CHAPTER 6 Rifle Muskets: Civil War Scandals

You place me in a most embarrassing position, Mr. Secretary.

How is that, Mr. Wilkeson? the gaunt-faced Pennsylvanian queried, the lines of his expression amplified by the fatigue and, somewhat, disappointment with which he laid down his role as Secretary of War for Mr. Lincoln.
Because, Mr. Cameron, the newspaperman responded, your contract for rifle muskets with the Eagle Manufacturing Company of Mansfield, Connecticut is for only 25,000 arms, and my friends there, whom I induced to engage in this business in expectation of your issuing a further order, as your assistant Mr. Scott assured me you would, will be sorely embarrassed in their operations on this small amount.
Indeed this is bad news to me, Mr. Wilkeson, War Secretary Simon Cameron sympathetically observed, as he stuffed papers from his desk drawer into a large portfolio, scanning them briefly, consigning some to the waste basket. But as you can see, I am leaving office today; I believe Mister Stanton, who replaces me, is the man you will want to see.
But cannot you issue another order to General Ripley now to have the Eagle works deliver an additional 25,000? These rifle muskets I know will be wanted, and the quantity is about the necessary breakeven number to cover their great costs in establishing a works.
Samuel Wilkeson had not come all the way to Washington on behalf of his friend, A. H. Almy, Treasurer of the Eagle Manufacturing Company, to be put off so easily if by being persistent he could gain what he wanted. The order increase to the 50,000 arms which were the terms of almost all the other contracts for Springfield Rifle Muskets, was essential to make the contract a worthwhile venture.
Cameron suddenly drew up the great chair which stood at his desk in the old War Office building, and in exhaustion sank into it, leaning back, staring at Wilkeson who leaned forward, both hands on the edge of the desk, seeking Cameron’s approval. The Secretary was tired; the preceding months had been a great strain on him; perhaps he was incompetent as so many of his enemies had said. But he had engaged in long talks with the new Chief of Ordnance, Lieutenant Colonel James W. Ripley, and agreed that two parts of a single arms program were necessary. First, that arms should be bought overseas as rapidly and in as great quantity as possible; and, secondly, that domestic manufacturers, whether they be gunmakers, or makers of plows, railroads, or sewing machines, should be given every encouragement on making the Springfield Rifle Musket which was the best arm in the world for the service.
Now Sam Wilkeson was before him asking him to add one last straw for the critics to seize upon; to increase an order from 25,000 to double the amount, a little matter of half a million dollars.
There are men in Washington who would put me in jail if they believed it possible, Cameron soberly stated to Wilkeson. Put yourself in my place. It is your last day, indeed your last hour, in an office of public trust second only to the Presidency. Would you increase the order?
No, ... no, Mr. Cameron, I must confess that I would not do so. . .
The conversation is fictional; the statements of fact are from the records. Thus ended the final day in office of one of our most controversial public figures, Simon Cameron, Lincoln’s Secretary of War from the beginning days of the conflict until the end of 1861. Perhaps Cameron was “incompetent,
yet he set into motion contracts for many hundreds of thousands of arms and although firms like the Eagle Company failed to deliver what was due, others like Colt, Sarson & Roberts, the Trenton Locomotive Works, even Sylvester Mowry and the Savage Repeating Firearms Company, supplied the essential needs of the Union from new manufactures, by the spring campaigns of 1863.
Had Cameron not committed the United States to the procurement of these arms, there would have been little chance for the North in the latter stages of the war. With one of the two Government arsenals, Harpers Ferry, in Southern hands, the musket-making capacity of the North was seriously crippled in the first days of the war. Cameron also sent afield a host of agents to scour the armories of Europe for guns. Many complaints have been leveled at the agents. But principal

The arms: From floor to ceiling like a mighty organ rise the burnished arms quoth Longfellow in his poem about Springfield Armory. Production of the improved Ml861 Rifle Musket at the National Armory was supplemented by hundreds of thousands of identical interchangeable arms made on contract.

buyers for the North, George Schuyler and later Marcellus Hartley, turned in a record of $4,000,000 spent honestly and thriftily for the Union, procuring hundreds of thousands of rifles and carbines of standard patterns and good quality.
Later Civil War historical writers have taken as literally true many of the contemporary charges that the arms supplied were junk guns, and somehow have assumed that the North went to War incredibly badly prepared. The truth is somewhere in between this exaggerated view and the converse, that there were plenty of good guns on hand, and in time. All this Cameron accomplished before he left office. Yet it is equally certain that the job was too big for him.
So hectic had the corridors of the War Office become with dozens of middlemen scurrying hither and yon with orders seeking a manufacturer, or gunmakers without orders seeking someone with that touch of patronage to get them one, that the new Secretary, Edwin M. Stanton, threw up his arms and ordered a commission to be formed to investigate the whole mess.
A former War Secretary, Judge Joseph Holt and Ohio arms agent Robert Dale Owen, together with Major P. V. Hagner, United States Ordnance inspecting officer at New York, were ordered to form a commission by Stanton’s letter of appointment March 18, 1862. Their powers were broad: to audit and adjust all contracts, orders, and claims on the War Department in respect to ordnance, arms, and ammunition, their decision to be final and conclusive as respects this department, on all questions touching the validity, execution, and sums due or to become due upon such contract . . . What Holt and Owen concluded was to be law, Stanton ordered, and no claims would be considered by the Department except such as the Commissioners had reported favorably upon. Hagner was to assist them, and the Ordnance or other branch of the War Department were ordered to supply such papers as the Commission might require to verify or study claims. As a last consideration, the Commission was to determine if any agent or employee of the War Department was directly or indirectly interested in any contract, for if the fact of such interest was established, it shall be good cause for adjudging the claim to be fraudulent.

Work of the Investigating Commission

Ohioan Owen, Judge Holt, and Major (later General) Hagner, accomplished a monumental task of sifting the claims and evidence and making the settlements in record time. Between 17 March 1862 and 1 July of that summer the Commissioners examined 104 cases* involving claims upon the Government totalling fifty million dollars. The Commissioners accepted some claims, set aside others, cancelled some contracts, renegotiated others at lower prices and in the end saved Uncle Sam some $17,000,000.
* For cases which do not pertain to the subject of small arms and which, therefore, have no meaning for the reader, details are not given. Omitted are: Cases 1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 17, 22, 23, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 40, 41, 42, 46, 49, 50, 51, 53, 57, 58, 60, 63, 66, 67, 71, 82, 86, 87, 92, 102, 103, 104, 105. 107.

Simon Cameron was condemned for corrupt contract practices while in office but his opponents studiously ignored fact he managed procurement of several hundred thousand small arms from abroad at time Union was destitute of guns.

In our desire to protect, as far as practicable, the public interests, the Commissioners reported, no private right has been infringed, nor is it believed that any one of the contractors whose engagements have been the subject of our investigations will, if provident and reasonably skillful in the execution of his contract, suffer loss, or fail to realize a fair profit. But the Commissioners were adamant in objecting to such arrangements as the interest-peddling which went on. A holder of one of these orders or contracts for Springfield muskets appeared before the Commission, as did a member of the United States Senate, and from their testimony we learned that their order had been obtained from the Secretary of War by the Senator, and that for the service he had charged and is to receive $10,000 . . . For this he holds the notes of the parties, who are responsible, and will no doubt make payment at the maturity of the paper in August and September next.
Because of the number of cases investigated, a full resume is beyond the scope of this book. The artillery manufacturers’ contracts and records are arbitrarily omitted, interesting though they be. This decision had to be taken also in the instance of sword and saber contracts. As nearly as possible, the details of the cases adjusted, together with details of the weapons supplied,

Hard-headed Edwin M. Stanton succeeded Cameron as Secretary of War, cancelled contracts and instituted investigation by Judge Holt and Robert Owen. This expert inquiry into Union arms preparedness of 1862 confirmed many orders let by Cameron but cancelled or disallowed others achieved through influence.

as far as known, will be limited to small arms and no other. Each relevant case is listed below; those more fully dealt with in other chapters, as Colt, or Remington, are noted only, then omitted from detailing in this chapter.

Partial Resume of Cases Investigated

Case No. 2. John Pondir, Philadelphia.
He contracted to furnish 10,000 Light Minie Rifles with saber bayonets, at $18.50 each, July 26, 1861. The rifles were described by Pondir as These are the beautiful Minie, which ... are at the low price of $18.50. They are a light .58 or .577 French pattern arm, of the Chasseurs de Vincennes style, back action lock, brass trim, made for Pondir under an order he placed at Liege. Barrels are blacked; long range rear sight, weight about 7#, barrel 32V4". The fabricant of these arms is unknown. Deliveries by Pondir on February 3, 19, 20, 27, March 6, and 11, totalled 2,288 arms.
The Commission recommended he be allowed to deliver the full 10,000.
Case No. 5. Richardson & Overman, see Gallager carbines in Chapter 11.
Case No. 6. G. W. Ramsdell, Austrian muskets.
Captain C. K. Garrison of New York, later distinguished as a shipping man and speculator in Civil War surplus, initially presented a specimen musket to General Fremont with an offer of the same at $27. Fremont saw a sample gun while stopping at the Astor House on his way to London to buy arms. To Cameron on 21 July, 1861 he wrote:
Sir: Captain Garrison has shown me a rifled musket of French make (Liege) rough, but well made, which I think is a good, serviceable weapon. I like it much better than the Enfield, or any others I have seen here, and would be glad to have ten thousand of them, for our western force.
A little subterfuge was injected here, for Garrison did not deliver, and his cause was taken up by Ramsdell, who offered October 31 to fill the order given to Garrison at a price $6 less with an arm equal in every respect to the one he agreed to furnish. Colonel Maynadier accepted the offer November 16, 1861, but it was not until January 13, 1862, that the guns came into the country. Ramsdell had in turn contracted with Samuel B. Smith, a New York lawyer, to obtain the guns; it was Smith who notified the Ordnance office the guns were ready for delivery. He had obtained them through Herman Boker & Company, and they were stored in a warehouse used for guns which Boker, also, had delivered to the Government.
Smith, having advanced money on this matter, was an interested party, though he signed himself Agent for George Ramsdell. He kept up a flow of letters asking that the arms be accepted and paid for. But Captain Silas Crispin, at the Ordnance Agency in New York, refused to accept the arms proffered; there seemed to be some mistake.
The sample gun, purporting to come from your office, Crispin wrote January 26, 1862, to Ripley, is at hand; and I find it, on examination, to be an Austrian rifle, calibre .715, an altered arm, said to be from the model adopted for the use of gun cotton, and known at this office as the Bulkley arm. This arm is of inferior grade, and has been purchased in this market at $10 and $10.50 per gun, about 15,000 having been purchased.
When Holt and Owen tackled the case, a hitherto unknown middleman, James Duffy of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, emerged briefly. Duffy, it appears, was a sometime employer of Ramsdell, who was a lumberman working for Mehaffy, House & Company of New York, of which firm I am a member, said Duffy in deposition. Captain Garrison meanwhile asked Duffy if he could sell an arm like the Chasseur de Vincennes. Duffy took the sample gun to Washington, was informed that $29 was too high a price. Fremont, having seen the Vincennes rifle, okayed the purchase; Garrison brought the telegram to Duffy who again went to Washington to see Secretary Cameron; then he was turned over to Colonel Ripley (Brevet Brigadier General).
He disparaged the gun, said Duffy; said he would not pay that price; that neither the gun that Garrison
had offered as a sample nor the one I proposed to substitute for it was worth anything; and in answer to the question, ‘Whether there was $6 difference between the guns?’ replied, ‘both together are not worth $6.’ When Duffy reported this conversation to Assistant Secretary Thomas A. Scott, the rejoinder was, If the gun business were left to General Ripley, the Government would get no guns.
Duffy thereupon used Ramsdell’s name, as the two were sometime partners as well as employee and employer. Holt and Owen unscrambled the matter by getting Smith, who had bought the guns to fill Duffy’s contract, for a considerable profit share, off to one side and suggesting that if he wanted to salvage anything out of this tangle he had better make a counter proposition. Smith agreed, and the Commission agreed to accept such of the 10,000 remodeled Austrian rifles as the Ordnance Agency would accept that were in every way equal to the second sample gun. All 10,000 apparently were satisfactory, and payment for them in the sum of $110,000 was made out to Ramsdell on August 29, 1862. Only 9,500 were .71 caliber; 500 were listed as Austrian rifles, caliber .69, but were accepted. Smith in making a counter proposal of $14.50 which the Commissioners reduced to $11 noted that the sample gun was iron mounted; that some, he was informed by Boker, were brass mounted.
The exact model of arm purchased by the Government in lieu of the light and elegant Vincennes carabine desired by Fremont is difficult to identify perfectly. But it had a sword bayonet, was an Austrian gun remodeled, and of .71 caliber; yet it resembled the Vincennes arm to some extent. In Chapter 8 is illustrated such an arm, having a Consol-Augustin remodeled lockplate of 1846 vintage, and a musket barrel of 1830 date, percussioned and fitted with stud for saber bayonet. The mountings are of iron and the weapon is a simulation, using Austrian musket parts, of the Vincennes or Enfield short rifles with sword. It is believed to have constituted one of the C. K. Garrison lot as actually delivered by Boker.
This particular rifle was purchased from the firm Ancion-Marx Fabriques d’Armes in Liege in 1961 by the writer. Its peripatetic history is only conjectural, but reasonable: From Boker’s store house it went to Fremont; did some service but not much in the Army of the West; was retired and remained in depot in St. Louis until sold about 1867. From there it went back to Liege to the agent of Francis Bannerman who in later years was that corporate identity known as Ancion-Marx, amalgamation of the firm Ancion & Cie. with other interests. It remained in Liege, from where it. had come, for almost a century. The price paid in 1961 was $23; a mean between the original $26 asked, and the $21 at which Garrison-Ramsdell-Smith-Duffy & Company proposed to sell.
The gun is a good one, cheaply made but hardly inviting the abuse and condemnation which later generations have heaped upon the head of General Fremont. It would be wise to remember that the rifle he

Doctrinaire General James W. Ripley, Union Chief of Ordnance, considered the Springfield Rifle Musket the best arm in the world for infantry. He was right, as events proved. Ripley had been C.O. at Springfield 1841-1854.

approved, and the rifle Ripley, Maynadier, Crispin, Holt, and Owen ultimately supplied to him, were not one and the same quality of arm.
Case No. 7. Manhattan Arms Company. See Chapter 23, Yankee Revolvers.
Case No. 8. Ben Mills.

Mr. Mills was evidently an officer or employee of the machine shop of Ainslee & Cochran, at Louisville, Kentucky. Holt & Owen recommended payment of their account for the full $ 151.70, for inspecting, repairing, and sighting the arms in the hands of the 19th Regiment, Kentucky Volunteers training at Camp Harrod. Eight men were on the job of making special lathe tools for aligning barrels and sights perfectly, and they worked on the regiment’s arms from about 3:30 p.m. of a Saturday, all of Saturday night, and Sunday until 2 p.m., for which we had to pay double wages, as Ainslee & Cochran complained. Their account was paid in full.
Case No. 10. Hedden & Hoey, 50,000 Prussian muskets to be delivered under order from Ripley dated November 23, 1861.

John Hoey, arms importer, in cooperation with Josiah Heddon (who possibly supplied the cash) had proposed to deliver 50,000 muskets within a specified time. Up to the date of termination of their contract they shipped 28,000 which had been accepted by the Government. Of these, 16,000 were shipped to Kentucky and placed in service. Hoey introduced a note from J. F. Speed of Kentucky, stating that Our men liked them as well as any guns sent us, except the Springfield musket. During the summer of 1861 he had caused some of them to be rifled, but Speed found this to be a useless expense, since the musket is now preferred to the rifle.
I can say of you, Speed wrote to Hoey, that at a time when we were sorely pressed for arms, and our state invaded, you rendered us valuable service, and through your instrumentality we procured arms at fair prices and of good quality, for which I desire to thank you.
While Holt and Owen were getting around to the case, in that Ordnance had declined to accept an additional 22,000 muskets offered, Hoey wrote to Lincoln. The President passed on his opinion to Stanton that the arms ought to be accepted, since the time delay was so slight and there appeared to be still need for the muskets. But Stanton would not interject his own opinion into the matter, stating to Holt and Owen, as he enclosed Lincoln’s observations, that Designing that in the action of the department all claims and contracts shall stand on the same ground, this contract is referred to you, with the President’s order, to be acted upon according to your judgment and the facts that shall appear in respect to the conformity of the arms, with the terms of the contract. Perhaps Stanton was heavy-handed in many of his methods, but this straightline backing up of his subordinate appointees reflects an unbending impartiality in his conscience.
The Commissioners had checked into the quality and serviceability of these Prussian guns, arms which very likely George Schuyler had inspected and declined to purchase. H & H were altering the cones to take the smaller U.S. musket cap. Said Captain Crispin, The arm is the Prussian smoothbore musket, of the model previous to 1839, altered from flintlock to percussion, caliber .70, weight 11 pounds. The plan of alteration from flint to percussion, of both lock and barrel, has, I believe, secured as much strength and durability as can be obtained in an altered arm. The lock appears to be a strong and serviceable one; the barrel is about 41 inches in length, and compares favorably in manufacture with the generality of smoothbore ones. The stock and mountings appear strong. The arm, however, has not been manufactured with much regard to smoothness and neatness of finish. They are all either old or have been in service . . . Permit me to suggest ... the propriety of using the ‘Nessler’ ball as a projectile for them. Its weight is about the same as the round ball, and it is stated by reliable European authorities that by its use the smoothbore musket has an accurate and effective range of 300 or 400 yards, or at least double that obtained by using the spherical projectile.
Crispin concluded his remarks by a flattering observation that . . the majority of arms heretofore delivered by Messrs. Hedden & Hoey have been pronounced by the inspector, Mr. W. W. Marston, superior to the sample, and the rejections but few.” Though Boker had supplied similar muskets at $5.50 each, the H & H price of $7 each was confirmed by the Commissioners. In view of their responsible attitude and conduct, the 10 days lateness was overlooked, and the balance of 22,000 Prussian altered muskets, long ready for delivery, were ordered accepted and paid for.
Between the spring of 1861 and November 5, 1862, John Hoey also delivered thousands of assorted rifles and muskets, Potsdam rifled muskets, Remington-Maynard transformed U.S. rifled muskets, Chasseurs de Vincennes arms and other types, including 8,999 Tower muskets at $7.50 each, to an aggregate value of just under a half million dollars.

Desire to equip U.S. forces uniformly motivated letting of large contracts for Springfield guns by Ripley and Cameron. Platoon of 6th Maine here shown after barrel of Fredericksburg was equipped with Ml855 RM (3rd from left), Long Enfield .577 (4th & 5th), Ml861 RM without patchbox (6th) and, (10th) 1859 2-band Enfield taking socket bayonet, unusual cut-down for short soldier.

Orison Blunt contracted to deliver Enfield rifles made in the US. Shown is Long Enfield (bottom) by Blunt, fraudulently marked Tower and ‘ crown.” Proofmark is Oval around DP over B. Hammer shape, cone seat differ from genuine TowerBirmingham British government short Enfield shown above it. Barrel, walnut stock, bear serial number 1.

Case No. 13. Colt’s Arms Company, Rifled muskets. See Chapter 25, Colt’s Goes to War.
Case No. 14. Orison Blunt, Enfield Rifled Muskets.
Orison Blunt, then at 118 Ninth Street, New York, was a practical gunmaker of considerable experience but did not always have sufficient capital. In 1847 he had been called upon to make the prototype revolver under direction of Samuel Colt for approval by Captain Walker, U.S. Mounted Rifles. This large .44 sixshooter, considerably modified from the Blunt model arm, became the celebrated Walter Colt and later, still further modified, the pattern for the Dragoon revolvers. At the same time, it appears Blunt was associated with Syms in either importing or fabricating completely in this country, a pepperbox revolver of the basic Mariette Franco-Belgian design. A Blunt & Syms type pepperbox in the writer’s collection is marked on the barrel face R-C and 45, suggesting that the machine shop maker was known as R-C and the 45 is the serial number, it appearing in several other places. The gun is otherwise unmarked. But Blunt & Syms had a large importing business on Chatham Street, and were otherwise active before the war.
With the outbreak of fighting, Orison Blunt evidently tried to go it alone. He proposed to import 20,000 Enfield rifled muskets, and also during the same delivery period, to furnish 20,000 Enfield rifled muskets, caliber .58, made in the United States. On September 10, 1861, General Ripley informed Blunt the Secretary declined to accept the imported Enfields but would take the U.S.-made guns, as many as you can manufacture in this country by the first day of January next, at $18 per arm, including appendages. The arms were to be inspected and none would be accepted but those which passed inspection.
With less than four months in which to work, I immediately commenced preparing my factory building, machinery, and tools, said Blunt, and have gone to great expense, knowing that the Government would require this arm. I am now all in working order. After the deadline, Blunt reported to Stanton on February 6, 1862,    I can produce 500 to 1,000 per month, like the two I now present, which I have made myself, and which are like the pattern gun filed in the Ordnance office. I am a practical manufacturer of guns and understand it in all its branches, and can make any part of the gun with my own hands. I would respectfully submit that the War Department will extend the time for the manufacture of these guns at least one year, with permission to turn in from 500 to 1,500 per month.
Stanton tossed the ball to Holt and Owen. Blunt further described the details of his preparations. Ripley recommended that Blunt’s request be acceded to, to deliver 1,000 per month from January 1862 to January 1863,    12,000 in all. As Blunt understood it, the parts not to interchange, but to be equal as sample I deposited with you. The Commissioners found for the plaintiff a little differently: they directed that an order be given to him for as many as he could make up to July, 1862, not to exceed 3,000 in all.
The exact model of Enfield supplied by Blunt has been a matter for speculation. There exists a species of 39-inch barrel long Enfield, not usually found with any European marks, marked upon the lockplate with a shield surmounted by an eagle, and the letter M in the shield. The meaning of the letter M is unknown; such arms are thought to be of Blunt’s fabrication: at least Claud E. Fuller (The Rifled Musket) and Robert Riley (essay in Gun Report, A Blunt or What?) examine that belief. But there are some details which do not jibe entirely. Because Blunt later pleaded to be permitted to furnish non-interchangeable guns, these M guns would seem to fall within the classification. But several with British (Birmingham and London) proved barrels are known. Others have strange cyphers, not too legible, of interlaced three letters in the location where proof marks are commonly found, left round of breech. This usage seems odd, though not necessarily impossible, for a U.S.-made barrel.
Blunt was quite certain as to the origins of his barrels, as on January 15 he wrote, My men are making 300 barrels per week, and can increase to any reasonable extent necessary, so that I am now prepared to furnish the government with from two to five hundred Enfield pattern muskets per month. This suggests Blunt’s shop was quite small, though respectable for one-man ownership. His barrel men also had to turn their hands to finishing other parts; say one week to make 300 barrels; then a week to make locks; half a week to make stocks; and the rest of the month putting them together and finishing.

Blunt Enfield lock has never been on a genuine Enfield, as screw boss to rear of curved bridle is undrilled. Instead, rear lock screw was passed into plate where hole is shown in line with hammer.

But all these calculations were mere conjectures of rate of production, for Blunt never achieved any particular rate. A very rare and hitherto improperly identified Enfield rifle which most nearly conforms to the Blunt order is shown by Fuller as The J. P. Moore Rifled Musket, his plate No. XLVII. The illustration shows a clamping band Enfield long rifle, otherwise undistinguished; the lockplate is unmarked outside. Says Fuller in describing this: It is of the regular Enfield type throughout, but the barrel is 40 inches long, caliber .58, and rifled with three wide lands. The total length is 56 inches, and the weight is 10 pounds, 9 ounces, which is more than a pound and a half heavier than the regular Enfield. The rear sight is of the regular

Muzzle of Blunt Enfield three-grooved is contrasted with normal 5-groove rifling at muzzle of new Pryse & Redman British Enfield. Blunt rifling has been deepened slightly at muzzle and barrel is faced off flat and not crowned.

Enfield type, soldered in place, and, in place of the usual British proof marks, the barrel is stamped on the left side near the breech with DP over B in a quarterinch oval.
With stock of American black walnut, this arm definitely would seem to conform to some U.S. order, but which? Admittedly not knowing, Fuller chooses to place this gun with notes on the John P. Moore order furnished June 10 and June 30, 1862, a total of 1,080 American rifles, long Enfield pattern, with appendages, $15.00. But more logically, would be rifles marked M for Moore, and rifles bearing somewhere a B, for Blunt. Could not the odd proof stamp Fuller notes, a DP over B in an oval, be for something like Definitive Proved, Blunt? As Blunt made his own barrels, he would have proof tested them. This unmarked gun has a 40-inch barrel, essential in finding a U.S.-made Enfield to conform to the Blunt order. The M marked Enfield is with a 39-inch barrel.
Accessory to the notion of unmarked locks is the finding recently by an Eastern gun-parts dealer of a small lot of Enfield lock plates. They were in a box tagged American and are of first class machine workmanship, but unmarked and unmounted. They are nicely casehardened, and of especial interest is the screw thread selected for the lockplate side nails or stock screws; screws from an English Enfield will not fit. American screws from a Springfield will fit. Could these not be the leftovers from the Blunt order, of which but a very few were ever delivered, possibly only the 500 pieces later mentioned? For Blunt, even after Holt & Owen were done with him, had problems. Ripley and Thornton were determined to throw every block possible into the path of those who continued to want to make nonstandard non-Springfield pattern arms.
By March 31, 1862, Blunt had 200 guns ready for delivery. Ripley told him he would not inspect less than 500. By May 13, six weeks later, Blunt had 500 ready, a production rate of 50 per week or somewhat less than he expected to furnish. Ripley then told Blunt that the model musket was not on hand in the Ordnance Office, and unless Blunt had it, there would be a delay until Major Thornton could be furnished with an approved pattern musket from which to inspect.
Blunt replied to Ripley that if he would look about his office, he would find it, adding:
The gun was examined and a parchment card tied to the gun, and the Ordnance seal stamped upon it, and I wrote my name on the card. This was all done under the direction and supervision of Colonel Maynadier, and I left it with him. The gun was put into a gray satinet cover, and then put into an India Rubber (waterproof) cover. I think there is no doubt but it is in your office somewhere.
At last the misplaced rifle was forwarded to Thornton, in Crispin’s office in New York. But the U.S. inspector there, G. G. Saunders, complained that the barrels had been rifled, thus preventing him from proof testing them in the white state for the provisional proof required by the Government. And Thornton

Often confused with Blunt Enfield is mysterious Enfield marked on lock with spread eagle and shield, and M in field of shield. Dates to 1863 are seen on lockplate before hammer. Specimen shown is Enfield eagle-M short rifle, with notched bayonet stud taking bayonet which has catch that does not lock at rear of stud like regular Enfield bayonet. Long Enfield rifles of this marking are believed to have been supplied by John P. Moore’s sons, allegedly made in the U.S. Short rifle shown, in Smithsonian collection, is dated 1863 though preference was for Long Enfields.

sought to inspect each and every part of the arm in detail.

Often confused with Blunt Enfield is mysterious Enfield marked on lock with spread eagle and shield, and M in field of shield. Dates to 1863 are seen on lockplate before hammer. Specimen shown is Enfield eagle-M short rifle, with notched bayonet stud taking bayonet which has catch that does not lock at rear of stud like regular Enfield bayonet. Long Enfield rifles of this marking are believed to have been supplied by John P. Moore’s sons, allegedly made in the U.S. Short rifle shown, in Smithsonian collection, is dated 1863 though preference was for Long Enfields.
sought to inspect each and every part of the arm in detail.
Blunt had three rooms set aside for the use of the inspectors, but he refused to allow this detailed inspection. He claimed it was not in agreement with his order as ratified by Holt and Owen; neither would I have taken any order for arms if they were to require the above proof and inspection, and it was distinctly understood that my guns were to be inspected when ready for delivery, and to be equal to the sample deposited in the Ordnance office.
But Thornton was firm, and no guns, apparently, were ever received from Blunt. I consequently stopped my works, he wrote later, in airing the matter through a brochure published by cannoneer Norman Wiard. According to this brochure, quoted by Fuller, Blunt was a gunmaking anachronism in head-on collision with governmental preference for large capital and machine manufacture. Blunt’s philosophy is interesting, for he sought to introduce the setting up system abandoned by the British during 1855, saying:
I should have adopted the European plan of manufacturing, which is as follows:
Establish a proof house with a government inspector or officer, to test the strength of every barrel, so that any one could make a barrel, take it to the proof house, have it proved and the proof house mark stamped upon it.
Then next, to establish a style of lock and mounting, ramrod, and bayonet. Let any one make the same that could make them according to pattern. The Stocker and finisher could purchase barrel, lock, mountings, ramrod, and bayonet, and finish their arms every week with little or no capital invested. The arms would then be all of the same pattern, same kind of mounting, same kind of barrel, same size caliber, and the same length of bayonet, consequently the arms would appear to the eye the same in every particular; and no part should be required to interchange, except the bayonet, ramrod and the cones.
There is no other arm manufactured beside the Springfield Rifled Musket, to any extent, that all the parts interchange, which as experience shows, is unnecessary.
I am satisfied that there is great room for improvement in small arms and ammunition, and the mode of manfacturing them, and I think the day is not far distant when we shall have an entire change in the construction of the same.
Case No. 15. Herman Boker & Company. For 150,000 muskets. See Chapter 22, Continental Arms.
Case No. 16. W. V. Barkalow, 26,000 English long Enfield rifles.
The commission determined that Barkalow in his
nondelivery was an innocent victim of international affairs. He had commenced to fill his contract but the Queen’s embargo caused him to suspend further work in England. Upon his return, though he was again able to ship guns, the United States suspended purchases until Stanton’s commissioners could look over the contracts. They decreed that since Barkalow was irrevocably committed to the manufacturers, to take 6,000 Enfields, that the order be confirmed to 8,000, the first delivery of 2,000 to be made before 1 June, 1862, and the final delivery completed on or before 1 September, 1862. Between April 26 and July 18 Barkalow delivered 8,000 guns for the full $160,000 due him, at $20 a gun. They were carried by the Inman line of (propeller) steamships, the Cunard liners of the day.
Case No. 17. Horstmann Brothers & Company, Philadelphia, Swords.
Case No. 18. Silas Dingee & Company, New York, 53,500 Austrian rifles. See Continental Arms, Chapter 22.
Case No. 19. T. Poultney, Smith’s patent Carbines. See Yankee Carbines, Chapter 11.
Case No. 20. H. Holthausen, 32,000 foreign muskets. See Chapter 22.
Case No. 21. Alfred Jenks & Son, Philadelphia, Springfield Rifled Muskets.
Jenks had obtained a contract 13 July, 1861 to furnish 25,000 Springfield Rifled Muskets. Though Model 1855 was spoken of, the primerless 1861 was built. On October 5, 1861, the contract was increased to 50,000 by direction of Cameron, and Jenks accepted, inquiring, Shall we continue, after the completion of our present contract, to use the present model, or do you design furnishing us with the last improved model?
This reference was to the 1861 Spe cial Model that Colt and two other contractors were preparing to furnish; the changes would cost Jenks something in tooling and he doubtless assumed any prices would have to be adjusted accordingly. Jenks’ firm was called Bridesburg Machine Works, and 1861 rifle muskets so stamped are of his delivery, fabricated principally at the town of Bridesburg, Pennsylvania, near Philadelphia. However, a few specimens of Ml861 Springfields
have been observed marked Philadelphia in the usual place in front of the hammer. The actual place of manufacture of these muskets has been questioned, but they are believed offered by Jenks under his contract.
As sureties for a second contract issued 15 December1863, for 50,000 Model 1863 Springfields, Alfred Jenks Sr. and his son Barton, appeared in association with Joseph G. Mitchell and John M. Mitchell, also Robert B. Cabeen, the latter two as sureties on the contract, and one William Whitaker, a manufacturer. Whitaker of Philadelphia was surety in the amount of $50,000, which would have been forfeited to the United States if there were delays on the contract. But Whitaker had been called in under unusual conditions; both John Mitchell and Cabeen were also sureties, $50,000 each, as required by the contract law. However, Judge Cadwalader, who took the oaths of the sureties, was not satisfied that these two were each worth enough more than $50,000, to make it possible for them to pay the Government should a claim arise. Therefore Whitaker appeared and testified to the Judge that he was worth $150,000, a great deal more than the sums needed, and his bond was taken in addition.
For Whitaker to have such a great interest suggests that he was a partner financially and possibly production-wise in the Jenks muskets. What he did can only be conjectured, but from Philadelphia on September 27, 1862, Alfred Jenks & Son wrote an enigmatic letter to P. H. Watson, Assistant Secretary of War:
We have on hand five hundred muskets of our manufacture, complete in every part, which are equally as serviceable as those delivered to the Government. They have, however, marks on the surface, which prevent us from offering them under our contract. They have stood government proof, and are worth eighteen dollars each, but we will dispose of them at seventeen dollars if they will be accepted by the department.
On November 11 Major Hagner reported that Of 549 offered, 85 are rejected, and 464 are serviceable; of these 132 are worth $17 and 332 not more than $16 each with appendages. On November 15 Colonel Maynadier ordered the guns taken at these figures. Payment was made to Jenks on December 5 for these guns at the rates quoted. Could these have been Philadelphia guns? Too few of the Philly-stamped muskets exist to suggest any large quantity existed. Perhaps Jenks had begun to tool up and stamp them Philadelphia, and had to change to Bridesburg in conformity with some Ordnance wish to have the location of the factory actually stamped on the guns? It is possible they were made up for some would-be Government patronage-seeker, perhaps for surety for Whitaker? Jenks did fabricate for other contractors, a situation which caused him delay and embarrassment in the beginning stages of production. They planned for quantities greater than the first 25,000, and bought tools accordingly. But they ran the risk of forfeit from nondelivery and so came before Holt and Owen at the end of March. Joseph G. Mitchell appeared stating:
We have [as of March 28, 1862] 14,000 arms passing through our establishment. We have none boxed as yet. We have only one [Government] inspector which is not sufficient. We have been delayed in our work, because a defective model was furnished us from Springfield Armory [Could the Philadelphia-marked guns be first production after the defective model?]. The octagon, cone-seat, and breech pin were defective. We have now six men at Springfield examining machinery, etc.
In five months we will furnish all the guns now overdue on our contract. It takes 13,000 guns on hand to turn out 200 per day. Our establishment can make 240 guns per day of ten hours. We have a contract with John Rice (which see) to furnish stocks and tips for him. We have finished 20 guns interchangeable in all respects except barrels. We are making all of the gun, except the barrel, sight, and stock, for Sarson & Roberts for 25,000. We have delivered to Sarson & Roberts almost everything under this contract.
Deliveries from August 16, 1862, through December 31, 1862, were sporadic in lots of 1,000 which the inspectors broke down into first, second, and third grade arms, paying between $16 and $20. Even the first grade arms were sometimes a shade off; $19.90 instead of the perfection demanded for $20. By January 13, 1863, no more foolishness was tolerated. Jenks Was turning out guns right on the button, and they were accepted by the thousands weekly at the full price of $20 until the end of the war. Then, some 6,000 which were slightly overdue were accepted at $19 and the Bridesburg Machine Works could look with pride at supplying not only 98,000 accepted Springfields, plus the 464 with marks upon them, but Saron & Roberts and Rice as well.
Case No. 24. Alexis Godillot, Paris & New York, Lefaucheux & Perrin revolvers and French rifled muskets. See Chapter 23.

Soldier’s kit might include Hardee’s Rifle & Light Infantry Tactics if he was bucking for promotion but more essential was Rifle Musket (Norwich contract piece supplied by Mowry shown) with muzzle tompion, ammo, and caps. Drill books were owned by Mayor of Toledo, Ohio, John C. Manor.

Case No. 25. E. Remington & Sons, Ilion, New York, 10,000 Regulation rifles, with sword bayonets. (Special Remington Zouave rifle 1862.) See Chapter 25.
Case No. 26. Henry J. Ibbotson, New York, 20,000 Enfield rifles. The Commission directed that insofar as Ibbotson had gone to Europe with money, and had shipped a small number of the guns before the Queen’s proclamation temporarily cut off shipments, the contract in full was null and void but that the guns he had in the United States if equal to the contract price, should be accepted and paid for. A total of 2,050 Enfield long rifles at $18.28Vs were accepted May 5, 1862; 87 at the rate of $16,281/8 the same day; all paid for May 19.
Case No. 28. Strobell & Company, Gibbs patent breech-loading carbines. See also Yankee Carbines, Chapter 11. Strobell & Company made an offer to fabricate or supply 10,000 Gibbs patent breech-loading carbines to Ripley. The general countered by ordering
5,000. But no contract was actually made. A contract was subsequently made with another party to furnish the carbines. Strobell & Company were left out entirely and received no compensation nor did they deliver any guns.
Case No. 36. Lamson, Goodnow and Yale, Springfield rifled muskets, Special pattern 1861.
This is one of the more famous firms to emerge from the Civil War in a stable and prosperous condition. When Robbins & Lawrence failed, in overcapitalizing but not receiving a British contract for 300,000 Enfield rifles, their assets in Windsor, Vermont, were acquired by a triumvirate, E. G. Lamson, A. F. Goodnow, and B. B. Yale, operating as Lamson, Goodnow & Yale. At the close of the War in 1865 Goodnow and Yale bowed out; Lamson carried on as E. G. Lamson & Company, and the writer owned an almost new condition rifle musket dated 1865, marked E. G. Lamson instead of the more usual three name company stamp. This did not have the usual inspectors’ stamps on the stock, and apparently had not been accepted by the United States Government; though three tiny 1/32 inch-high letter stamps were to be seen on the stock flat opposite lockplate. For a brief time the firm was known as Windsor Mfg. Co.; then in 1869 R. L. Jones joined the firm and ten years later became partner in Jones & Lamson. This firm took over the machine tool business which the three partners had founded in the War to supply other musket makers, and in 1889 removed to Springfield, Vermont, where the company today is one of the nation’s largest and most progressive machine tool makers.
On 11 July 1861 L G & Y took a contract issued by Ripley to make 25,000 of the new Colt-pattern rifle muskets, at $20. About 11 September they first received a model musket from Springfield; the 60 days’ delay caused them embarrassment, as their contract called for first deliveries in six months; and October 7 they received an increase in the order by another 25,000 arms.
Barrels were ordered from N. Washburn, Worcester, Massachusetts, welded iron, bored and in the rough state, and were processed to finished condition in two works: first at the Bay State Works, Northampton, Massachusetts, and at the barrel mill of Cooper & Hewett. The Bay State Arms Company is listed as working at Oxbridge, Massachusetts, about 1870-75, making single-shot target rifles and pistols. It is probable this gunmaking venture grew out of the Bay State Works venture into barrel making for L G & Y. Bayonets and ramrods were also made for L G & Y at Bay State.
Locks and bands were made at a factory owned by the triumvirate in Shelbum Falls, Massachusetts, a cutlery shop, which on occasion had employed 400 workmen. By February 8, 1862, they reported 25,000 of some parts already finished, and large quantities of other parts ready or in process. Also at Shelburn they had 70 men working on making drop forging tools for this Special Model for Springfield Armory, as at the time it appeared likely that Springfield would put this model into production as soon as it could. As of February, Springfield Armory had six drops in operation forging parts for the 1861 Special Model musket as made by L G & Y. The Windsor works was also busy making up special gauges and other tools for Springfield to use in production work. At Windsor the machine tool manufacture was concentrated, and there they turned out not only equipment needed for their own gun work, but stockmaking machines for Amoskeag (they had turned a stock finished except for ramrod groove by April, 1862 at Windsor) and stock machinery for Providence Tool Company while in musket production. We are ahead of the armory in this pattern, and we are to get up gauges for the armory while finishing our own, said Mr. Goodnow before the Commissioners.
The decision of Holt and Owen was fair, affirming the contracts, and allowing a grace period on account of the lateness of their receiving the model arm from Springfield. Deliveries between September 24, 1862, and December 10, 1864, indicate payments at $20, $19.90, $19, $18, $17.50, and $16, the Commission taking advantage of the late delivery to the extent of declaring the arms should be assessed at less than contract prices if not perfect. This decision of the Commission was taken upon their being satisfied that $20 allowed an exorbitant profit on any contract exceeding
10,000 or 15,000 arms, and the inspectors in New York cut the prices accordingly. L G & Y delivered their 50,000, and apparently assembled some few later on as E. G. Lamson & Company for private or militia sale.
Case No. 37. Providence Tool Company, 50,000 rifle muskets.
This firm also continued in the gun business beyond the span of the War years and made notable contributions to ordnance engineering and to the sporting rifle

Basic infantry arm of Union was Ml861 RM improved over 1855 type by omitting patchbox. Soldiers found primer door cover also objectionable as it flipped loose when catch became weak, rattling and losing caps. Contract piece shown was delivered by either Burt or Hodge, is marked Trenton.

scene. Their Peabody and Peabody-Martini Creedmoor long range match rifles were without peer in the target rifle field, achieving the recognition as competitive rifles that the Sharps achieved in the sporting rifle field. They pioneered a practical breechloader and sold many hundreds of thousands of them to Turkey. Modified by the Swiss designer Martini it became the British service rifle and is today still popular wherever usage suggests the propriety of a single shot system.
John B. Anthony, treasurer and prime mover of Providence Tool Company, took a contract for 25,000 rifle muskets, increased by an additional 25,000, on 13 July ’61 and 26 November ’61. Formerly makers of ship hardware, Providence Tool acquired a new shop and installed complete machinery for gunmaking. They claimed to have the first set of barrel rolling machines in the United States, and had obtained 200 tons of English Marshall iron to replace barrel blanks obtained from Washburn which had proved inferior quality.
Redfield of New York was to furnish the first 3,000-5,000 stocks; afterwards the Windsor machinery from L G & Y would fill the quota. They exclusively contracted the production of a forging and machine shop at Freetown, Massachusetts, for sights. This shop is under our control, and cannot make for others without our permission. Bayonets and ramrods were made at the ship’s chandlery shop in Providence.
For gauges, they hired a machine shop in Springfield and had their own men make up the inspection tools, constantly checkings their work against the tools at Springfield Armory. The pattern guns given out at Springfield are not model guns suitable for making the gauges by, and therefore we have had to start a shop at Springfield, and get opportunities to verify our work by the true models as we could.
Between December 18, 1862, and May 25, 1865, Providence Tool Company delivered 70,000 rifled muskets, the majority being graded Class 1. Most were accepted at $20, others at 10 off, $19.90, $19, $18.90. From May, 1864, deliveries were on the third order, a contract for 32,000 arms at $19 each.
Some of these rifles were in 1866 transformed by the tip-down breech of General Benjamin S. Roberts to breechloaders. An almost new specimen of this pattern was purchased from the shop of Mr. Johnson, 16 Quai du Louvre, Paris, by the writer in 1948. The condition of the arm suggested it had been recently removed from a case of muskets, possibly sold to France in 1870.
Case No. 38. Durrie & Rusher, Enfield rifles.
As no arms were received by the United States under contract, the reader will not be referred to any detailing of this contract in Chapter 22. However, it is interesting to consider that the agent of these men, Mr. Francis Preston, of Manchester, England, did ship about 3,600 long Enfield rifles and 96 short Enfields with sword bayonets, which, as they were refused under their contract, were sold by them at assessed prices on the open market to the U. S. agent at New York, apparently Crispin. Because of late deliveries, occasioned by the Queen’s Proclamation, Holt and Owen took the opportunity to wiggle out of validating the contract and it was declared null and void.
Case No. 39. J. P. Fitch, 75,000 English Enfield rifles.
In this case, too, the Queen’s Proclamation having cause nondelivery, the Government in the order having reserved the right to take them or not if delivery was not on schedule, elected through Holt and Owen to not take the rifles, and Fitch’s order was cancelled.
Case No. 43. W. A. Wheeler, 50,000 Rifled Muskets.
This case was decided against Wheeler, and no arms were received. However, the handling of it by Holt, Owen, and ultimately Stanton, was far from objective, though the interests of the Government, that is, cutting off the spiraling supply of contract rifle muskets, were served.
Wheeler was written an order for 50,000 rifle muskets at $20 December 24, 1.861. But this order, though signed by Ripley and ready to go out, was left in Assistant Secretary Thomas Scott’s desk when he and Cameron left office. It appeared to the Commissioners, and to Stanton on appeal, that the purpose of the Government being thus inchoate and unconsummated, the deal was not officially made. Wheeler, in March, 1862, came to the Ordnance office and from the letter book received a certified copy of his acceptance order, and then endorsed that to show he had taken the order and was getting to work on it. Holt and Owen did not approve the copy as the original, and Stanton upheld their move. The contract is interesting because of the first statements Wheeler made in his original letter to Cameron proposing to make rifle muskets:

Washington, D. C. November 18, 1861

Sir: I have obtained, in connexion with a number of capitalists in New York, the control of one of the largest manufacturing establishments in the country, which can readily be converted into a manufactory for arms, which enables me to make the following proposition, viz:
I will furnish 100,000 stand of the most approved muskets, with interchangeable parts, equal in every respect to the best Springfield pattern, without the Maynard primer attached to lock, which I learn has been abandoned by the Government— delivery as follows: within six months from the date of the contract, 5,000 in thirty days; thereafter 6,000; and within each succeeding thirty days, 8,000, until the entire number is delivered. The arms to be delivered at Governor’s Island, or such other arsenal in or near New York as the Government may direct, and be subject to usual inspection by an officer of the United States Army.

Your obedient Servant,

Wm. A Wheeler

First, Wheeler had control (at least provisionally or temporarily) of a very large plant. His estimated production offers are five to eight times the norm achieved by other factories, even experienced arms firms, as they all seemed to lay their plans for producing 1,000 muskets a month. Wheeler hoped to make 8,000 monthly, an enormous total for those days. A large factory near New York controlled by other speculators was the Trenton Locomotive Machine Shop at Trenton, New Jersey, where a few arms were turned out. One conjecture, from his assertions that he wanted to deliver at New York or near New York, is that he was considering doing the work here.

Second, while he refers to the Springfield without Maynard primer (1861 model) he does not precisely state he will make Ml861 Springfield muskets but an interchangeable arm, of the most approved pattern, which is equal in every respect to the best Springfield pattern. It is possible to read this sentence with a double entendre, that is, that he proposed to furnish a Springfield musket which would be equal to the Springfield pattern musket, of the best finish and detail. But it seems less subtle and more common to interpret this as a claim to making a musket which is like the Springfield in not having the Maynard primer, and is of the most approved pattern, and is equal to the Springfield. The only arm of this nature considered in the context of the times is the Enfield long rifled musket. Yet Wheeler does not say flat out, Enfields. The puzzle may never be unravelled as to the model of arm Wheeler hoped to make, and where he hoped to make it.
Case No. 44. Wm. F. Brooks of New York, 10.000 Gibbs carbines and 10,000 Springfield rifled muskets. For Gibbs carbines, see Yankee Carbines, Chapter 11.
The Springfield musket contract was annulled due to nondelivery. Brooks was associated with William W. Marston, New York gunmaker and inventor of the Marston breech-loading pistols and rifles. His armory though small was complete. He proposed to make the Springfields after he had finished the carbines, using stock tools for the Springfields that had been running on carbine parts. Result was no Springfields, and Brooks lost his chance by order of Holt and Owen.
Case No. 45. Samuel B. Smith of New York, 40,000 Austrian .54 rifles, reduced by Commissioners to 20,000. This, too, is a short item; Smith proposed to deliver 40,000 arms as per sample, he having bought the Lorenz rifle a tige with leaf sight at Boker’s and brought it to Washington. The proposition was accepted by Ripley at $20 a gun, though he was then soon buying the same rifle direct from Boker through Crispin at only $15 each. After kicking the ball back and forth, a compromise was reached at $16 for all up to 20,000. Some block sights were in the lot; but leaf and block sighted guns were accepted at $16. A total of 9,667 Austrian rifled muskets and appendages in bond at $16 were paid for to Samuel B. Smith on August 29, 1862, a sum of $154,672.
Case No. 47, John Hoff, Washington, D. C., and Philadelphia, 20,000 foreign Minie Rifles, Austrian caliber .58, blued barrels. See Chapter 22.
Case No. 48. Savage Revolving Firearms Company, Middletown, Connecticut. This case is two-fold, the revolver contract part being found herein under Federal Revolvers, Chapter 23.
Organized to manufacture revolving breech firearms, handguns, and rifles, of the designs of North and Edward Savage, the firm had as secretary James A. Wheelock. Responding too late to the general scramble for muskets in ’61, Wheelock in June of 1862 sought a contract to make 50,000 Springfields at the very low price of $16. Their factory in Middletown, Connecticut, was described by Wheelock as occupied by practical gunsmiths of long standing—for three quarters of a century. He stated his firm was the oldest and one of the largest establishments in the country, industrial and corporate successors to the historic firm of Colonel Simeon North’s.
Holt, Owen, and Major Hagner thought the proposal a fair price, and that the fabricant had the capability to deliver; but as they had confirmed contracts amounting to over 600,000 guns, they did not think it proper to accept; the Government only wanted 500,000 muskets. Wheelock would not be put off, and on June 16, 1862, he wrote to the Commissioners of his recent trip to New York. He said that speculators there whose contracts were confirmed had offered him orders up to 200,000 guns, and some would give as much as $19 a gun just to have them manufactured. Wheelock doubted that half the guns that were ordered would be manufactured. To show the Commissioners that he wanted to work for the Government at a fair price out of patriotism, and was not just angling for a contract from any source, he declared that the contract awarded and confirmed to Parker, Snow, Brooks & Company they were willing to assign to Savage Revolving Fire Arms Company! On 9 September 1862 Wheelock’s persistence was rewarded by Ripley signing their contract for 25,000 Springfields, deliverable in lots of 2,000 per month after the 6 months tooling-up time, at only $18 per gun. Thirteen thousand five hundred guns were delivered to February ’64. A second contract for 12,000 Springfields at $18 was signed 25 February 1864 by General Ramsay and Wheelock, and to November 7, 1864, 12,000 arms were delivered. They were graded out at usually less than contract price, but in exactly what particulars the Class 2, Class or poorer arms were deficient is not known.
Case No. 52. Wigert & Otard, New York, 10,000 French rifles with sword bayonets. Wigert on September 5, 1861 offered to deliver 10,000 Chasseurs de Vincennes rifles in 55 days. George L. Schuyler wrote from Paris on October 10, when queried about this, that Wigert could not fill the order as such guns were not to be had. The price of $23.50 Schuyler supposed would draw inferior guns and recommended a strict inspection at New York. Wigert then wrote for an extension of 8 months. This was after delay granted, and when Holt and Owen came to investigate, the matter stood as before; contract existing but no guns. They withdrew and annulled the order.
Case No. 54. Mickles & Hopkins, New York, 60,000 iron mounted muskets new, never having been used, caliber YIV2 mm.
This offer was informally accepted by the War Department, George Schuyler having been directed to inspect them in Antwerp if offered; and, if usable, accept them. But the order was never formally issued to purchase them and it was adjudged that as they were almost certainly Prussian muskets (M & H substituted brass mounted for iron mounted with approval), and the price of $7.65 being too high, the order was generally cancelled.
Case No. 55. W. A. Seaver, 50,000 Enfield muskets at $20 equal to sample with tower mark deposited in Ordnance office by Messrs. Mitchell and Jones. No deliveries; contract annulled.
Case No. 56. H. Simon & Son, 5,000 Long Enfield Rifles at $19. No deliveries, contract annulled.
Case No. 59. Hewett & Randall, 10,000 Long Enfield Rifles at $20 with $3 forfeit per arm for nondelivery. No deliveries, declared binding on neither party, annulled and forfeiture remitted.
Case No. 61. Howland & Aspinwall, 17,000 Enfields. See Continental Arms, Chapter 22.
Case No. 62. John Rice, Philadelphia, 36,000 Springfield rifle muskets.
This case is a classic one, showing not the machinations of incompetent persons, but the efforts of a sincere and mechanically skilled contractor who proposed to arrange the manufacture of muskets for the Union, but was himself not a skilled gunmaker. There is evidence that all the parts needed for these arms were in fact in existence at the time the matter came before the Commissioners, yet there is no published record of any deliveries.
Rice, a contractor for stonework at the Capitol then being finished, and a carpenter by trade, had many friends in the mechanical industries of Philadelphia. On October 2, 1861 he wrote offering to supply muskets to Cameron, as I can organize the manufacture of them at various places in Philadelphia, and furnish from ten to twelve thousand inside the time mentioned. This, if accepted, will furnish employment to a large number of workmen who are now idle.
The proposal included delivery in full by 1 July, 1862. Though the terms appear reasonable and deliveries early, the matter was referred to Ripley who considered that contracts enough were outstanding and that Rice’s could not be accepted. Meanwhile, Rice had been checking about in Philadelphia and seemed confident of success. The next month he wrote a new offer, saying he would make Springfields at $20, and deliver 3,000 to 4,000 each month for 12 months, commencing in February, 1862. This proposal Ripley was instructed to accept; by letter a contract was issued 21 November, 1861, ordering 36,000 rifles beginning with 3,000 in February and 3,000 monthly thereafter. In case of any failure to make the deliveries to the extent and within the times before specified, all the obligations of the United States to receive or pay for any muskets then deliverable under this order shall be cancelled and become null and void, wrote Ripley. Rice accepted these conditions on November 27, 1861. He had but two and a half months before he had to supply the first 3,000 rifles.
To Essler & Brother (later known as C. H. Williams & Co.) of Philadelphia he went for locks, later reported and I can get them as fast as I want them. Jenks at Bridesburg made his stocks; Rice bought the wood, and it remained at Jenks’ waiting requirements for it to be turned and shaped. One thousand five hundred had been finished by Jenks for Rice as of April, 1862, but apparently by that late date when Rice appeared before the Commissioners, no actual guns had been assembled. Rice, due to failures in getting his barrels from Washburn, whose troubles with iron had delayed other makers, felt that deliveries could not be made before July, 1862. Rice had been successful in getting the time of delivery extended to 1 May, 1862, so pushing it up to July did not seem too much more of a problem.
He did not, in all this time, have an actual works or shop in which to assemble the arms. This shop he hoped to obtain somewhere near Springfield, asking if he could deliver for inspection at the Springfield Armory. Meanwhile, he sent several locks up to Springfield for gauging, and also ramrods; the locks were perfect, the ramrods required slight alteration in his own gauges to be made perfect. Between February and April 1, Rice was kept in suspense about the realities of his contract. Did he really have an order? Would the Government designate a place of acceptance and inspection for his guns? To this, Stanton asked, where was his factory? In the breakdown, Rice showed himself an excellent organizer, so long as the Government would give him a little flexibility in time delivery. His muskets were being made by the following parts contractors:
Wm. Mason of Taunton, Massachusetts, barrels, who reports that he will be ready in time for the delivery.
Hiram Bigelow, New Haven, Connecticut, guard plates, bows, triggers, butt plates, etc. Will be delivered as per agreement.
Humphreyville Manufacturing Company, Seymour, Connecticut, bayonets. We can make 600 bayonets per day. In April, and after, there will be no failure to deliver your bayonets as called for in our contract. E. P. Coleman & Brother, Philadelphia, ramrods, Now ready to deliver ramrods.
W. F. Nicholson & Company, Providence, sights, bands, swivels, We see nothing to hinder prompt deliveries.
Cole & Brother, Springfield, Massachusetts, and Pawtucket, Rhode Island, cones, Will be able to furnish 6,000 by the first of April.
S. Stowe Manufacturing Company, Connecticut, band springs, We hope to make our first delivery in April 12 to 15 (of gun springs). Hoping they will be in time.
C. B. North, Springfield, Massachusetts, for washers. There were the discs also called, when fancy, escutcheons, against which the heads of the lock plate side screws bear.

Dwight & Company, Bridgeport, Connecticut, appendages. These men apparently were represented in part by Samuel Norris of Springfield, who reported, The appendages will be promptly delivered according to contract.

C. H. Williams & Company, Philadelphia, sent a sample lock to Rice, and trust it will convince him of their ability to fill his contract.

Armed with these statements of condition as of April 1, 1862, Rice made a proposal to the Commissioners for the Government to take the contracts off his hands:

If I could get the Government to take the prices

I have contracted for, I would be glad to be relieved;
I can ascertain my liabilities in ten days.
But Holt and Owen considered the alternative, that Rice had been faithful in following up the mode of manufacture which was the only one open to him. Their problem was not to criticize the foolishness of the Government in giving him the order in the first place, unless it was truly irregular, but in seeing that the contractor performed according to the best of his ability. While the interests of the Government were to be protected, it was not their job to censure nor condemn diligent contractors, especially a man like Rice who seemed able to corral all the fabricants of New England into making the parts required. Unless he would be permitted to furnish some portion of the number ordered, his loss would be excessive, and the Commission so ordered it:
May 2, 1862

. . . As . . . the government will derive benefit by earlier deliveries than can be promised by manufacturers now starting, it is fair to Mr. Rice to confirm in part the order given him at the price stated therein ... a number not exceeding in all25.000    muskets, with the proper appendages, be accepted under the terms and conditions of the order dated November 20, 1861, provided that a first delivery of at least 2,000 be ready prior to July 1, 1862, and that monthly thereafter at least2.000    per month be delivered until the number ordered is completed . . . (Holt, Owen, Hagner)

The identification of these muskets is lacking. It seems highly probable that Rice, given the grace time he asked for, must have tried to get some guns together. The stocks from Jenks at least had tips, and locks were definitely in existence, and passing gauge at Springfield, in April. Arms of Philadelphia locus, from the marks on them, are Philadelphia and Bridesburg muskets. The latter are assumed to be Alfred Jenks & Son guns made at their Bridesburg Machine Works. The Philadelphia arms it is conjectured (see Jenks Case above) might be some marked by Jenks in just getting started, and not precisely uniform in stamping with their Bridesburgmarked locks. The possibility also exists that these Philadelphia arms are of the John Rice issue; proof is lacking for either case. Two other marks are known on Springfield rifled muskets which have puzzled Fuller: milbury, and Windsor locks. Both towns in Connecticut have gunmaking backgrounds; both could have furnished the necessary labor for assembling Rice’s muskets. Both are relatively centrally located in the regions where he contracted for the major amount of work, leaving only locks and stocks to come up from Philadelphia. By the time of the Commission’s decision to confirm his order to the amount of 25,000 pieces, Rice still had not made up his mind where to assemble, but continued to prefer the area of Springfield, Massachusetts. Windsor Locks, Connecticut, is on the road to Springfield; perhaps Rice was able to get a few arms finished there before defaulting on his second, confirmed contract.
Case No. 64. Union Arms Company, New York, and R. S. Gallaher. Springfield rifles and Marsh’s patent breech and muzzle-loading rifles.
Of all the speculative middlemen, Robert S. Gallaher seems to have made one of the best possible arrangements for production and capitalization of a new enterprise. The Union Armory was famous in New York by 1863, and fears were entertained by the authorities that the rioters in the great draft riots of July, 1863, would break in and carry off the arms to create a real civil insurrection. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were paid in by the stockholders—yet apparently of 65,000 Springfields contracted for, of which 25,000 were confirmed by the Commission, and 12,500 Marsh patent rifles, none were ever delivered to the United States. It has been conjectured that some were delivered by Union to state authorities. Fault in this reasoning is that the state authorities supplied men; arms were supplied by the general government. Perhaps not all states turned in their bills to the United States for settlement, but a great many suppliers of arms directly for state issue, in turn came before Holt and Owen for settlement of their accounts. If any state had received any considerable number of either Springfield type arms from Union or Marsh breechloaders, they would have been to satisfy the needs of their three years’ volunteers and would almost certainly have been paid for by the United States. Though a full report on Gallaher is lacking, there is a strong suspicion that for all his plausibility, he was able to spend a lot of money without making very many arms. An automobile entrepreneur with many good ideas, it will be remembered, frittered away over ten million dollars in such a fashion in the late 1940’s without producing more than a handful of finished autos, though his muchtouted engine concepts were implemented in later automobiles.
R. H. Gallaher originally obtained one contract in his own name, for 20,000 No. 1, Springfield guns, with appendages and angular bayonets, from Ripley on August 31, 1861; delivery to begin in 60 days, at $20. This was extended by a War Department letter, November 26, 1861. Meanwhile, Gallaher and either a brother or father, as John S. Gallaher & Company, obtained a second contract for Springfields, 20,000 of them at $20, on October 11, 1861. Meanwhile, an inventor whose design seems to be the model for what was later celebrated as the E. S. Allin conversion to the Springfield, making a muzzle-loader into a breechloader, also obtained a contract. Twenty-five thousand Springfield rifles, in all respects, except the breechloading attachment, identical with the standard rifle musket made at the United States armory at Springfield, Massachusetts, and are to interchange with it in all their parts, except those pertaining to the breechloading attachments, and with each other in all their parts, were ordered of inventor S. Wilmer Marsh October 14, 1861. To make these guns, Marsh turned to Gallaher. Needing capital and planning to build for the Union, Gallaher formed a corporation, The Union Fire-arms Company, of New York City. Stockholders and officers included Edward Robinson, James McKay, Linus Scudder, Enoch Chamberlain, John Hays, and Robert H. Gallaher. As the agent of the Union Firearms Company, R. H. now obtained a fourth contract, the Marsh one having been assigned to Union, directly in the name of Union for 25,000 additional Springfields.
On January 3, Cameron agreed, by letter, to the assigning over to Union Fire-arms of all the contracts listed. It having been shown that the Union Fire-arms Co. . . . have the necessary capital and facilities for manufacturing guns for the government. . . By the time of this consolidation into one contract, Gallaher had sold $240,000 worth of stock in the new company, all the capitalized amount, and had put money into the expansion by other sub-contractors of their capacities to make small parts for Springfields.
He approached Daniel J. Young, formerly a works manager of the Harpers Ferry U. S. rifle factory, to obtain some of the more skilled Virginia workmen who had been more or less banished from the state and were looking for work. Gallaher had represented these men from Harpers Ferry in the Congress before the war, and their ability to do the work needed was a part of his plan to make muskets. The Manhattan Firearms Company agreed to sell him some new machines, which they had begun to build for him, and lease him a large number of other machines plus “all small tools and a large amount of vacant room.
Obviously, some part of the Union manufacturing was to be done in the Manhattan armory. W. C. Hicks, superintendent of the Boston Arms Company, agreed to turn over all that firm’s machinery and to come to New York with sixty of the best gun workmen in the United States. Steelmaker R. A. Douglas of New York had ready his rolling mill to roll barrels as per contract of 500 tons, which I hope you will soon be ready to commence ordering. Charles Hewitt, of Hewitt & Cooper, Trenton Iron Works was ready to roll gun barrels as soon as Gallaher could show him a sample of the moulds as they came from Douglas. Collins & Company were ready to make his bayonets. The ubiquitous C. K. Garrison offered added capital if needed.
The Springfield muzzle-loader was, with all these preparations, not a difficult thing to make, except so far as the precision of work was concerned. Only a little more complicated was the Marsh patent breechand muzzle-loader, which Union was also to supply. Tested on the West Point ranges by Lieutenant S. V. Benet, later Brigadier General, Chief of Ordnance, and father of the poet Stephen Vincent Benet, the report was quite favorable:
West Point, U.S., August 24, 1861
Sir: Yesterday I superintended the trial of Marsh’s breech and muzzle loading rifle, and have the honor to make the following report:
The arm consists of a United States rifle, calibre .58, fitted with a breech attachment. The latter is connected to the upper
edge of the breech of the barrel by a hinge, and consists of a breech plug or bolt, with a gas check at the end next the barrel. The gas check is made of a double ring of steel, breaking joints, that is expanded by means of a steel cone that passes through it, thus closing all escape of gas. The plug or bolt is thrown up by pressing the trigger forward, and exposing the opened barrel to receive the cartridge; it is brought back to its place after loading by a blow of the hand, and is held in position by a steel pin that enters the bolt at its rear extremity.
The ammunition used was of two kinds; a common paper cylinder tied to the United States expanding bullet, and the seamless skin cartridge, used with the Enfield rifle. The same cartridge serves for both breech and muzzle loading, and no material enlargement as a chamber is therefore made.
Forty-four shots were fired with the common cartridge, loading at the breech. At the seventh round the cartridge could not be inserted, the cartridge paper having been driven into the interior orifice of the vent. This was readily removed with a wire, and the firing continued. At the twenty-eighth round thereafter the bolt moved with difficulty, caused by the escape of gas and consequent fouling. At the forty-first round paper again stuck in the vent; at the forty-fourth fouled and worked with difficulty. The gas check and breech were cleaned, when necessary, by merely rubbing them with a rag or the moistened finger, a very simple, easy and quick operation, that did not materially interrupt the course of the trial.
The breech attachment being thus cleaned, the rifle was fired seventy-seven rounds with Enfield skin cartridge, loading at the breech. At the twenty-eighth round, the breech fouled, and was cleaned with a rag in a moment. At the forty-fifth round it again fouled, and was cleaned. At the fiftieth (or ninety-fourth of the entire firing) the rifle was loaded at the muzzle; the barrel was so foul that the breech was sent home with difficulty. The firing was then continued, loading at the breech, with ease, and so continued to the seventy-seventh, (or one hundred and twenty-first of the entire firing). The last round was loaded at the muzzle with great difficulty, because of the excessive fouling of the barrel. The barrel was not cleaned during the trial.
The gun was fired ten rounds in one minute and fifty seconds.
Conclusions.—The mechanism is very simple and strong, and not easily put out of order. The rifle with which the firing was made is evidently an old one, has been much used, and
the bolt that closes the place, the steel pin that may account in part for great, and the invention
breech not at all firm and solid in its enters its rear end working loose. This the fouling. The fouling was not very has the great merit of permitting the clogged parts being easily cleaned by the finger moistened with saliva, where a moist rag is not convenient. By this simple expedient the rifle was fired one hundred and twenty-one rounds with no difficulty or detention, although the bore had meanwhile become so foul that loading at the muzzle became a tedious and troublesome operation.
The common cartridge was inserted entire, without tearing, the cap exploding the cartridge through the paper without fail. The sticking of the paper in the vent might be easily remedied.
Should, from any cause, the breech attachment fail to work, a few turns of a screw fixes it in its place, and the rifle becomes a muzzle-loader, using the same ammunition.
The invention has undoubtedly great merit, and I believe that a new rifle, with the parts more skillfully fitted, would give more satisfactory results.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. V. Benet 1st Lieutenant United States Ordnance
Brevet Brigadier General J. W. Ripley
Chief of Ordnance, Washington, D. C.
Faced with the favorable report on this rifle, Holt and Owen could not entirely dismiss the matter. However, their avowed purpose was to reduce the indebtedness of the United States for various kinds of breechloaders, and they suggested to Gallaher that he make some proposals along these lines. He assented, and voluntarily reduced the Springfields to 25,000 in number, surrendering his claim on the United States for the 40,000, and ultimately dropped his demands for the Marsh guns to 12,500 instead of 25,000; the price was reduced to $27.75 instead of $29.75. The Commission’s secretary, J. Wise, sent a note on May 1, 1862 to Gallaher to help him quiet his apprehensive backers, saying his contracts would be confirmed, and on May 5 Holt, Owen, and Hagner recapitulated the record of delivery schedules and confirmed the contracts as stated, first deliveries to begin in July. Gallaher was directed to prepare a model musket on Marsh’s pattern for Ripley to approve not later than June 15.
The forfeiture of any guns not delivered on time was to be strictly complied with so as to reduce the number of guns delivered; Gallaher had to put up or shut up.
According to Fuller (Springfield Muzzle Loading Shoulder Arms), only three Springfield muskets were made up by Union Arms and delivered to the United States, probably as samples. No contract deliveries were made, and there is no record of payments. Union did make a few revolvers, of solid-frame percussion system resembling the Whitney small pocket arms. The dissolution of Union Fire-arms Company of New York seems to have been not with a bang, but an inaudible whimper.
Case No. 65. C. W. Durant, Colorado Territory.
Governor Gilpin, to arm the Union citizens of Colorado, bought up an unspecified number of sporting rifles and muskets from Durant, in the amount of $3733.50. Although the prices for the article are high,' yet they do not seem unreasonable, and the Commissioners directed the account to be paid. At the same time it is said the Confederate sympathizers bought up all the percussion caps in town. Thus the rifles and muskets were useless because Rebels controlled the caps. It was a standoff in Colorado!
Case No. 68. Gordon, Castlen & Gordon, Louisville, Kentucky, $1425.00 for Navy pistols and musket caps to arm the regiment of Colonel Jackson, approved by Brigadier General W. T. Sherman. Directed to be paid.

Usual minney ball ammo was totally enclosed in paper wrapper, but special cartridges known as Williams’ Ball had zinc base washer with paper folded into crease. Zinc cleaned out lead smears, reduced fouling to permit more shooting between serious cleanings with water.

Case No. 69. Starr Arms Company, revolvers, carbines, and Springfields. See Chapter 17.
Case No. 70. Schuyler, Hartley & Graham, 10,000 Enfield rifle muskets for Ohio.
State agent C. P. Wolcott in New York, acting for the Governor of Ohio, had ordered 10,000 Enfields at $19 from S. H. & G. Five hundred were delivered to him before the Queen’s Embargo suspended shipments; the firm’s man in Birmingham, Francis Tomes, was told to keep alert and send more guns as soon as he could. This was done, but the state agent no longer having authority to buy, the Maiden Lane partners sold to the United States agent, Captain Crispin, at $20, prevailing market price. Meanwhile more guns arrived, Crispin suspended buying, and some 7,000 arms in all were considered a problem, Schuyler, Hartley & Graham wanting the United States to buy them. They reduced the price finally to $16.25, and the Commission directed they be permitted to deliver up to 7,000 of such arms, including 1,500 contracted for to be made in Suhl, Germany.
While these arms are often described as Enfields, it is evident from the Commission’s decision that they are not, for the words of the decision are, including the 1,500 made at Suhl, if of equally good quality and similar in calibre and finish. This suggests the arms were only similar to the Enfields, and that there was doubt as to whether they might be blued and casehardened as the Enfields, or finished otherwise.
During May and June, 5,320 Enfields were received and 998 Suhl rifles (Enfield pattern) with appendages, at the arbitrated contract price of $16.25.
Case No. 72. William Mason, Taunton, Massachusetts, 50,000 or 100,000 Springfields, at $20, contract letter January 7, 1862.
Manufacturer of machinery for cotton mills, Mason wanted to put his shops at the service of the Government. The glamour of gunmaking seems to have attracted him; he obtained a contract for 50,000 guns, at $20, but persuaded Ripley to endorse it with an additional 50,000, if they were all made in his own shop, and not pieced out here and there. The Federal Government seems to have been highly receptive to the idea that more complete armories than just Springfield and Colt’s should exist in the North, and Taunton was well suited for waterpower and manpower, midway between Boston and Providence, for fine machine work. But when Mason had expended about $600,000 in new machines, Holt and Owen put a damper on it.
There seems to have been some confusion over exactly what Ripley did mean in saying the order would be approved for 100,000 guns if manufactured in your own establishment at Taunton, Mass. The Commissioners took it at face value and interrogated Mason as to where he was having his guns made.

Accessories for CW guns were leather box for percussion caps, thumb-screw vise to cramp spring for stripping lock, pin punch for removing band springs and driving tumbler out of hammer, and combination two-blade screwdriver and nipple wrench. Extra nipple was often carried, together with screw fitting for ramrod to withdraw misfired bullet, and worm which held tow for wiping out bore. Wire loop is nipple pick to clear cap debris in case of misfire, while three angle tools are two Colt and one Whitney nipple wrenches.

Washburn, it appears, was supplying the barrels rolled but not finished. Mason planned to finish them, and had promised some finished barrels to John Rice and another contractor, F. L. Bodine. Stock machinery prepared for Eagle Manufacturing Company was taken over by Mason, who planned to fabricate stock tips, buttplates, and ramrods himself. Colman & Company, Providence, engaged to make 50,000 locks and work only for Mason; they were swaging and milling parts in April when Mason was questioned. Some bands were to be made in Fall River, not far from Taunton, under direction of Mason’s own superintendent at a private machine shop. Another machinist, Hames, made guards; both parts Mason planned to bring under his own roof as soon as he could. Gauges were being made at Tyler’s in Springfield, Massachusetts, and compared with the armory’s master gauges. Bayonets only were not arranged for, but as S. H. Waters & Company in Milbury, and one Osgood in Ilion, New York, also Eagle Manufacturing Company, were making them in quantity, he did not see any question about supply; also Dagget, sabre maker at Attleboro, offers to make bayonets, he concluded.
Mason was a manufacturer of acknowledged responsibility, and a direct dealer, not a middleman. Holt and Owen were faced with the unpleasant task of serving the Government by chopping down this man’s orders from 100,000 to something more economical, say 30,000; they spent a lot of wind in arguing the demerits and irregularities of the case, picking on the conflict of manufactured in your own establishment meanings, and decreed that the contract should be confirmed for only 30,000. That Mason had a great amount of justice on his side was reflected by the commissioners’ accepting 30,000 instead of 25,000. But Mason was not satisfied, and wrote a very carefully and temperately worded appeal to settle for 75,000, which would about break even for him the way he had arranged his affairs. There is a slight hint or suspicion that Mason realized the similarity between gunmaking machinery and cotton gin-making machinery, and had bought a lot of basic tools that were adaptable to several kinds of manufacturing; perhaps Holt and Owen suspected this from Mason’s statement that I do not mean to say that all this machinery or outlay would be lost if the contract were now taken from or refused me, and they rather limply concluded by endorsing his appeal as:

June 10, 1862

Considered by the commission, and it is decided that the number of arms assigned to Mr. Mason is as large as the commission think it proper at this time to assign to one contractor at the price of $20.

J. Holt

Robert Dale Owen

Commissioners

Case No. 73. Burnside Rifle Company, carbines. See Chapter 11.

Case No. 74. Burnside Rifle Company, breechloading infantry rifles. See Chapter 11.
Case No. 75. C. B. Hoard, Watertown, New York, 50,000 Springfields.
The settlement of this case by Holt and Owen at Hoard’s urging is novel; it will, therefore, be given first. The denoument comes second.
Faced with threat of reduction in numbers of guns, Hoard proposed voluntarily to reduce the price of half of them. This was okayed by the Commissioners. Hoard then proposed that the reduction, to $16, would apply to the first 25,000 guns to be delivered, the second 25,000 being taken at $20. This would save him money, for if he failed to make deliveries (as so many contractors expected to do on the early ones,) the losses would only be at $16 per gun instead of $20. This the Commissioners also agreed to, closing the case so far as they were concerned by their report of June 10, 1862, which confirmation is upon condition that he shall, within fifteen days after notice of this decision, execute bond with good and sufficient sureties, in the form and with the stipulations prescribed by law and the regulations for the faithful performance of the contract, as thus modified, resulting from said order and acceptance, and upon his failure or refusal to execute such bond, then the said order shall be declared cancelled and of no effect.
Hoard had achieved the tacit approval of the Commission to his making 50,000 muskets. But apparently he did not want to risk forfeit of even the $16 muskets. He delayed just too long for the order of the Commission to go into effect, and on June 28, 1862 obtained from General Ripley a new contract, in due form, to be sure, but with new terms, to supply 25,000 muskets at $20. Twelve thousand eight hundred were delivered between September 17, 1863 and August 2, 1865, at prices assessed between $16 and $20, the majority at $19 or $18.90.
The Hon. Charles B. Hoard was a steam engine manufacturer with a modern factory at Watertown, New York. On December 4, 1861, he wrote to Simon Cameron asking to obtain a contract for 50,000 Springfields upon the same terms as to quantity, price, and time for delivery, given to other parties having similar contracts. Accompanying his modest proposal was a rather immodest barrage of letters signed by numerous legislators and representatives, of the State of New York and the United States, persons known to Cameron, who certified to Hoard’s ability to undertake this work. The remaining names, with unimportant exceptions, of members of Congress from New York can be obtained, if desired by the department, Hoard wrote to a colleague who was trying to use his influence in the matter. The night before Christmas General Ripley sent out a little present to Mr. Hoard, the contract letter for 50,000 muskets at $20.
Hoard was a highly respectable citizen, and his business had been interrupted by the suspension of trade with the South. Perhaps his steam engines were a part of the cotton machinery which Mr. Mason made— a steam cotton gin certainly was an ever-increasing and valued farm article in the South, and Hoard’s steam engines may have been part of this industry. He also had a half interest in a nearby agricultural implement shop, which lay idle because so much of his trade was with the South. When he heard of Secretary Stanton’s order which seemed to throw into disrepute his contract, he at once wrote to the Honorable Preston King, a Washington colleague, to see if Mr. King could do anything for him:

I am not willing to be ranked with men who would take advantage of the necessities of government, if they could, to profit therefrom, he said to King. If the Government does not need the guns, certainly I do not desire to make any; but if it does need them, and they are to be made by some one, at a fair price, then I, having a large factory idle, which can be converted into an armory, would like to put its wheels in motion which have been stopped by this rebellion, much to my injury, and convert it to that use.

Detail of india ink stamp of James D. Mowry on side of a Norwich Armories-made Ml861 Rifle Musket. Mowry evidently stamped guns obtained by him from other suppliers, which he in turn delivered under his contract to the Union. A Norfolk-made Ml861 is also known stamped with name of contractor Welch.

Awaiting the reply, Hoard continued to make his arrangements for gun parts, machinery, and work space.
He bought the other half of the farm tool shop, planning to convert it to the stockmaking works. Washburn as usual was to supply the barrels, 50,000 of them, lumped for cone seats at $1.50 each. Robert Hoe & Company of New York and American Machine Works of Chicopee were scheduled to deliver machinery. This machinery was a large lot of highly specialized gunmaking devices, and useless for any other purpose. They included such set-ups as one lock bedding machine, two barrel bedding machines, one butt-plate bedding, boring, and tapping machine, and one guard plate bedding machine with side apparatus for boring for screws. C. C. Chaffee of Springfield promised nipples and Hoard had sent an engineer to the armory to make drawings of everything, while between $1,000 and $2,000 had been laid out for gauges now being made. In support of the price of the guns, $20, upon which he calculated to make less than his usual 10% profit on steam engines, Hoard offered an unusual calculation of the cost of the Government-made article. This cost basis is the one any private enterprise must go by, figuring in all the overhead before deriving a total cost of the gun. But the Springfield accountants work on the governmental philosophy that if you have a government, you gotta have an armory also. Their computations of the cost of a musket therefore leave out entirely the enormous capital investment at the National Armory, and figure a lot of bare costs without full overhead put in. The calculation Hoard’s way was rather stiff:
Supposed cost of Springfield Armory buildings and machinery: $2,000,000. Annual average production, 14,000 arms.
Upon this data, as a basis, and I believe it is very near the truth, it would appear that the annual interest at 6% on the cost is:    $120,000
Assuming that the machinery cost one-half of the outlay, which is not far from the fact, and that the natural wear and loss of machinery is ten percent, and when work is prosecuted only during the day, and this is the rate usually calculated upon by manufacturers, and double that when night and day work is performed, the loss on one million of dollars annually is ......................................................................100,000
The cost for present production of a musket is $14 each, which would be for 14,000 muskets ..    196,000
$416,000
Showing the actual cost to the government, upon this calculation, believed to be even below the truth, to be $29.17.
But Hoard’s senatorial friends, his calculations to show the economy of doing business with Hoard’s Armory, his letters, even personally laying the matter before Abraham Lincoln, availed him nothing but the conclusions above cited.
Case No. 76. James D. Mowry, 30,000 Springfields, order 26 December, 1861.
In association with Frederick W. Carnmann, paper manufacturer James D. Mowry of Norwich, Connecticut engaged to supply Springfields. He at first expected to make them in his father’s machine shop in Norwich, but when he received an order for only 30,000 guns, decided to get the parts made here and there and sub-contract the assembly. Samuel Norris in Springfield was to assemble the parts which had all been arranged for by May of 1862 when Mr. Carnmann came before the Commission to give a progress report. Barrels of course came from Washburn, though one Congdon, importer of English hardware, had received samples of British barrel skelps which he was having finished up at the Armory to see if they were suitable. Norris would supply the mountings; stocks to come from their own machinery set up in New York; and locks from either Williams & Company of Philadelphia at $2.25, or Bateman, New York, at $2. Said Mr. Carnmann:

Mr. Norris has agreed ... to assemble the arms and be responsible for the inspection. Unless I can do better, I will accept this offer. I have had three offers from manufacturers to make these guns complete at their risk; these offers were from $17 to $18.50. My disbursements thus far have been small, and Mr. Mowry’s also.

The Commission reduced the number of arms to
20,000, and Mowry went ahead. He solved the problem by procuring arms from two suppliers; two types of Mowry-marked arms exist. As Mr. Cammann said in explanation before the Commission’s decision, He applied for 50,000 guns, but as he only got 30,000 he decided not to make much—only a part of the work. Mowry supplied guns marked with his name, u.s./jas. d. mowry/norwich conn, on the lock with an eagle, forward of the hammer. While Fuller categorically states He sublet all parts except the stocks which he made in New York. The arms were assembled at Springfield, Mass. this appears not to be true for the most part. We believe the Mowrystamped lockplates are fitted to arms fabricated for Mowry, doubtless using his sources of supply and any other sources of parts handy in season, by the Eagle Manufacturing Company at Mansfield, Connecticut. Reference to the contract in proper form which Mowry was directed to execute including bond with sureties for performance, to deliver 20,000 arms, said contract to be executed in 15 days after notice of this decision, indicate the connection.
On June 7, 1862, Mowry of Norwick, as principal, with Carnmann of New York and Albert H. Almy of New York, as sureties, executed a contract with General Ripley to furnish 20,000 muskets. While Carnmann is identified as interested with Mowry in the contract, Almy was the Treasurer of the Eagle Manufacturing Company. Though a full history of Eagle is not known to this writer, it is probable the firm maintained executive offices in New York, accounting for Almy’s choosing to reside there. With Almy concerned and liable to forfeit $20,000 personally if Mowry defaulted on his contract, the whole resources of Eagle were unquestionably thrown behind the Mowry project. That Mowry was under a positive obligation to Eagle is shown by his signing as surety himself in the sum of $20,000, along with Almy, to a contract which Eagle negotiated later that same month for rifle muskets!
The Mowry-lock muskets were manufactured by Eagle, but deliveries were not in full. Eagle’s first delivery was April 14, 1863; Mowry’s should have been July, 1862, but they did not get together enough arms to make the first lot of 500 until June 1, 1863. On June 3, Eagle turned in 1,000; on June 15, Mowry delivered 500. Thereafter they alternated, Eagle apparently achieving a production of about 2,000-3,000 arms a month, for on August 29 both contractors delivered 1,000 rifles each. Eagle’s last delivery was September 11; Mowry continued to turn in 1,000 fortnightly until November, 1863, by which time he had delivered only 10,000. November, according to the statistical terms of his contract, was the final month for deliveries.
On the 20th Mowry wrote to Stanton asking for permission to extend the time of deliveries. Stanton turned the matter over to Ripley. Though Holt and Owen had used the matter of Mowry’s lack of manufacturing facilities to whittle him down, hoping his default would reduce the number of guns the United States would have to pay for, Ripley so liked the Springfield rifle that he okayed the delivery of 2,000 more muskets. These were delivered during December and January of 1864. It is probable these arms are of a most unusual category; fabricated and marked by the Norwich Armories in Norwich, Connecticut, they bear, on the left side of the stock opposite the Norwich-stamped lockplate, a circled ink stamp about
1 inch across, oval in form, the brand of Jas. D. Mowry!
This connection between Mowry and Norwich Armories, though both were in the same town, has not been remarked before. Though only one such arm with this mark is presently known, it seems unlikely that Mowry would fill his requisition with odd lots from here and there. More probably he in turn agreed to take from Norwich Armories completed Springfields of their make to fill his order. The fact that he became in the next year the registered agent of Norwich Arms Company, seems to confirm this supposition.
The balance of Mowry arms bore his stamp on the lockplate, and dates of 1864 will be found. Apparently Norwich supplied these guns to fill his order, we assume, because of his status also as an agent of the company. Mowry delivered in all 22,000 Springfields, some of inferior grades to Class 4 at $16. But the last 10,000 were delivered promptly on schedule in lots of 1,000 accepted at a full $18 re-negotiated price.
Case No. 77. Eagle Manufacturing Company, 25,000 muskets, reduced to 20,000 before the Commission.
In this brief compass, we return to the firm concerning which our chapter first opened. With a fictitious interview between Secretary Cameron and newspaperman Wilkeson we set forth Eagle’s principal complaint: the small quantity of the contract. The treasurer, A. H. Almy, argued that Colt, and Lamson, Goodnow, and Yale had not only had their first orders confirmed, but upon complaining the totals were not enough to allow economical manufacture, had the totals increased. But the Commissioners were more savvy at the 77th case than at the first. As they elaborated in Mason’s case, the price of $20 was entirely sufficient for the Springfield in lots even as small as 15,000 or 20,000. In large lots it should be less. Though Almy sought the intervention of his brother, J. H. Almy, the Assistant Quartermaster General of Connecticut, in writing to Secretary Stanton and the Ordnance officers, he was unable to get an increase in the order. He claimed to be able to deliver guns by July, 1862; it was not until April 14,
1863, that Eagle delivered the first 500 of but 5,500 arms. The collaboration between Eagle and Mowry, and the personnel of Eagle being the same as Norwich Arms Company, suggests that the capital and industrial potential of Eagle and Mowry was ultimately merged
with Norwich Armories. By delivering upon Norwich’s contracts, apparently both Almy and Mowry stood to profit better. The records show 5,500 delivered between April 1 and September of 1863, not the 20,000 cited as being delivered, according to Fuller. Locks are marked with date at hammer rear, 1863, and eagle, u.s./eagleville before the hammer.
Case No. 78, James T. Hodge, Trenton. Contract to supply 50,000 muskets.
Case No. 79, Addison M. Burt, Trenton, contract for 50,000 muskets in conjunction with Hodge.
These gentlemen independently obtained contracts for 50,000 Springfields each, both on December 29,
1861. Honoring the clause voiding the contracts if transferred, they studiously skirted about all hint of business combination by not forming a partnership, logical though such a move would have been. Burt’s brother, O. F. Burt, was a partner in the firm of Muir & Company, musket contractor at Windsor Locks, Connecticut. Burt himself had been a spring maker for railroad cars and had to close down his business in Richmond, presumably Virginia, as he speaks of departing from that place in March and leave all my property there. He was not a mechanic, but a financial and administrative man, apparently the leader or stronger of the two. He asked permission of the Government to form a company, Burt, Hodge & Company, in connection with their musket contracts. Meanwhile he and Hodge, without forming a partnership which they felt would amount to transferral of their contracts, obtained a charter from New Jersey for a firm, the Trenton Arms Company. Its armory was the shops of the Trenton Locomotive and Machine Manufacturing Company, and its director, A. G. M. Prevost, worked closely with them in sub-contracting their muskets.
Burt capitalized the machinery, which was bought from a dozen makers, some still famous in machine tools. Hodge contracted in turn with Burt to have the parts of his muskets made. And Burt contracted with Trenton Locomotive for some machines, for shop space, and workmen. Burt quite understandably pleaded to be allowed to treat the affair as Burt, Hodge & Company, but the Commissioners would not agree. The two in their Trenton Arms Company seriously intended to continue the musket making business, not only for Government but for all customers.
The preparations they were making were extensive. While Burt told the Commission they planned to make everything except the rough barrel in Trenton, this was not entirely true. C. H. Williams & Company of Philadelphia proposed to make locks for them, and when Holt and Owen asked for specific details, Williams told Burt that he could commence delivering an order of 20,000 locks by August, 1862. He sent Burt one of the locks, which had passed inspection at Springfield Armory. Samuel Norris had persuaded Major Dyer and Master Armorer E. S. Allin to take
four C. H. Williams Philadelphia locks apart and scramble them with four Springfield locks, reassembling at random. They reassembled perfectly. I think you will have no cause to fear inspection of your work, if the locks you manufacture are as perfect as these. I should also say they fit the gun stock most perfectly, Norris reported for Williams to use as a testimonial.
Washburn of Worcester, the Trenton Iron Company, and Morris, Tasker & Company of Philadelphia, had all been approached about supplying barrels. Which firm finally landed the contract is not known. Burt was not planning to rely indefinitely on Williams for locks, either; the schedule of tooling, approximately $80,000 by that April of 1862 when they came before the Commission, and rapidly increased to over $120,000, is interesting to consider in these days of automation. Today a giant Kingsbury machine will converge from all directions upon a colorless lump of grey forged steel and in a matter of minutes spew forth a glittering, precision jewel of a revolver frame, or a motor block. The process was a little more tedious then. Burt had by April 1862 laid out or committed himself for tools from the following:

Bement & Dougherty, Philadelphia .......................... $23,435.00

Hughes & Phillips, Newark, N. J....................................2,650.00

Brown & Sharpe, Providence, Rhode Island .................1,449.50

James S. Brown, Pawtucket ...........................................2,100.00

Wood, Light &; Co., Worcester ......................................1,050.00

George Crompton, Worcester ........................................5,500.00

William Mason, Taunton, Mass.........................................364.00

Am. Machine Works, Springfield ................................15,000.00

Hope Iron Co., Providence ............................................3,755.00

W. A. Wheeler, Worcester .............................................4,030.00

Charles Parker, Meriden, Conn.........................................100.00

... Ames, Chicopee ........................................................5,000.00

Massachusetts Arms Company, Chicopee Falls ..........    775.00

George S. Lincoln &; Co., Hartford .................................452.25

Trenton Locomotive Works, Trenton, N. J..................15,791.00

81,451.75

American Machine Works was making the stocking machines; in addition, they had contracted at a day rate to make all the gauges, adding an estimated $5,000 more to the above total. The investment in machines on hand at the Trenton Armory set aside for Trenton Arms Company was $36,788. While the largest number of like items was 27 vises, it is true that the list, if of machinery in good working order, exclusive of the particular tools and fixtures required in making the muskets, reflected a pretty complete shop for that or any other time.

Though Hodge and Burt had determined to equip a plant supplying 9,000 muskets a month, they admitted their first deliveries scheduled for July would be made partly of purchased components and partly of Trenton-fabricated items.
Doubtless Williams locks were to figure in these early deliveries; it would be interesting to compare the eagle stamps of different contractors such as Welch, Rice, Trenton, Jenks-Bridesburg, and others, to see if it is possible to trace them back to Williams of Philadelphia. Barrels, it appears, were eventually obtained from Dinslow & Chase of Windsor Locks. Paradoxical though it reads, O. T. Burt, Addison M. Burt’s brother, had contracted for 25,000 barrels with D & C to begin deliveries in August, 1862. These were not for the William Muir & Company contract in spite of O. T. Burt being a partner in that venture. Muir’s barrels were contracted by a steel works on Staten Island, New York. A director, Mr. Andrews, testified to the Commission in connection with the Parker, Snow, Brooke & Company contract, that he had a contract with Muir to make 30,000 barrels for them! Thus the Staten Island barrels went up the river to Windsor Locks; the Windsor Locks barrels floated down to Trenton across the marshes from Staten Island!
The Commission suggested the two non-partners counter with voluntary proposals to decrease their orders to 25,000 each, which they then confirmed subject to forfeitures monthly in the event of non-delivery. Burt and Hodge thereupon executed duplicate contracts with Ripley, on 9 July, 1862, with Burt’s brother, O. T. Burt, (whose residence address was Syracuse, New York), and Juan C. DeMeir of New York sureties for both. A. M. Burt’s first deliveries from Trenton began March 26, 1863, and until December 30, 1864, he delivered 11,500. Most were $20 guns; many were reduced for defects to $17.
Hodge began deliveries May 14, 1863, and up to December 17, 1864, had turned in 10,500. Though his sub-sub-contract with Burt involved payment only for arms inspected and received by the Government, when received and paid for, it must have been a tightly stressed friendship that survived the drastic inspection cuts in prices for arms; Hodge too was paid for guns as low as $17 for blemishes and imperfect arms. Though the Springfield-pattern arms marked Trenton for some reason have been questioned or doubtful in association with Hodge and Burt, this seems groundless in view of their controlling the New Jersey incorporated Trenton Arms Company.
Case No. 80. William W. Welch, Norfolk, Connecticut, 18,000 muskets.
This is a rather modest proposal, and Mr. Welch apparently was willing to disclose what Colt and others knew, that a small lot of Springfields could be arranged for at $20 at a fair profit. Welch estimated his net at about $3, somewhat over 15 per cent. For a small manufacturer, he was one of the most consistent in deliveries once he got started. At least the first 500 bore locks by C. H. Williams & Company of Philadelphia. This firm had been makers of sculptured wood mouldings for picture frames and decorative construction trim. In September, 1861 they saw that the house building business was poor, the house dividing business on the upswing, and changed to lock making. By early April, 1862 they had delivered 500 locks to Welch, as well as 500 to John Rice and 500 to
Trenton Burt. They were preparing to take an order from Mason in Taunton for 50,000 locks, and had 6,000 on hand to fill these customers’ early needs. Lockmaker Robert Essler of Williams & Company was experienced in the wood business and had in turn arranged with the Empire Works to make stocks, which he also was to supply to Welch. We rate the value of lock and stock at $5.35; we cannot furnish for less at present, he informed the Commissioners. Holt and Owen reduced the small number of 18,000 to 16,000 from Welch, provided he signed a contract in due form. Deliveries did not begin until September 23, 1862; from then until December, 1863 they were at the rate of approximately 500 monthly until 16,000 were accepted.
Following, on January 12, 1864, Welch entered into a contract with General Ramsay to supply an additional 2,500 muskets. Two deliveries of 500 each on May 10 and May 31 exhausted the contract. With Welch in these deals were Plumb Brown and Ralph Brown, both of Norwich. They formed a company at the end, Welch, Brown & Company, and undertook a final contract to close out the arms left over; on February 3, 1865 they appealed to Secretary Stanton to be allowed to deliver the last 1,500 guns which had been forfeited under the January 12, 1864 contract. General Dyer, then Chief of Ordnance, recommended that this be permitted, the first class arms to be taken at $18, and the second class at $15. Springfield Arsenal also was authorized to buy Welch’s spare parts at suitable prices. On April 21, 1,000 Springfields were accepted at $15; the close-out balance was only 360 arms on May 3, 1865. Marked on the lockplate Norfolk, there is not considered at present to be any differentiation between W. W. Welch arms and those last few thousand of Welch, Brown & Company. Possibly early 1863-make guns would reveal some tell-tale sign of a Williams lock; a Norfolk rifle is known that is stamped on the left of the stock cheek: w. w. welch, Norfolk, conn. It is not known if Welch, a conscientious man, ever made more than the barrels in his Norfolk, Connecticut machine shop. case no. 81. William C. Freeman, 500 Joslyn designed revolvers, improved pattern, not actually manufactured at the time of order August 28, 1861. Order revoked and annulled by Commissioners.
case no. 83. Sarson & Roberts, 25,000 Springfields.
John B. Sarson of New York on August 31, 1861, delivered 90 cavalry carbines, otherwise unidentified, at $14 each. Thinking the gun business was a profitable one, he sought to get in deeper, and in partnership with William S. Roberts joined the cavalcade to Washington to get on the musket gravy train. In December, 1861, and January, 1862, they delivered 4,900 Potsdam muskets, the Prussian brass-trimmed Model 1830 flintlock transformed to percussion, at $6.50 each. On January 22, 1862, they delivered also 143 long Enfield rifles at $20. But this was a sideline,
for since December 26 they had been actively preparing to build Springfields, following the outline of their proposal of July 31, 1861.    ,
Among the first manufacturer-importers to come to their country’s call, they offered to make either 25,000 Enfield or Springfield rifle muskets at $18.50, and also carbines of the Enfield pattern, or of the American standard (not patented arms) at fifteen dollars ($15) each. Their shop at 11 Platt Street, New York, was ready to turn out, they claimed, 500 guns a week within 30 days from the date of the order.
Ripley accepted their proposal at their terms on August 3, and on that same day Sarson & Roberts wrote asking for three pattern muskets to help speed their preparations. But by November 23, the 30 days had long lapsed with no delivery owing to the many and great obstacles we have had to overcome in the manufacture of Springfield rifles, as they said. If we had fully realized the difficulties in the way of making the Springfield gun over the making of the Enfield pattern, with which we were much better acquainted, I do not think we should have ventured to have undertaken so difficult an enterprise.
This is a most revealing statement, in the light of the odd Enfield-form lockplates which were circulated in the antique gun market just one century later, as curiosities.
Sarson and Roberts may have been making some parts for the Enfield; hence they offered to make either the Enfield or the Springfield, rifle musket or carbine form. Ripley of course chose the Springfield and if these lockplates are from Sarson & Roberts they evidently did not make up any Enfields or, as is barely possible, the 143 long Enfields cited as delivered early in 1862.
Because of their difficulties, they asked the War Department to cancel the order of August 3 and issue a new one based on their greater understanding of the manufacturing problems. They wrote now formally to Secretary Cameron, offering to make 25,000 strictly interchangeable Springfields at $20 each, and gave themselves a lead time of two months with first delivery promised February 1, 1862. Ripley received this offer in memorandum from the Secretary and respectfully returned it to Cameron, disapproving it not only because of higher price and their previous failure, but because of the precedent it would set. But he was over-ruled and Assistant Secretary Thomas Scott issued the order on that frantic 26 December. They overshot their deadline and by April, 1862, had 200 barrels ready for proving. Letters to the Ordnance office went unanswered but Captain Dyer at Springfield Armory kindly gave them the proof data they required:

The musket barrels are required to be proved as follows, viz: First charge, 280 grains of powder, one ball weighing 500 grains, and two wads. Second charge, 250 grains of powder, one ball weighing 500 grains, and two wads.

Though slow, they were conscientious and when their case was filed before Holt and Owen it took little time to settle. The order was confirmed in the number of 20,000 rifles, subject to their making a proper contract. This was done June 17, 1862, with Joseph Hall of Staten Island and William Hayes of Brooklyn as sureties. The partners had obtained stocking machinery from Pusey, corner Elm & Pearl Streets, and it was operating in their shop. Jenks of Philadelphia was sub-contractor, making all parts except stock, barrel, and sight. Sights were made by Brown, rough barrels were obtained from Morris, Tasker & Company of Marshall iron from England, finished in the Sarson & Roberts shop on machines made for them by A. & F. Brown, who also made the barrel gauges. Some Pennsylvania iron was used for their barrels, from Craig & Koch at Reading. It was not so light and silvery and did not finish so finely as the Marshall iron, which was celebrated for its beauty as well as serviceability, but it stood proof. First delivery of 340 Springfields was split up into 2d, 3d, and 4th quality arms by Crispin during inspection, and deliveries continued at approximately 300-500 guns a month up to November 20, 1863. To complete their guns, they drew parts from Springfield Armory to the value of $8,434.12. Between hammer and bolster on the Sarson & Roberts locks an eagle is stamped; below the bolster the words u.s./new york/1862. Only 5,140 were delivered by Sarson & Roberts; the reason for failure to make more is unknown, as monthly totals were reaching a fairly respectable average of 1,000 when they stopped work.
Case No. 84. Eli Whitney, of New Haven.
Not the elder Whitney, deceased on January 8, 1825, but his son, Eli Junior, sometimes called The Second, was the principal in this case. He had assumed control of the arms factory and machinery works started by his father for making cotton gins and muskets, several years before Sam Colt came to him in 1847 to make revolvers. Contracts for Mississippi rifles at the same time increased the skill and technological resources of the Whitney works, by the millstream outside New Haven.
The community surrounding the cluster of armory buildings below the dam came to be called Whitneyville, and as the War began, Eli Junior commenced adding two new factory buildings. In these shops he filled a contract for the State of Connecticut for 5,600 rifles which were, as he said, nearly like the Springfield. In locks and trim they were close to the Ml861 type, but the sight was the 1858 leaf pattern resembling the Remington special or Zouave rifle sight, and that on other special arms. This sight base has less metal around the leaf screw, and the base is flat on the edge instead of stepped to protect the folded down leaves, as is the common Springfield sight. The lock is undated and forward of the hammer is marked in small letters e. whitney/n. haven. There are no proof marks and no U. S. nor Connecticut marks. The front sight base which serves as a bayonet stud is wider for the Enfield triangular bayonets with which these rifles were fitted, so Whitney could save a little money with the cheaper imported stickers. A second model of this pattern is stamped on the lock with a huge spread eagle and the word whitneyville in large shaded letters. The sight is the Springfield pattern, also.
This rifle must have been made some time after April 11, 1862, at which time Whitney informed Holt and Owen that I am not yet ready to make sights, as I have been using, for the State work, sights of another pattern. I am now forging the Springfield pattern. As of April 11, he had not delivered a final lot of 2,000 of these arms to Connecticut; the first 3,600 had been turned in.
Presumably the big eagle and Springfield sighted guns are of this second batch of 2,000. Though Connecticut did not inspect these arms, except to view them after finishing and see if they were good and serviceable, Whitney was not afraid of the strict interchangeability required for making the new Springfield. When he heard the price had been fixed for contracts at $20, he wrote on December 17, 1861, offering to make 40,000 at that figure. His offer was accepted by Ripley December 24, but Holt and Owen reduced the number to 25,000, subject to a proper contract.
Whitney himself demurred on accepting this counterproposal, a whole year during which he completed the 2,000 nearly Springfields for the State and took a flyer in a cheapie militia musket which now rates as one of the rarities of the whole Civil War gun field. This is a much misunderstood arm and has been called (and sold at inflated prices as) a Confederate arm.
Two versions exist, the long 40-inch barrel rifle and a shorter model conforming to the two-band Enfield sergeant’s rifle (33-inch barrel). The lock is of odd non-Springfield form, suggesting some sort of sporting lock plate adapted to the Springfield-contour nipple bolster. It is blued and marked simply e. whitney along the bottom edge forward of hammer. The hammer shape resembles a U. S. 1842 pistol hammer placed in a die for straightening and lengthening the shank to make it fit. The spur is lightly file-checkered, and the lock parts are rust-blued. The trigger guard and plate of Springfield rifle-musket form are of brass;

Set of production gauges in A. L. Jackson, Chicago, collection reveal great number of inspections Mississippi rifle went through in manufacture. Eli Whitney was pioneer introducing these gauges to commercial arms manufacture and yet turned out some of worst-fitting miscellanies of parts used in the war.

the Enfield-type solid bands held by 1853-pattern springs are finished in a brownish lacquer resembling brass; the butt of steel is similarly bronzed, but the fore-end cap is of brass. While some specimens are recorded as unnumbered, the specimen in the author’s collection, though not proof marked at all, is stamped 166 under the barrel and inside the lockplate. Rifling is three equal lands and grooves, .58 caliber. A short version of this arm is recorded by Fuller as caliber .61, rifling consists of 7 grooves.
A report exists indicating that Whitney had contracted on 6 June, 1860, with the State of Mississippi, to supply 1,500 of these rifles with bayonets. The exact description of the arm Whitney was to deliver is contained in a letter by Adjutant General W. L. Sykes of Mississippi to his governor, John J. Pettus, dated January 18, 1861. Sykes says:

Relative to the Mississippi rifle, it is but justice to state that every effort has been made to procure them within the power of this department. This arm being renowned for the brilliant victories achieved upon the battlefields of Mexico in the hands of the First Regiment of Mississippi Riflemen, has derived the appelation of Mississippi Rifle, and is the principal arm called for by the volunteer corps.

Whitney agreed to make these guns, but it must be remembered that all his Mississippi Rifle making machinery must have been in storage as he had not delivered any of this pattern for some years prior to 1860. He shipped out 60 rifles to Mississippi, but as Sykes noted, The arms were received and examined and proved to be old guns fixed up. Such an act being a violation of the letter and spirit of the contract, none of the arms were taken as a part of the contract, though the sixty were taken as an experiment.
Sykes was quite certain the 60 rifles received were old guns fixed up. This does not conform to the Whitney Enfield long and short rifles in collections. The rear sight of the long rifle No. 166 is same pattern as the Connecticut State Nearly Springfields, but another hole is drilled forward of the fixed base about %-inch as if for another sight base. The possibility exists that he proposed to fit the sight of the Model 1855 Maynard Primer rifle musket and decided against it as too complicated, filling the base screw hole with lead, blacked over. Such a sight is shown on Whitney’s advertisement of November 15, 1862 for these. At any rate, it is an arm entirely different from a refinished Mississippi Rifle and is certainly not a Confederate rifle.
The ad alluded to is a flier or broadside including a testimonial to Whitney’s rifles from no less a distinguished personage than Jefferson Davis, who is credited in the fall of 1862 not with being President of the Southern Confederacy, but as ex-colonel, Mississippi riflemen. Pistols only were in regular production at the time and priced; as to the odd Enfields of which both short (with patchbox) and long were illustrated, the flier simply said: For further information with regard to the above, and also with regard to Minnie rifles and Muskets, if wanted, address as above.
Who bought these Minnie rifles is not known, with one exception. They may have been used by watch and ward police societies, or by state prison guards and others needing military long arms on short budgets.
But Schuyler, Hartley and Graham was one source for marketing, and some of the Minnies were evidently bought by Major Hagner, or Whiteley, or Crispin in open purchase in New York. In the accounts of arms purchased from Schuyler, Hartley and Graham are listed on August 31, 1861, 60 Whitney’s Enfields, with sabre bayonets, at $22. Additional Whitney’s short Enfields were obtained September 6, 80 of them, at the same price. Delivered September 24 were 60 Whitney’s short rifles and on October 4, 1861, 80 more Whitney’s short Enfields, sabre bayonets, all at $22, a total of 280 short Whitney Enfield rifles with sword bayonets. The only listing that might refer to Whitney long Enfields is a shipment of December 27, 1861, when 100 Whitney Navy revolvers were received from S. H. & G, together with 180 long Enfield rifles, maker unspecified, at $20. It is possible these were Whitney arms, though omission of the maker’s name is not characteristic of the other listings for short rifles.
With the emphasis in the service for the long rifles rather than the short sword bayonet models, of all makes, Whitney probably concentrated on the long model and still had some on hand by November 1862, to judge from the ad.
For the scion of the house who was even then world famous for top quality precision machine work, these Whitney Enfields were a pretty poor advertisement. The bands shake, and fitting and finish is very poor, though certainly serviceable. But this little known and much-misunderstood weapon of the War seems to have been the North’s secret weapon. To judge by the workmanship, it was best left that way.
In addition to two different Connecticut State rifles, and two Enfield arms which had never been closer than a laugh to Enfield Royal Small Arms Factory, the Whitney Armory fashioned an odd and powerful copy of the French heavy Minie rifle, known as Carabine a Tige, 1846 model. A specimen Carabine in the author’s collection dated 1858 was fabricated in Liege for the Brazilian Navy, and has a 34 3/16inch round barrel shaped at the breech in an octagon (from rear sight back), rifled four grooves, .69 caliber. It takes a brass-hilt yataghan or sword bayonet, and with a 22’/2-inch curved blade attached it is a formidable puncher for close-in fighting. The guard strap is notched, as are so many French arms, to give a little grip for the hand in thrusting the bayonet. A long-range elevating slide rear sight to graduated 1,000 meters is fitted, and the sling swivels.
Captain John Adolphus Dahlgren, commanding the USS Plymouth, was much impressed by this French rifle. The caliber he liked because it permitted a maximum use of buckshot, which was ideal for the closequarters rough and tumble of deck fighting. He took the French pattern and modified it by the addition of the 1861 type Springfield lock, Springfield butt form, and a special spur behind the guard to give the hand an even better grip in thrusting with the bayonet. All other details he kept as in the French original, including the large headed ramrod designed to thump the solid Delvigne projectile against the tige to upset into the rifling. This was no longer necessary using the U. S. hollow-based .69 conical projectile.
Dahlgren’s classic Boat Armament text of 1856 featured the Carabine a Tige M1846; it was not until 1862-3 that he was able to have the model made by Whitney and adopted for the landing and assault boats of the Federal Navy. In general orders to the South Atlantic blockading squadron, penned aboard his flagship the Philadelphia, Dahlgren remarked on his pattern of rifle:
It has frequently happened that the peculiar nature of the duties in this command has required the service of bodies of men to be landed from vessels to act for a short time as infantry, assisted by light field pieces.
In order to meet similar exigencies commanders of vessels will take pains to select from their crews such men as may seem to have a turn for this kind of duty and have them drilled with small arms until they have attained the necessary proficiency.
In so doing it is to be borne in mind that the drill and the maneuverings are to be few and exceedingly simple.
The men should be thoroughly skilled in the loading and firing of their weapon, and firing at a mark is to be encouraged.
The light infantry drill will be best adapted to this service, and to the habits of the seamen.
The preferable arm, when it can be had, will be the new navy rifled musket, known as the Plymouth musket, because the first of the kind were made for the U.S. ship Plymouth, when under my command, the pattern of which was got up by myself as most suitable for sea service.
It is a short musket, about 34 inches in the barrel, bore 0.69-inch, and rifled.
Its special bayonet is a short, broad and stout knife, of the well-known Bowie pattern, the principal use of which I designed to be in the hand in close conflict, such as boarding. In campaigning it would also serve many wants; but it may be fixed and used as a bayonet.
There is also a sword bayonet similar to that of the French, making the total length of weapon, from butt to point, about equal to that of the army musket with the ordinary bayonet.
The musket is perfectly balanced for aim when the bayonet is not fixed; and its large bore gives great effect to buckshot, which, at short distances, is always to be preferred.
As a general rule, we have too much neglected the use of this formidable ammunition for small arms.
It is believed that the first bayonet regularly fitted to this arm was the copy of the French yataghan blade. By 1863 Dahlgren had decided on the use of the bowie-type knife and designed a massive chopper 12 inches long, 1 11/16 inches wide, and thick. It stuck on the end of the barrel but could also be carried as a bowie and was used as the sailor’s regular sidearm, constantly with him even if the muskets were locked up. These were made by Ames of Chicopee. Sword bayonets were made by Collins & Company,
Hartford, and were numbered to match the rifle. Officially the U. S. Navy Rifle Model 1861, these arms were dated through 1863; Fuller cites a specimen No. 4986 dated 1863. Bowie bayonets were also dated, some in 1864. About 7,000 Whitney Plymouth rifles were made. Being busy on them explains his failure to deliver or attempt to renegotiate an Army contract until a year had passed.
Then, curiously, he signed a contract, on 17 October,
1863 to supply General Ramsay with only 15,000 Springfield rifle muskets at $19. He had been working to get these ready, for his first delivery was three days later, on October 20, 1863. Five hundred Springfields were graded out as 310 class 1, 186 class 2, and 4 class 2*/i, paid for at $19, $18.90, and $18.50 respectively. In spite of the head start, he delivered but 14,500 of these by January 30, 1865.
Case No. 85. William Muir & Company, New York and Windsor Locks.
In this case bargaining achieved the desired end for Muir, confirmation of his contract for a full 30,000 Springfield rifle muskets. He delivered them all.
William Muir on 7 December 1861 received an order from the Secretary of War for 30,000 Springfields at $20. He commenced to sub-contract here and there, ordering 4,000 locks from Essler & Brother in Philadelphia. These locks seem to have given some difficulty among collectors in later identification of the arms supplied by Muir, because in addition to a lock marking, wm. muir & co./windsor locks, ct., there

Man who made most Springfields was Major Alexander B. Dyer, who commanded Armory from 21 August 1861 to 12 September 1864; was later Chief of Ordnance.

Basic machines of major contractors were similar, often supplied by same machine tool builder like Robbins & Lawrence or Ames. Washburn’s barrel rolls looked like this drawing. Barrel began as punched blank called mould and while hot was passed through diminishing grooves of rolls till thinned out longer. Mandrels kept hole in center constant.

is another lock marking simply Windsor locks and the date and eagle. Whether these Windsor Locks (only) plates are Muir’s earliest effort, or residue from the end of his contract, is not known. Both possibilities will be explored; it seems obvious that they have a connection with Muir’s operation though oddly, Muir & Company was actually of New York and there is a question as to how many of the rifles were actually made at Windsor Locks. The fine hand of O. T. Burt, who was a surety to the contract of A. M. Burt of Trenton, is seen in the Muir affair.
When Muir bit off the 30,000 musket chaw on December 7, he decided soon he had made a mistake. He asked for the opportunity to have the contract amended to read Wm. Muir & Company, thus avoiding the later nullifying he risked if he should assign the contract. This was assented to by Cameron and then Stanton and the amended order was dated January 10. Following receipt of the amended order, Muir together with O. T. Burt of Syracuse, New York, (brother of A. M. Burt, Trenton), formed the company Wm. Muir & Company, with Burt as a heavy stockholder. Offices were at 372 Broadway.
O. T. Burt, who had a financial interest in the Hodge-Burt Trenton contracts, was also behind the Windsor Locks firm of Dinslow & Chase. This shop proposed to supply Muir with barrels and also was making 25,000 barrels for the Trenton maker. But Dinslow & Chase also possessed capability to make locks. Though Muir proposed to get additional locks from Parker, Snow, Brooks & Company (the predecessors of the famous shotgun firm Parker Brothers), the
Trenton makers planned to rely on Dinslow & Chase for locks if need be. The Windsor Locks-marked plates then appear to be of Dinslow & Chase fabrication or assembly. By May 2, 1862, Muir informed Holt and Owen that We have a few guns assembled, and explained that a flood washing away part of the millrace dike had delayed their works by cutting off the power. It seems possible these first few guns were assembled with Windsor Locks lockplates prior to Muir’s incorporating as a company. Those made after the firm was duly established would bear that company name.
Muir was urged to make a proposal to reduce his contract to 20,000 to have it confirmed by Holt and Owen. But he demurred, saying all his contractors were talking about 30,000 pieces and he could not take the loss. Then he had a brainstorm: sell 25,000 at the full $20 and the last 5,000 at only $16. This the Commissioners went for and this was the way Muir filled the order. His contract, formally signed July 9, 1862, contained these terms and the deliveries which began January 22, 1863, and finished November 3, 1864, were paid at that rate: $20 and $16.
O. T. Burt upon completion of the Muir contract sought to get rid of the remaining surplus parts. He notified Major Laidley at Springfield Armory of these items and asked if he wanted to buy them. On November 3 Laidley instructed Master Armorer E. S. Allin and three aides to go to Windsor Locks and inspect and classify the items remaining. Among major parts there were locks, barrels, and ramrods, which Laidley informed Burt he could not take: The locks are all condemned and have the letter C stamped indelibly upon the different parts. We could not issue such articles to our troops.
But of the barrels, Laidley was less particular. He instructed Springfield workman P. O. Bush to inspect them again and such as could be made useful by cleaning up and removing the C were to be taken. Whether the Windsor Locks locks were such, having the old Muir marks removed in the cleaning up and renovating, we do not know. Either first or last, they seem certainly to have originated in Dinslow & Chase’s shop in Windsor Locks.
Case No. 88. Amoskeag Mfg. Company, E. A. Straw, Agent, Manchester, New Hampshire.
This was a simple and short case. Amoskeag was introduced to General Ripley by Hon. C. H. Dalton, who asked for a contract to make 10,000 Springfields. November 18, 1861 Ripley returned Dalton’s proposal to Cameron endorsed negatively. But Dalton and E. A.
Straw, the registered agent of Amoskeag, persisted, and on January 7, 1862, Ripley was ordered to send them a letter-order. This he did, 10,000 arms at $20, and Amoskeag got up steam to fill it.
On May 21, after being informed that Amoskeag was a company employing 600 men, representing about $3 million capital, the Commissioners confirmed the order because it was a small one, subject to their taking out a contract. This they did, 17 June, 1862, contracting to furnish 10,000 arms in all respects identical with the standard rifle-musket made at the United States Armory at Springfield, Mass., and are to interchange with it and with each other in all their parts. Amoskeag claimed they would finish and assemble the rifle complete in their own works, obtaining only the raw materials, rough barrels, and such, outside.
It seems difficult to reconcile their contract with what they actually delivered under its terms. For their muskets were not the Springfield, but the Colt Special Model which is sometimes known as the Springfield Model 1863, but was never made at the Armory, at least not in mass production. Meanwhile, their plant conversion to make the Springfield and also the Lindner carbines (see Chapter 11) continued during the summer and winter and on June 11, 1863, Amoskeag delivered the first 500 arms under their June 17, 1862 contract.
Somehow, in spite of millions of capital and employing regularly 600 men, Amoskeag took longer to deliver their first gun than many of the small shops that had contracts for five times as many. Only 10,001 were delivered. Inferentially, the one extra gun included in the shipment of July 13, 1863, was to replace one held out of the first shipment as an inspection sample. Indeed, how much of the Amoskeag gun was Manchester-made, and how much came from Colt or some other source, like Lamson, Goodnough & Yale, is a moot question.
Amoskeag’s second contract, dated November 5, 1865, called for them to make 15,000 Springfields of the model of 1862, similar to those now being delivered under contract with this department, except that the locks and bands must be case hardened and blued, in the same manner in which those parts are now being finished at the United States Armory, Springfield, Massachusetts.
The first 10,001 were finished national armory bright, with burnished lockplates, and the barrels longitudinally brushed to a silvery luster. Whether the second lot of Amoskeag Special Models received conformed to the contract or the original inspector’s model is not known. So many of these arms were later C & R, cleaned and repaired, that the barrel bands and lockplates may have been brightened up on Amoskeag guns of the second lot originally colored in these parts. By February 28, 1865, 15,000 were received. Meanwhile, on January 6, 1865, Amoskeag’s third and last contract shaped up, not as a formal document but as a letter of acceptance of a proposal. John B. Anthony, a principal in the Providence Tool Company, and E. A. Straw of Amoskeag, joined together in a sort of memorial-type letter on 16 December, 1864, to Secretary Stanton, asking to be permitted to finish up their spare parts into complete muskets. General Dyer agreed to this on January 6, and Straw shipped down 2,000 more finished guns made up from overruns of major components. In all, 27,001 arms were delivered and paid for, not one of which conformed to the letter of the contracts.
It is thought possible, but as yet unproved, that Straw may have bought muskets from Colt to supply for the first deliveries, and thus set himself on the trail of making the Special Model instead of the 1861 Springfields for which he contracted.
Case No. 89. Green Kendrick, Waterbury, Connecticut. Springfields, no delivery.
An unsuccessful contractor, Green Kendrick earlier had failed in pre-war United States contracts and now tried his hand at arranging the Springfield 1861 rifle muskets. By collaborating with O. T. Burt of Trenton, Muir & Company, and Dinslow & Chase, he hoped to get his parts made along with those for the Muir contract. In addition to the list of sub-contractors, perhaps the most interesting point John Kendrick, Green’s son (for the old man was sick and this had delayed his work), reported to Holt and Owen on April 11, is that His arms are to be finally assembled at Windsor

Vertical four-spindle barrel drill let tool bite down from own weight as cutting face chewed away chips. To drill solid steel barrels, this rig designed by Fred Howe for Robbins & Lawrence at Windsor, Vt. 1852 was probably used by Lamson, Goodnough & Yale for Civil War production of Rifle Muskets.

Locks, Connecticut, by Mr. E. W. Andrews.
It is possible that the rare' Windsor Locks arms are the first few of the Green Kendrick order and that because of Kendrick’s sickness and general disability no more were made. No delivery is found on this order, which was issued by letter dated January 10, 1862, calling for
25,000 arms. No formal contract was ever made, as Holt and Owen had required, and the order was annulled by non-compliance.
Case No. 90. James Mulholland, 50,000 Springfields.
On January 7, 1862, the superintendent of the Reading Railroad, James Mulholland, obtained a letter order or contract for 50,000 Springfields but was delayed by the failure of Springfield Armory to make a pattern rifle available to him until the middle of February (order of 13 February). Not proposing to capitalize the manufacture of the arm himself, Mulholland went to Parker, Snow, Brooks & Company of Meriden, Connecticut, to do the job, anticipating that he himself would only make the bayonets in a small shop in Meriden. Stocks were to be furnished by H. E. Robbins of Hartford, who operated a musket stock mill at Unionville, capable of making 6,000 stocks per month. Though locks were proposed to be obtained from Williams & Company of Philadelphia, most of them would be made by Parker, Snow, Brooks & Company. Snow was a practical gunmaker of 15 years experience, Parker an inventor of note as manager, quite willing to take on the added liability of the Mulholland contract.
When, in response to the decision of Holt and Owen cutting the quota to 25,000, Mulholland negotiated a formal contract on June 11, 1862, Charles Parker along with B. Rush Petrikin signed it as sureties. E. W. Andrews, who, according to John Kendrick, planned to assemble Green Kendrick’s guns at Windsor Locks, was witness to the signature of Charles Parker. Mulholland’s first delivery was 500 guns on July 7, 1863; 5,502 arms in all were delivered, almost certainly marked with the lockplate stamping of Parker, Snow & Co. The last delivery was October 31, 1863.
Case No. 91. F. L. Bodine, 25,000 Springfields. No delivery.
Though containing an interesting picture of a contractor’s efforts at sub-contracting (locks by Williams of Philadelphia, barrels by Mason at Taunton), the Bodine case does not indicate any arms were made. There were no deliveries.
Case No. 93. Warren Fisher, Jr. This is the record of the Spencer Repeating Rifle Company, Boston. See Chapter on Spencers.
Case No. 94. Merrill, Thomas & Company, Baltimore. Breechloading rifles and carbines. See Chapter 11.
Case No. 95. P. S. Justice. See Chapter 7.
Case No. 96. A. K. Eaton, New York, New York, 50,000 Springfields. None delivered.
Though introduced to the Secretary of War by the great Peter Cooper himself, Eaton flopped as a musket maker or arranger of parts. He formed a company, the Syracuse Fire-arms Company, and he had high testimonials from financiers and mechanical people. But erysipelas laid him low and he failed in his contract. Of Eaton, Cooper wrote: he was a man of high scientific attainments and great ingenuity and skill as a mechanic. Three other firms, including barrel makers Cooper & Hewitt, cited him as in the front rank as a man of science, and is a thorough mechanic and an inventor of genius. Maitland and Auchincloss described him as a gentleman of uncommon mechanical skill in the department of firearms. Whether Eaton was once of the firm that Gluckman & Satterlee lists as Eaton & Kittredge of Cincinnati, about 1850. is not known. A later Syracuse Arms Company, very likely the heirs of Eaton’s enterprise, made hammerless shotguns in Syracuse, New York, presumably not earlier than, say, 1875.
Case No. 97. J. Pierpont Morgan. This was the Hall Carbine Affair detailed elsewhere in Chapter 12.
Case No. 98. T. Robinson Rogers, 25,000 Springfields. No delivery.
This is an odd one, in the conduct of the principal. Rogers was sent a contract-letter December 24, 1861 and accepted it by his letter in reply January 2, 1862. When Stanton called for copies of documents for Holt and Owen, Rogers promptly complied on February 7, noting he had bought materials and some machinery and expected to be ready. Then, silence. Repeated notes sent to him produced no further response, and on June 18, 1862, the Commissioners agreed to confirm his order for 20,000 arms, provided he signed a contract. But, no Rogers, no contract, no guns.
Case No. 99. Rogers & Spencer. Pettingill pistols. See Chapter 23. 25,000 Springfields. None delivered.
This case had its stern aspect, for Hagner dealt very harshly with them though they had acted in good faith. Rogers & Spencer of Willow Vale, Oneida County, New York, had for 25 years operated a machine shop. At the time War began they were making revolvers of the Raymond & Robitaille and Pettingill patents, but obtained an order for 25,000 muskets. Rogers, in Washington in June testifying before the Commission, advised that nothing had been done on the muskets and agreed to relinquish the musket contract to gain approval of the revolver order. This was assented to and the musket order was declared null and void. Relayed to Willow Vale, it produced an immediate response from Courtney Schenck, apparently Rogers & Spencer’s works foreman:
New York, June 27, 1862 Gentlemen: I shall protest against any action to cancel the Springfield gun contract issued to Messrs. Rogers, Spencer & Co. I have been for a long while engaged in arranging to manufacture these guns, and the parts are now under manufacture and have been for some time. Mr. Rogers, when in Washington, where he had been about one month, was not aware that so much progress had been made, as it has been done principally by one of the other partners, and we expect to deliver guns as soon as any other party ... I hope if the rumor is true of your intention to annul this contract, you will consider it, and give us a fair chance with the rest of the manufacturers.
Courtney Schenck Per Rogers, Spencer & Co. Schenck did not write with authority. To check the correctness of the letter, Hagner cagily wrote directly to Rogers & Spencer in Willow Vale (near Utica), asking for a copy of the letter he had received from them on 28 June, which he said had been mislaid. It had of course been mislaid on top of the active file on his desk. Rogers & Spencer on July 4 confirmed what Hagner had suspected, for he had already on July 1 told Schenck there was no hope for the case. On July 7, Hagner wrote again to Rogers & Spencer, enclosing copies of Schenck’s original letter, Hagner’s refusal to Schenck of July 1, and the following note which simply does not ring true:
Washington, July 7, 1862
Gentlemen: I enclose copies of letters received and written by the commission. Mr. Holt thought he had lost Mr. Schenck’s leter and therefore wrote for a duplicate. It was afterwards found.
This will explain the enigma which puzzled you.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, P. V. Hagner,
Major of Ordnance
Messrs. Rogers & Spencer,
Willow Grove, (sic.) Utica, N. Y.
Whether Hagner had qualms of conscience later about this is not told by history, but history does record a rather unusual contract for revolvers which Rogers & Spencer ultimately received. The demand was no longer so great for revolvers, but the Willow Vale firm sold 5,000 revolvers in a quick contract that was of no value to the United States, as shown in Chapter 23. Perhaps this contract was Hagner’s doing, to make up for his adamant stand on the muskets. If Schenck was correct, and parts did exist of Rogers & Spencer make, for the Springfields, they were probably absorbed in the manufacture of other arms by other contractors, such as C. B. Hoard at Watertown, New York.
Case No. 100. Caspar D. Schubarth, 10,000 breechloading arms and 20,000 Springfields.
Schubarth described himself as a small gun dealer with a shop in Providence, and stated that he had been engaged in making firearms over seventeen years. Available lists do not reflect his status as a gunsmith in the United States and his expression, having served my time to the trade suggests he worked most of this time in Europe, perhaps in his native Norway. However, he had some powerful friends in Rhode Island and one of them, Senator James F. Simmons, gladly took him around Washington and helped him obtain a contract. For this service, Schubarth promised Senator Simmons a commission of five per cent. The gunmaker had been told by Providence friends, machinists Amos D. and J. Y. Smith, with whom he first considered executing the order, that it was customary to offer commissions.
Schubarth proposed to make his own patent breechloader, but Ripley, without even bothering to learn the name of the man who showed it to him (it was Schubarth himself) quashed that idea. On October 9, Schubarth proposed in writing to make 10,000 breechloaders at $35 (for carbines) and $37.50 (for rifles with bayonets), and 20,000 Springfields at $20. Ripley returned this proposal to Acting Secretary of War Thomas A. Scott, vetoing the breechloaders and saying, as he had on so many other occasions, Contracts and orders for muskets on prospective deliveries have already been made to a sufficient extent, and I cannot recommend the acceptance of this proposition.

Ames stock turning machine was improved by Cyrus Buckland from Thomas Blanchard’s original designs at Springfield Armory; was widely used by contractors.

Scott received this memorandum October 10. It is not difficult to imagine what happened: Schubarth and Simmons converged upon the hapless and harassed Secretary.
My constituent here can make all the Springfields you need; and what if those other contracts for ‘prospective delivery’ fail, Mr. Scott, what then? Simmons doubtless argued. The result at any rate was obvious; the day after he recommended refusal of Schubarth’s proposal, General Ripley by direction of the Secretary of War issued a letter-contract to Schubarth ordering
20,000 Springfields. His colleagues with whom he at first proposed to arrange the manufacture, Messrs. Amos Smith and J. Y. Smith in Providence, urged him to obtain a larger contract, claiming 20,000 muskets was not enough to get their tools warm. In November, Schubarth returned to Washington and buttonholed Senator Simmons, who again helped him to obtain an extension. On November 26 Ripley ordered an additional 30,000 Springfields from the persistent Caspar.
Behind-the-scenes activities revealed how well grounded Ripley had been in refusing and being cautious in dealing with such men, in spite of the ease with which the Secretary, his superior, ordered arms. For when Schubarth returned to Providence with the expanded order, the Smiths could not or would not cooperate with him. Possessing a big contract, he had to cast about for new partners, and lined up Frederick Griffing of Brooklyn, and James M. Ryder of Pawtucket, to finance him. The three formed a partnership listed as C. D. Schubarth & Company; to it Schubarth contributed his contracts and gunmaking know-how as his one third; the others contributed their money and time. The articles of copartnership contained an interesting limitation, that it existed solely for the musket business, but said copartnership shall extend to no other undertaking, business, or transaction whatever. Finding any sporting gun or transformed musket legitimately marked C. D. Schubarth & Company is therefore most unlikely today. The company, by signed copartnership articles, was formed 15 February, 1862. Subcontracts which Schubarth arranged were:
Barrels, Aston & Co. of Middletown, Connecticut, from rough barrels made by Washburn and Trenton Iron Works.
Locks, 3,000 from Jenks of Philadelphia, the rest from Williams, also of Philadelphia.
Stocks, from Empire Works, New York, foot of East 24th Street.
Mountings, Pecksmith Manufacturing Company of Suddington, Connecticut, to make bayonets, butt plate, stock tip. Guard bow and trigger from Bigelow, Hartford.
Implements, made in Providence under supervision of Schubarth.
Final Assembly, in Providence by Schubarth.
The partners Ryder and Griffing, when they came to learn of the assistance of Senator Simmons, called on him and reached an agreement about the commissions; Simmons received their notes for $10,000; but Schubarth still considered that in all the Senator was due 5% or about $50,000. When Commissioners Holt and Owen came to view the deal, they delved deeply into

Elaborate guard plate inletting machine did in seconds what good man with chisel did in minutes. Enormous production of War material North and South was result of mechanization of industry which emergency justified.

the fundamental integrity of the senatorial office. The Senate itself resolved to find out what their member from Rhode Island had been up to, and upon their resolution the letters and records of the case were transmitted to the Hon. S. Foote, President of the Senate pro tem.
What Judge Holt and former Congressman Robert Dale Owen had to determine was not only if any laws had been violated by Schubarth and Senator Simmons, but if the deal was contrary to the principles of the Government.
Two statutes bore upon the case, affecting the receiving of compensation by a senator. The first was an Act of April 8, 1808, prohibiting a senator from holding an interest in a contract with the United States. Since payment of the commission by Schubarth was not contingent upon completion of his musket contract, but was for the service of having got the contracts in the first place, it was obvious that the senator held no interest in the contract.
The second Act, of February 26, 1853, prohibited a senator from receiving compensation for acting as agent or attorney for prosecuting any claim or claims against the United States. Though Senator Simmons’ aid might give rise to a claim, as it did in the person
of Schubarth before the Commission seeking ratification of his contracts, the Senator’s actions were not of themselves pressing any claim of Schubarth’s against the United States.
The logic of Judge Holt is seen in the Commission’s report: Senator Simmons, also, we doubt not, regards his action in accepting this compensation as strictly legal, and we cannot, in the present condition of the legislation of Congress upon this subject, contest his opinion.
But the Commission rightly noted that it was not the labor of accompanying Schubarth to chat with Thomas Scott for which Simmons was to be paid, but for his supposed influence over the Executive Branch of the Government.
If we understand the theory of our government aright, the Commissioners curtly summed up, the influence which a member of Congress, as such, exercises over the administration of the departments is as much public property as is his vote in the Capitol. While the latter is so carefully protected from being brought into conflict with his personal interests, why is not the former entitled to the same guardianship? Holt and Owen raised that question on June 2, 1861.
A century later, early in July, 1961, in trying to give a damaged revolver to Senator Paul H. Douglas of Illinois who had promised to investigate the Government’s destruction of these arms, I found that such guardianship was actively at work, if not in law at least in morality. Misunderstanding at first what the pistol was, the Senator without even looking at it, said, Oh, no, I never accept gifts.
In Senator Simmons’ day, $50,000 for helping a constituent obtain a contract for needed War supplies was usual. Holt and Owen had to accept Schubarth’s open-faced sincerity, and taking into consideration that others who were American-born had counseled him into making the commission offer, they decided that no blame to either party should be declared. Rather, the evil if such existed, lay with the system. In confirming 30,000 muskets, they required that Schubarth in order to have his contract approved, had to execute a formal contract.
Schubarth’s contract for not 30,000 but only 28,000 Springfields was signed 10 July, 1862. As surety, in addition to his partner, Ryder, was Albert H. Almy, of New York, the Treasurer of the Eagle Mfg. Company of Mansfield, Connecticut, an associate of James D. Mowry, and President of Norwich Armories. There is nothing to make it appear that Almy was engaged in anything improper, yet it appears that he had his finger in the supplying of several hundred thousand Springfields, more than any other single person including prime contractor Samuel Colt. To what extent the Schubarth arms were fabricated at Norwich Armories, using Schubarth’s 3,000 lockplates already in progress of manufacture by Jenks, is only a conjecture. Schubarth’s first delivery, December 19, 1862, was of 500 arms; following deliveries to October, 1863, averaged
1,000 pieces totalling 9,500. Whether Schubarth from
the $189,305.10 he received ever paid Senator Simmons for those two visits to the War Department is unrecorded.
Case No. 101. Joseph B. Butterfield, Philadelphia,
50,000 Springfields.
Butterfield began by offering his own version of a sword bayonet Enfield rifle. Though Butterfield was mentioned favorably by Colonel Kingsbury, the War Department preferred to take up his offer of making Springfields. The exact nature of the Butterfield Enfield is not known and no specimen seems to now exist. Butterfield proceeded to push ahead on the Springfields when he received Ripley’s letter-contract of December
24, 1861, ordering 50,000 rifle muskets.
Mr. Stephens of the Butterfield firm sent out to raise the money, and had interested a backer when Stanton’s order calling for copies of contracts made the backer pull out. Stephens called on Stanton thereafter and was assured that if the arms were made as per contract they would be received. He got another money man interested, but the rumors about annulling contracts after the appointment of the Commission frightened off this one, too. Stephens, having a hard time, turned to Samuel Norris, who was busy making gun parts and sub-contracting at his shop in Springfield, and had turned out some thousands of arms, for Massachusetts. Norris promised to supply Butterfield’s muskets if the order was confirmed, and Stephens reported that he could deliver 500 in July. The Commissioners, on June 18, 1862, confirmed the order for 25,000 muskets, but Butterfield failed to execute the contract. No Butterfield-marked muskets are known, nor should there be any.
Case No. 106. Colonel O. De Forrest, see Chapter 23. Concerns Butterfield brass-framed so-called Confederate revolvers actually used by Federal troops.
Case No. 107. E. Townsend, shot for cannon. Recommended paid.
Oddly-Marked Rifle Muskets
Versions of U.S.-pattern rifle muskets are thought by this writer to be post-Civil War utilization of unserviceable arms, not issue or volunteer rifles as believed. These include the very few Springfield Rifle Muskets found with lockplates engraved fJlanton. and those of Springfield pattern variously marked whitney with, in some instances, extra-large eagles or with flat nonbeveled lockplates which are usually considered to be cartridge-rifle lockplates.
The Manton arm exists in very few examples. Seemingly identical to the U.S. Ml861, it is different as Fuller describes The Rifled Musket (Stackpole Co.), p. 176:
No record of this contract is available. This is a regulation U. S. Model 1861 rifled musket, the lockplate of which is marked forward of the hammer manton in Gothic print and to the rear of the hammer the date 1862. The barrel
has the customary vp and eagle-head proof marks, the eagle head in this case being considerably different from that ordinarily used. In addition to the U. S. proof marks the barrel also has the British proof marks with the numerals 25 like the regular British Enfields were marked.
The us on the tang of the butt plate instead of being the ordinary letters stamped in are heavily shaded letters having the appearance of engraving.
Another specimen seen by this writer was converted to a shotgun after the fashion common after the war.
The firm Joseph Manton & Sons was one of the great gunmakers of London; unfortunately Fuller does not state what British proof marks were present on the specimen he lists, and the shotgun seen by the writer had no such proof marks. If by Joseph Manton & Sons of London make, it should reasonably have a Londonproved barrel. But this is not routine in the several examples known.
Suggesting a clue, in the absence of full knowledge of this interesting arm is the record of sales after the war. Then, as for example during March, April, May, and June of 1871, Charles Folsom, 53 Chambers Street, New York was a buyer. Awarded to him during those sales listed was a selection of Colt and other revolvers, unserviceable, 100 Colt breech stocks at 40^ each, evidently for the pistol-carbines, and 17 Henry rifles and 500 Spencer carbines. He also bought 196 pounds of unserviceable spare parts at 35^ per pound—a valuable assortment.
Later buyers at Government sales numbered Charles Folsom, who is believed to have been associated with H. & D. Folsom in what later became the H. & D. Folsom Arms Company. Registered as a private brand name employed by the H. & D. Folsom Arms Company is the name Manton & Company. This private brand was more or less fraudulently applied to arms to gull the unsuspecting into thinking they were getting a fine gun, of a make dimly remembered as a glorious piece of gun craftsmanship from before the war. Folsom Arms controlled the factory, Crescent Firearms Company, of Norwich, Connecticut, a city where large supplies of surplus Springfield Rifle Musket parts might be logically found in the scrap trade, from the production there of the Norwich and Jas. D. Mowry contract arms 1861-65. We suspect the Manton

Forest of machine tools filled Colt’s Armory shops. Scene was typical more or less of machine works of 1861. Western buffalohide belts slapped over pullies to furnish power derived from steam engine or water wheel.

marked guns are Folsom reworked muskets, marked for sale in locales where the name Manton meant something, including possibly in unsophisticated parts of the United Kingdom where British-proved guns would be mandatory, regardless of mark. Offsetting this conjecture is the very remote possibility that George Schuyler arranged for Manton of London to make the Springfield Rifle Musket and these few pieces which have come to light where preliminary samples for an uncompleted order. Such would have exceeded the authority of Schuyler’s orders, and is not mentioned by Schuyler in otherwise detailed correspondence. Manton is not known for the manufacture of military type arms. In later years this firm took on the character of a general sporting goods supply house. The writer once owned a Winchester Ml905 self-loading rifle, caliber .401, stamped manton & co., calcutta, their once-owned, later independent Indian agency.
The Whitney arms are difficult to date exactly. How many of several variations upon the main theme of Springfield rifle musket are wartime, and how many interim 1866-70 conglomerations for commercial sale, we will never know. But that Whitney sold Springfield pattern arms commercially is a fact. The writer once saw in use on the range of the Associated Gun Clubs of Baltimore, Maryland, about 1948, a Springfield rifle musket bearing the mark on the stock of a large spread eagle and the words in a circle (as remembered), whitney arms co. The barrel was blued. Upon removing it from the stock, the bluing appeared to be old, refinish or new finish, of the same dating as the stock stamp. The lockplate marking is not now recalled, but it was not Whitney. However, a host of Whitney lockplate marks exist, some involving the large spread eagle. It seems this was recognized in the arms trade, even far abroad in the Orient, as a trade mark of Eli Whitney’s sales organization. Some of these arms, especially short barreled and special model arms, were postwar, put together surplus parts.
Special Model Muskets and two-band rifles seem to be a part of this picture. The contention is often parrotted that these were put together for artillerists, etc. An early quotation in the arms history field on the subject is from Charles W. Sawyer’s Our Rifles. Published in 1922, this is one of the first references to special models and seems to have moulded arms collectors’ thinking for years:
During the Civil War when exigencies demanded more arms than could be issued of the model then under manufacture. spare parts of preceding models were drawn from the storehouses and incorporated with parts of the latest design. Not only was this done in the shops of the Government but also some of the contractors were furnished with extra parts made in the Government shops.
Sawyer then goes on to describe a particular rifle:
Calibre .58. Weight about 8 pounds. Length of barrel about 33 inches. Two bands. Except for adherence to these specifications the details of this class of arms did not follow a prescribed rule.
These arms were made during 1863, 1864, and 1865 from the left-overs of rifles and muskets of 1865 and preceding years. The specimen shown has a lock of the 1861 pattern bearing the date of 1862; a cut-down barrel dated 1863; a re-shaped model 1841 stock, and a butt plate of 1819 pattern. Some of the specimens of this arm, now in collections, are mounted with brass, and others with iron, and still others with part each. These arms were made during the Civil War when adherence to a standard pattern became a detail of minor importance, because the main object was to get something—anything—that would shoot.
The issue of these arms was to artillerists—field and coast -—for personal defense under unusual conditions, and for use when foraging as mounted infantry.
The gobbledygook in the foregoing will reveal to the thoughtful person that Sawyer simply did not know what he was talking about. So far as strict adherence to a standard pattern is concerned, the numerous contracts reproduced in part or in spirit in this section reveal how important Generals Ripley, Ramsay, Dyer, all believed a standard pattern to be. Minor details not affecting service might pass a Springfield Rifled Musket at $19.90 instead of the contract $20, but you can bet your last shinplaster that Springfield looked exactly like 800,000 other of its fellows.
Within the production of the Springfield basic arm there were, it is true, changes. These patterns existed and were used as guides in accepting arms. Contracts negotiated during the 1864-5 period often were filled by arms of the improved models. But the short jobs, the 33 inch barreled guns, are unauthorized models. Even when the barrel is tapered at the muzzle to take a bayonet, commercial speculation by surplus arms dealer Francis Bannerman as a cadet rifle is the explanation. The majority of such arms, especially those such as the specimen cited by Sawyer with stock of one model and butt of another, are gunsmith puttogethers either for Confederate service or just hopeful sale for bear hunting. No contracts exist for short Springfields, and Civil War photos of artillerists show them equipped with regular rifles. The last sentence of Sawyer’s is a malapropism—he says when foraging as mounted infantry. To have any sense at all the statement must read, when skirmishing as mounted infantry. And, even then, mounted infantry dismount for purposes of entering the skirmish line (unless the word is used carelessly in describing a cavalry type action). As for foraging, the only enemy battled by foragers were pigs and chickens. Springfield Armory in the hot days of ’63 did not produce arms designed for chicken thieves . . . one snaphance a millenium is enough.