I acknowledge no superior on this side of the ocean, in America the Secretary of War and all officers senior to me are my superiors, and especially Colonel Gorgas. from whom I receive my orders. Not only on general principles can I take no orders from you, but I have an order sent me after the Battle of Bull Run, giving me carte blanche, and directing me not to allow myself to be governed by political emissaries of the Government. Now, if you are not a political emissary the Government, I don’t know what you are.

Though Huse stated there was no more controversy, the dispute lasted some time. But we suspect Huse had a better friend in the self-important Mr. Mason
than he realized, for the integrity of Mason was not under fire. He must have appreciated the strict sense of duty which Huse showed by speaking up so quickly and refusing to allow himself to be pressured—indeed, the whole interview might have been arranged as a test to determine how Huse would react. Gorgas’ continuing faith in the loyalty and correct deportment of his young protege were upheld, and Huse was not interfered with in his special assignment for the duration.
There is a possible basis for the charges he was feathering his own nest. He may in fact have been doing so, but not at the expense of the Confederate States Government. His travels allowed him to cement relationships with leading men in the arms trade, which six years later he turned to his private account. He was living in New York, at 17 Broad Street. Then, as an American citizen, forgiven his treasonous role in being the keystone in the whole Confederate ordnance arch, he was permitted to bid in United States surplus arms at the great post-war government auctions. On October 30, 1870, Huse was awarded 13,000 Enfield muskets at $8.50 and 2,600,000 musket cartridges at $16.50 per thousand; these might have been arms which he actually bought and shipped to the South, later to be captured by the North, cleaned and repaired, and ultimately resold to him! November 15, he bought 800 Spencer rifles at $30 each and 324,576 Spencer cartridges at $18/M; and on November 25, 30,000 cartridge boxes and belts at $1.41. Huse also bid on
14,000 new Springfield rifle muskets at $10.75, but was a dollar to two dollars under the winning bids by Austin Baldwin, Herman Boker, and Hartley. Symbolically, this concluded Huse’s career in the arms field, for in America in 1870 as in the arms markets of Europe in 1861-65, he was ultimately outbid by Austin Baldwin, Herman Boker, and Marcellus Hartley.