CHAPTER 8 Millions for Muskets

When Secretary Stanton called to the colors a partner of the gun-sales firm of Schuyler, Hartley and Graham of New York, he could have let himself in for a peck of trouble. He proposed to place in Marcellus Hartley’s hands virtual control of the supply of arms from abroad. Yet a most searching scrutiny of the record reveals in the person of the youthful Hartley, furnished with the emoluments if not the dignity of a brigadier general, one of the most zealous and honest Union men to emerge from the history of the war. Preceding him as arms buyers were the reckless General Fremont and Colonel George L. Schuyler, whose name is the same as one of Hartley’s silent partners, but is not that man.
It was to Colonel Schuyler that Cameron turned first, possibly through recommendation of the Ordnance officers stationed at Governors Island. On June 3, 1861, General Ripley signed his famous letter to Cameron of estimates. Though he was kept in the dark about the other plans for the number of men contemplated being placed in the service, Ripley made a fair guess the Union needed an aggregate force of 250,000 men of all arms, cavalry, artillery, and infantry,
and requested Cameron to instruct him as to his course for obtaining arms. Though a stickler for discipline, realizing his office could not run efficiently unless in an orderly manner, Ripley was not bashful about giving advice. And on June 3 he called the Secretary’s attention to the fact that he, Ripley, had suggested, some five weeks before, when my views on this subject were requested, the propriety of obtaining from abroad from 50,000 to 100,000 small arms and eight batteries of rifled cannon, but that he had no indication any action had been taken on the matter. The suggestion had been made to General Scott; Mr. Daniel Tyler of Connecticut, subsequently General Tyler, was then considered as the agent to send abroad, but no action was taken.

Fremont’s Purchases in Europe

The sense of uncertainty created situations which could only lead to abuse. John C. Fremont, that glamorous officer of the Corps of Topographical Engineers, the Pathfinder, was in Europe that spring.
He conferred with the United States Minister in London, Charles Francis Adams, and with Henry Sanford, Minister in Brussels. His belief was that when he returned to the United States to assume command, there would be a great scramble for arms and he did not want to get caught short. He bought quantities of arms at high prices, in one case leading to a scandal of War profiteering which did not easily die: the Hall Carbine Affair. But his foreign purchases were simply standard arms at too-high prices. From John Hoey, an importer with offices in New York, he obtained 100 Enfield rifles on August 31 and another 100 on September 4, at $26.50, as much as ten dollars more than other Enfields later were appraised for. His stop in New York on his return from Europe permitted him to buy, on that same August 18, also from John Hoey, 2,180 smoothbore muskets, new, brown and bright, at $10. These apparently were Austrian smoothbores, of the 1840 Augustin-lock type which Fremont had to have converted to percussion cone before issuing. He also purchased Colt revolving rifles, perhaps from Hartley’s store, for as much as $65, and Colt’s carbines at $60, much more than these arms are worth as General Ripley complained in evaluating Fremont’s irregular conduct. The Colt carbines were issued to Fremont’s bodyguard troop of cavalry, the Fremont Hussars, under command of Hungarian Major Zagonyi. Back in Europe the boats were loading rifles for Fremont, arms purchased in concord with the actions of Minister Sanford, who plunged into the gun buying markets with a will. During the end of 1861 and in 1862, Sanford paid out $446,298 for arms which were among the cheapest arms bought by the Union in the rising market, and the best value for money spent.
Principally from the fabricants of Liege, Sanford obtained 28,364 smoothbore muskets, and 27,648 rifled muskets; and 25 Lefaucheux pistols, ordered by General Fremont. While the description pistols could refer to topbreak double barrel pinfire handguns resembling sawed-off shotguns, of small size (9mm or 12mm), they more probably were Lefaucheux military Model 1853 revolvers, 12mm, of the type more commonly recognized as a U. S. secondary martial pistol. The muskets are not fully described; there is a probability that they were the Ml840 series of back-action muskets, which had been in the French service and retired owing to wear in the rifling. These guns were rifled about 1847, and new arms made of the same pattern during this time, at the various government factories but also, and principally, at Liege. Though a standard pattern of the French service, it was a popular export model from the Liege fabricants who supplied similar muskets to War departments around the globe. Those which Sanford found he could buy so cheaply, at an average price of $7.96, may have included the Liege muskets, once-rifled, and then reamed up to smoothbore again after wear in the rifling.
The philosophy seems to have been, at least so far as salesmanship goes, better to have a bright-bored

Foreign arms purchased by Col. Schuyler or Marcellus Hartley were issued in early stages of War to supply Northern levies. Shown at sally port of Union heavy artillery fort near Arlington, Va., is guard with Lorenz Austrian rifle.

smoothbore than a worn rifle. The long-range rear sights which elevated the muzzle to throw the Minie projectile of nominal .70 inch diameter a thousand yards, were melted off; they were attached with soft solder. The muskets being struck up bright, the solder often remained in a smear on top of the barrel to show where the sight had been.
It is believed that these were the arms Sanford found so easily available, weapons which otherwise would have gone into the African or Far Eastern trade for sale to colonial princes and despots. Yet functionally, their back-action locks were superior to the side lock of the U. S. muskets, including the new, vaunted perfect Springfield rifle; they were less likely to be contaminated from the cap smoke on discharge. The bands and barrel proportions were much like the same parts of the common U. S. type 1835-1842 muskets, smoothbores, and the stocks were of good walnut. Sanford, for all the complaints of later commissions, made a fairly good buy. And in the emergency, obviously the merchants would not offer their very best arms first, for it would leave them with unsold arms such as their reworked smoothbores, still on hand. Sanford and Fremont got what was offered, and approximately at the going prices.
Fremont was allowed to keep the arms he had purchased in Europe, to equip his command. But this was not the way to run a war, both Cameron and Ripley agreed. The Ordnance general was particularly miffed by Fremont’s irregular purchasing sprees, for he repeatedly referred in his official correspondence to the third section of the Act approved February 8, 1815 . . . that it shall be the duty of the colonel or senior ordnance officer, under the direction of the Secretary of War, to make contracts and purchases for procuring the necessary supplies of arms, equipments, ordnance and ordnance stores. As Ripley very coldly observed, These purchases by Major General Fremont or his agents are not in accordance with the stipulations of this act. That Fremont was short-circuiting Ripley’s own efforts to buy arms cheaply, for the same ultimate consumer, Uncle Sam, was a matter that Ripley did not choose to make an issue of at the moment.

Schuyler Appointed Central Purchasing Agent

To bring order to the mounting chaos of separate bidders raising prices on arms in the New York market, President Lincoln decided to appoint a single agent. He chose Colonel George L. Schuyler as that man; Schuyler was informed of the choice by Cameron on July 29, 1861: The President relies upon your integrity and discretion to make such purchases of arms as you may deem advisable upon the very lowest terms compatible with the earliest possible delivery. A credit of $2,000,000 was to be placed to Schuyler’s account with Baring Brothers, London bankers, to buy 100,000 rifle muskets with bayonets, 20,000 sabers, 10,000 carbines for cavalry, and 10,000 revolvers.

Among best arms bought abroad were Thouvenin system rifles from Dresden, a heavy but accurate .69 round ball gun (top); and French minies. Thouvenin rifle is steel trim, casehardened with blued barrel; Carabine de Chasseurs de Vincennes (middle) is bright with 4-groove .69 bore for minie bullet. At bottom is elegant .58 beautiful minie, brass trim, blued, weighing 7.5 pounds.

While Schuyler could not be limited in detail as to the nomenclature of the arms he should buy, he was quite fully acquainted with the desire for Springfieldquality arms. Ripley had explained to Secretary Cameron that the Enfield rifle as made at the Royal Small Arms Factory in England was largely a result of studies made by British engineers at Springfield Armory; machinery had been bought in Springfield from the same toolmakers who supplied the Armory, and some half dozen of the top Springfield men had been hired to supervise at Enfield—boss of them all as Chief Engineer was James H. Burton of Harpers Ferry. Ripley had confidence in the serviceability of the No. 1 quality machine-made Enfield, if Schuyler would buy them. He was to purchase as many as possible to fill the requirement ready-made, and the rest were to be contracted for, to be delivered in New York not more than six months from the date of his orders.
When Schuyler got to London on August 12, 1861, he scouted around and spent the week fruitlessly discovering that Rebel buyer Caleb Huse, and other agents, including those from the Northern states, had tied up the London and Birmingham factories. The London Armoury, only private machine-made Enfield source, which a short time before had refused to do business with Southern agent Caleb Huse, now turned the cold shoulder to Yankee Schuyler; they were all booked up by the Confederacy. With his inspector, August Rhuleman, he crossed over to France quickly to see what could be learned there. Government arsenals in both England and upon the Continent were full of arms, but they were second-class weapons. They were, however, entirely serviceable and of the class with which the Union eventually fought a large part of the war.
But they did not conform to Colonel Schuyler's instructions. In Paris he conferred with Ministers Dayton and Sanford, who came over from Belgium. These men had been offered 20,000 Carabines de Chasseurs de Vincennes, for about $17 each, but had demurred for want of funds. Now Schuyler took over their offer and was able to line up 28,000 more, in the arsenals of France. Apparently they were possessed by a private firm, perhaps the gun trade in St. Etienne. Half were to be delivered in 30 days, the balance in 60 days from signing of the contract. The inference here is that the firm had a contract with the French Government to supply these arms and had a quantity of work well advanced that they could finish up for the United States, deferring deliveries to La Republique a few months, for possibly slightly higher per gun price.
Back in England, Schuyler wasted no more time in London but took the train to Birmingham, then and now the main gun-making center for the United Kingdom.
Small private makers abounded in this Midlands city, but their productivity was small. Some, such as W. W. Greener on St. Mary’s Square, were later to boast of high production on Britain’s cartridge rifles for the War Department, but in Schuyler’s time they were emphasizing fine shotguns and, to a lesser extent, sporting rifles. Schuyler doubtless stopped in to see the proprietor, W. Greener, authority on shooting and foremost arms writer of the day. Back in New York, shops featured Greener shotguns, fine strong doubles with their barrels marked Laminated steel warranted

Mediocre arms include Wiirtemburg musket of French type made at Oberndorf Royal Factory. Gun shown, top, was used by 111. soldier. Middle, Prussian “Potsdam

marked musket has U.S.-repaired hammer. At bottom is Bavarian .69 smoothbore such as Hartley bought a few of. Gun shown is Liege Museum model.

indestructible by gunpowder.” Such guns, chopped a foot or two in the barrel to a handy 20 inches or less, were to be a preferred weapon among many of the Southern chivalry. But Schuyler was not in Birmingham to discuss shotguns.
He was introduced to the members of the newly formed Birmingham Small Arms Trade, a syndicate forerunner to today’s famous B.S.A. Guns, Ltd. arms, cycle, and motor-making corporation. Though the gunmakers of Birmingham had, since the 17th century, been supplying the wants of the Crown and producing for export, their handwork system left much to be desired in efficiency, and their business arrangements likewise were deficient in bargaining power. The start of the Crimean War stimulated 16 of Birmingham’s master smiths in 1854 to form the Birmingham Small Arms Trade Association. Externally, the group formed a united front in bargaining with contractors and buyers. Internally, the group bargained more resolutely with the trade unions. From December 1854 to April 1856 the Birmingham makers supplied 156,000 rifles to the Board of Ordnance, compared to only 75,000 obtained from all other sources including the newly-established Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield north of London. There, the former barrel mill had been largely increased by the addition of American machinery from Colt’s and Robbins & Lawrence, and from the Ames syndicate of Chicopee Falls. Its productive capacity threatened to take from the Birmingham trade all chance they had in future of selling to the Government, for the Crown would not buy handmade guns when it had put up so much money at Enfield to get them by machine. In order to remain competitive and move with the times, the Association in June, 1861, moved to found the Birmingham Small Arms Company, to make guns by machinery.
When Schuyler came to Birmingham he had to present his appeal to the committee of the whole, all 16 shareholders. From them he elicited a promise to obtain 35,000 Enfield rifles within six months from date, as he reported to Cameron on August 20 after signing the contract. To make these rifles the Association drew on its existing handmade capabilities, combined with its developing machine-made potential. Among the first, urgent purchases appears to have been stock-making machinery, and an examination of guns such as those of Pryse & Redman, members of the Trade Association and stockholders in the Arms Company, reveal machine inletting of great precision, Yankee quality work, in the lock mortises and other cuts. The 16 subscribed initially £24,500. At once £7500 was spent on acquiring 25 acres at Small Heath, where the great BSA-Guns Ltd. was to stand for a century. The factory was not large, costing £17,050. This would compare roughly to a U. S. factory of perhaps double the price or at the prevailing rate of $5 gold to the pound—in New England, a capital of about $170,000. This would compare with the first investments in the U. S. rifle making section of Colt’s, for example. The first B.S.A. company was a respectable armory, but not the wonder of the engineering world that the firm was some day to become, employing 28,000 people and, during War Two, producing 1,650 parts of arms each minute during the entire six years of war.
Having wrapped up this deal, Schuyler turned to Baring Brothers. Unfortunately, Mr. Chase, Treasury Secretary, had neglected to pass along the appropriate bank credit until one week late. Even then, they lacked the proper signatures. The Birmingham makers, aware that state agents, North and South, were scouring the town for arms, not unnaturally considered this a breach of their agreement and did not deliver to Schuyler. Caleb Huse was in the offing, and by offering 50 per cent more for the arms than the North would have paid, though based on the South’s credit through Fraser, Trenholm & Company of Liverpool, he got the deal. The price was 66 shillings a gun; within ten months, normal market prices in Birmingham were to range below 50 shillings, and sometimes as low as 38 shillings, though these were for second class arms, handmade and not of the best finish. Beech or other soft wood was substituted in these cheaper rifles for the straight-grained walnut selected to fit up the machine-made guns and first class handmade arms. Such guns were serviceable, and often bore the Tower mark of the Birmingham Tower government inspecting depot and arsenal, but the Association members tried to convince the buyers, at least of the North, that only they controlled the first class arms; all those obtained elsewhere, they said, were the rejects.
Schuyler did not fret about Birmingham after this failure, but continued on his buying trip. But the French Vincennes Carbine deal also was quashed by order from the Emperor, who refused both belligerents the right to buy from the French arsenals. When this became evident to Schuyler about the middle of October, he found that he had not racked up a very distinguished record of purchases in either Britain or France. He had purchased 10,000 pin-fire 12mm revolvers from Lefaucheux of Paris, the large size known as the Model 1853 with side loading gate and fixed trigger guard. At a price of $12.50 each, these were complemented by 200,000 Lefaucheux 12mm cartridges costing $17.45 per thousand. As a comparison for prices, Union Metallic Cartridge Company in the 1870’s on an experimental order for the Navy Department offered to make a small quantity of similar cartridges, .38 centerfire for revolver, such as they had never made before, at slightly over $12 per thousand.
Back home the call for 75,000 men to suppress the combinations of states in rebellion had been swelled by the drafts on the loyal states for men. Ripley had promised the Vincennes rifles Schuyler wrote of to various importunate governors for their men; then when Schuyler reported the deal had collapsed, there was embarrassment in Washington.
At Dresden in Saxony, Schuyler was more fortunate. He reported he had purchased 27,055 Dresden rifles at $14.04Vi each, which were assumed to be, as one writer later stated, almost identical to the Enfields except for 1,000 which proved to be Austrian rifles. Unfortunately, what Schuyler purchased was a lot, possibly mixed, of Dresden arms comprising at least two patterns. First, the type he was happy to get like the Enfields was wholly unlike the Enfields. It was the somewhat cumbersome Thouvenin system a tige of several variations. The short rifle has a back action lock, strongly built, and pin-fastened stock with two wedges. The stock tip has a curved back edge. The forward sling swivel is fastened to a long screw directly through the stock above the front funnel-shaped ramrod pipe. All furniture is iron, gray case-hardened; when made properly the model is a very strong and serviceable weapon, adapted for saber bayonet. The Saxon model rifle a tige has a patent breech, the tige screwed into the bottom of the chamber. In the riflemusket, some of which were probably obtained in this shipment, the tige is screwed directly into the bottom of the breech plug. The new model rifle musket may also have been made available to Schuyler; cleaning difficulties with the tige blocking part of the fouled chamber caused the Saxon War minister to revert to the plain chamber, where the bullet is expanded by the explosion. With 40.4-inch barrel, the caliber was .577, four grooves, twist 1 turn in 64Vi inches. The rear sight is 4.82 inches from the rear of the barrel, with a fixed leaf sighted for 200 paces or 154 yards, and two leaves; lowest for 400 and highest for 600 paces. The rammer is countersunk for the ball.
Another arm, almost obsolete in Saxony along with the Thouvenin breech tige rifles, was the Jaeger rifle. An octagon barrel short carbine with pin-fastened stock and common side lock, percussion or transformed percussion, this model had been modified in 1849 to the Thouvenin a tige. The breech was given a conical chamber and the tige screwed into the bottom; the ramrod, carried in the stock, was fitted with a head and this, to protect the rifling, with a brass band. Barrel without breech pin was 29.54 inches, eight grooves caliber .577 (actually .576-inch). The Austrian rifles received by Ruhlman as inspector on the spot may have been actually these Saxon 1849-transformed Jaeger rifles, or may have been octagon barrel Lorenz 1854-5 Jaeger style rifles, also a tige which the Saxon closely resembled.

From Dresden Armory Schuyler went on to Vienna.

The sympathies of the Austro-Hungarian government were with the North. But revealing the liaison which the South had with the forces of the Hapsburgs is the uniform dress of the South. Confederate uniforms are styled after the Austrian pattern, even to the gray, to the same degree that the United States uniforms are copied from the French blues. While the Austrian postal service prepared to refuse correspondence addressed to the secession states, Schuyler closed a deal with the Vienna arsenal for 70,048 Lorenz rifles of the latest model, 1854-5; the price, $15.10 each.
August Ruhlman took a good look at these guns and reported that they could be reamed up from their .54 caliber to .58 without any risk. The Austrian War department assisted in speeding the packing. When Schuyler and Ruhlman first saw the rifles, they were racked in the thousands inside huge, vaulted, dimly lighted arsenal storage rooms, three stories high, some 360 feet long, while four huge armories measured nearly 800 feet in length. Within these dim, dry rooms could be stored hundreds of thousands of rifles; Schuyler was taken to one floor and there he bought what the Austrians wanted him to buy. In eight days 50.000    rifles were packed, and the loaded freight cars shunted from the double tracks which lay alongside the arsenal, to the railroad depot. At the price paid, Schuyler secured new, first class arms; for the price received, the Austrian officers, among the few government officers anywhere with good business sense, probably bought for their own army twice as many arms out of a new lot then under construction at the small arms factory nearby.
Schuyler was not entirely bereft of Vincennes rifles; he shipped 4,558 of these at $17.13 back to Ripley. The Small Arms Association of Birmingham finally released 15,000 Enfields to him at $18.45, and in Bohemia on the way to Vienna he ran across 10,000 cavalry carbines. These at $6 seemed a good bargain; they were .70 caliber, short barrels, and with spur-like extensions to the tangs of the trigger guards. Originally Augustin lock detonators, they had been transformed in Belgium to percussion; Bannerman later sold them to collectors for as much as the Government originally paid for them.
Back home, the colonel wanted to be paid at the rate for his rank. Ripley refused, said he was a civilian employee on per diem, or $1,770.84. Inspector Ruhlman was paid $572.56, and their expense sheets tallied $2,361.55. The account at Baring Brothers was overdrawn $94,334.90. Colonel Schuyler had blown his two million dollars.

Stanton Seeks a Better Purchasing Agent

When Stanton succeeded Cameron after the New Year, 1862, Schuyler’s purchases were among the many things with which the irascible but hard-headed new War Secretary was annoyed. The man had done much worse than Stanton supposed a more competent person would have accomplished. The lack of specific instructions on a detailed technical basis as to the types and qualities of arms he should buy contributed to the hodgepodge of Lefaucheux pinfires, Enfields, few and costly, Thouvenin rifles from Saxony, and Bohemian carbines. Stanton wanted to set it up with a true professional.
Meanwhile, the demands for arms were increasing. The New York militia were ready to move as soon as clothing was issued to them; to Governor Tod of Ohio Stanton on May 26 dispatched a telegram:

We want as many troops as you can raise in the state for the term of three years, or during the war, or for any other term, not less than three months, according as you can raise them quickest.

Quartermaster General George B. Wright promptly replied; said 10,000 men could be raised, and that
7.000    arms would be needed. Wright’s was but one of dozens of similar notes; the loyal states had no shortage of men. But they had few arms. Governor Morton
of Indiana had sent that state’s militia weapons off to war with the troops mustered into Federal service; no replacements had been received. The unsettled affairs in Kentucky made him afraid of border raids; but though he had men, there were no guns. Hon. Robert Dale Owen handed to Stanton the Governor’s appeal for arms, saying Our western men are excellent judges of rifles and know how to use them. If the Government has no good guns to spare, I can make a contract with a responsible New York house for 5,000 first class Enfields at $14.50, deliverable in 40 days, provided the order be given immediately.
Owen was in touch with Marcellus Hartley of Schuyler, Hartley and Graham. Hartley had been informed by his agent, Francis Tomes, then active in Birmingham, that contracts could be made with the Birmingham Small Arms Trade Association at as little as 38 shillings, unloading (including premium on exchange) at as little as $14.50 in bond at New York. But Hartley was fearful of changes in this price structure unless someone tied up the makers with extensive contracts. While Owen awaited a reply from Stanton, Hartley contacted General Ripley, and alluded to the quantities of Enfield rifles which British and Southern private speculators were stockpiling in Nassau warehouses, in the Bahamas, ready to run the blockade into Southern ports for sale. He proposed to Ripley that arms could be bought in Nassau at a low price, rather than causing their owners to risk capture in running the blockade. Said Ripley to Stanton, It may be advisable for the Government to send out an agent to look into this matter. If so, he should be a reliable, shrewd businessman, to be selected by yourself. His instructions and his mission should be secret, and known to as few as possible, so as to avoid the competition he would otherwise find in making his purchases.
But Ripley was apparently working at the behest of Hartley who, from the will and spirit with which he undertook his eventual assignment, quite obviously wanted such a job. By Ripley suggesting only going to Nassau, he caused contrary-minded Stanton to want to send a man to Europe. By referring to a shrewd businessman to be selected by Stanton, after introducing the fact that Hartley had special knowledge of the availability of arms, he cleverly dangled the bait before Stanton to ask Who is this man Hartley? Contradictorily, in this same letter of June 7 to Stanton, Ripley conjectured that If the fact of an agent having been sent out to purchase should accidentally become public it will probably have the effect of inducing the holders of Enfield arms in New York to come down to the price at which the purchases are limited. (The New York office under Captain Crispin had been instructed to buy 50,000 Enfields at not more than $15;
10,000 only had been obtained; about 2,000 more rifles could be bought privately, most owners holding out for $17.) The need for weapons was continuing acutely; his estimate of the previous summer of 100,000 and eight batteries of guns now was increased:

Ordnance Office, June 7, 1862

Hon. E. M. Stanton:

Sir: The number now on hand of good rifled arms, both American and foreign, for issue to troops in service, is about 94,000. The number of such arms which are required to be delivered under existing contracts and orders in the next six months are 138,981 of the Springfield pattern, and 25,000 foreign, in all 163,981, of which the deliveries are not certain and cannot be relied upon. The U. S. Armory at Springfield may be relied on for a supply during the six months of at least 80,000, and probably 90,000 arms. This makes in all, a supply for the six months, which may be confidently calculated on, 174,000, of which there will be ready for issue in this month 107,000; in July, 1862, 13,000; in August, 13,000; in September, 13,500; in October, 13,500; in November, 14,000—174,000. What may be our requirements during this time will depend very much on contingencies that I cannot foresee.

Stanton preferred to hedge his bets. He called in Robert Dale Owen, who seemed to know something about the technical side of weapons; Owen suggested Marcellus Hartley, of a responsible New York house, and Hartley was called to Washington.
In 1861 Hartley, Schuyler & Graham had two stores, one at 13 Maiden Lane, and another large showroom at 22 John Street. Youthful but mosttravelled member of this firm was Marcellus Hartley, who, in 1861, was 34 years old. To the long glasspaneled showroom at John Street came colonels of dandy regiments and pastors of boy’s schools, to obtain the fanciest or the simplest in military equipment. Union men admired the patriotically hilted fancy dress swords. But a clandestine copperhead wandering in to buy percussion caps to smuggle south might be amused by another style of sword handle in stock, a kepied officer stabbing a dragon which writhed about to form the handguard. Could it be an allegory of Beauregard slaying the Anaconda, the blockade which Lincoln had set around the Southern coast? In glass fronted cases were racked Smith carbines, Lefaucheux shotguns, the finest of British percussion doubles, and a complete array of Colt’s and Remington’s arms. A distinctive feature of the Maiden Lane shop was a huge display board upon which were wired percussion Colts in the white, for Hartley did an extensive business in elaborately engraved arms fitted with specially-cast metal grips by Louis Tiffany.    -
Hartley had entered the gun business on February 8, 1847, with Francis Tomes & Sons, hardware and gun dealers on Maiden Lane. When business was slack he was sent as a traveller to the west and south to drum up trade. Very valuable experience and knowledge of the gun trade came to him, and remained with him when he left Tomes to go into business for himself. He assumed there was no chance for him to rise to partnership in the Tomes firm and in 1854 began to look about for a new position; preferably a business of his own. He found two like-minded souls, J. Rutsen Schuyler and Malcolm Graham, of Smith, Young & Company, in which Schuyler was a junior partner. They were also hardware and gun dealers. On March 1, 1854, the new firm of Schuyler, Hartley & Graham
opened its books at 13 Maiden Lane, almost opposite Tomes and Smith, Young & Company.
Four days later Hartley and Schuyler sailed on the Baltic to Europe. They made the grand tour, a tour the modern American gun crank must surely envy. They visited all the gun factories and spent their money on everything that caught their fancy. Hartley, with his experience of what sells, bought a stock that, after four months abroad, was returned home to bring very handsome prices. The company was in business at last.
During the winter Hartley travelled west, promoting sales to merchants in the Mississippi area, St. Louis, and the Ohio Valley. It is possible that on this trip, 1854-55, Hartley saw something which was later to profoundly influence his life, his business, and the course of American arms making. Someone showed him an early metallic cartridge. Said to have been a rifle cartridge, it is possible he saw a Morse experimental at Harpers Ferry, in western Virginia, or one of the early Maynards. Without expressing his intense curiosity about it he asked for the gadget as a souvenir. This odd copper cartridge later came to mind and led to the formation of the Union Metallic Cartridge Company.
During 1856 and 1857, Hartley made yearly buying trips abroad, but remained in New York during the period 1858-1860. The business had expanded, through the solid connections he had established abroad, to the point where it was the largest of its kind in the country. Not immune to taking a profit when it barked at him, Hartley one day in 1857 passed by a shop in Florence filled with paintings, copies of old masters. Selecting one that took his fancy Hartley asked the price; turned and left when he learned it. The shop-keeper persisted, reducing the price; even following Hartley to the next town to bargain with him. Suddenly Hartley asked the Italian how many pictures he possessed, and how much he wanted for the lot. A bargain was made and munitions-king Marcellus sold the pictures to ante-bellum Southern mansion proprietors to hang in their drawing rooms.

Marcellus Hartley is Appointed

The War Department had informed Minister Sanford in December, 1861, that no new contracts for foreign arms were to be made, the Department hoping that domestic factories would supply the deficit. Hopes were not realized, and Stanton reversed his position several times about procuring more arms from overseas. Then the Government called for 300,000 more men and this put an end to delays. On July 14. Marcellus Hartley got his sailing orders:

WAR DEPARTMENT Washington, D. C. July 14, 1862 

Sir: You are hereby appointed the special and confidential agent of the government, for the purpose of obtaining arms in Europe. . . .The government desires to obtain abroad . . . rifled muskets with angular bayonets, of the calibre of .577 and .580, andconforming, in their distinguishing characteristics, to the long Enfield rifles.

P. H. WATSON, Ass’t. Secretary of War

The approval of the Enfield rifle as made in England had resulted in a curious nomenclature being accepted by the War Department. Watson’s letter described the kinds of arms Hartley was to buy; grouping them into five classes in descending order of merit:

1. The machine-made English Enfield, with interchangeable parts, manufactured only by the London Armoury Company.
2. The hand-made English Enfield.
3. The Prussian or Dresden Enfield.
4. The St. Etienne or Liege Enfield (misspelled Tiege in Ex. Doc. 99).
5. The Vienna and Austrian Enfield.

Hartley was told to get all the L. A. Co. long rifles possible and tie up the firm with contracts until January 1, 1863. Of the last four classes of arms, he was to buy all in the market, at fixed prices, not to exceed 100,000 arms total for the four classes. The prices were: 70/- for 1st class, 60/- for 2nd class, 16 thalers for 3rd class, 60 francs Fr. for 4th and 55 frs. for 5th class.
Watson slipped in a demand that neither Ruhlman nor George Wright, nor Caleb Huse or Major Anderson ever abided by: he ordered that Every arm— and so all your agreements should provide—must be rigidly inspected in all its parts by an examiner of tried skill and inflexible honesty; and the utmost precaution must be taken to see that after an arm has been accepted another one be not substituted before, during the process of, or after it has been packed. Many frauds were practiced in this way on American
buyers last year, and will doubtless be attempted again . .
Inspection was rudimentary at best, the United States inspector often merely examining one musket in a case and thus passing thousands. Hartley was instructed to set aside arms that did not pass inspection but if they were otherwise good arms, he could take them at a less price in proportion. He was also instructed in the great secrecy with which this mission was to be accomplished. Hartley must not become known as the agent of the United States Government. As a “free lance
speculator, he could bargain more effectively with the gunmakers, pleading his need to make a profit. All guns were to be shipped to Schuyler, Hartley & Graham, and the War Department promised to see to paying the bills promptly. He could hire clerks and inspectors as needed, expenses would be paid, and he would, at the age of 35, have salary equal to that of a brigadier general in the United States Army, say $5,000 per annum. Interesting to report is the fact he was never, as Alden Hatch declares in Remington Arms, appointed to the rank of brigadier general. Hatch also errs in saying his salary was $2,500 a year; his salary was at the rate of the pay of a brigadier general. Hartley, unlike New York State Militia Colonel Schuyler, held no commission saving that of spending upwards of $2,000,000. Watson’s letter of authorization noted that £ 80,000 would be deposited for him at Baring Brothers—he should advise when more was needed.

Hartley Goes to Europe

Hartley left for England at once, accompanied by his family. He did not get his credit at Baring’s for three days. Hatch thinks they diddled him because of alleged Southern sympathies. But this seems doubtful

Hartley became agent for London Armoury Company’s Adams revolvers in New York, sold small quantities to U.S. buyers. Top is big 1851 DA Dragoon .50; middle is Adams with Tranter’s patent double trigger made by licensee August Francotte; bottom is Beaumont Adams 1856 .450. Same model was also made in U.S. by Mass. Arms.

in view of Barings’ almost official status as bankers for the United States in Europe. That he even received the credit within the same month he landed in England, should be accounted a miracle of efficiency under Stanton’s direction. Then he hastened to Birmingham, where he took a house at No. 6 St. Mary’s Row, not far from Greener, and near Pryse and Redman, the BSA headquarters, Webley & Scott on Weaman Street, and a host of other suppliers grouped between St. Mary’s Square and Steelhouse Lane. The shipments began to come back to New York and the drafts on Barings piled up.
The correspondence of Marcellus Hartley is fragmentary, but much on this important period has been preserved and reproduced in the volume Marcellus Hartley, by J. W. H., believed to be J. W. Hammersly. This book is a memorial volume to Hartley published in 1903 privately after his untimely death. The reports made by Hartley to the War Department sum up his activities that summer and winter of 1862 and the start of 1863:

6 ST MARY'S ROW,

BIRMINGHAM, August 2, 1862

To Hon. E. M. Stanton,
Secretary of War
Dear Sir: I arrived in Birmingham Saturday July 26 and found that our agent (Francis Tomes of Lewis & Tomes, his old boss) had secured all the ready-made rifles at prices quoted by me, and the services of nearly all the manufacturers. Nearly all the ready-made guns had been bought up by speculators immediately upon receipt of the news of the want of 300,000 more men. The London market had been cleaned out by speculators for the China trade. In this market Henderson, an American, had made contracts with nearly all the manufacturers at low prices, and is now holding them to it, some 36/— to 40/—, a loss in many instances to the manufacturers; our agent succeeded in obtaining some from them at an advanced price, but as they hope to complete contracts this week and we have secured them, and the arms go to New York, it is better that we should get him out (of) the way.
The Small Arms Company, a combination of manufacturers who produce about 3,000 per week, have given the refusal of their Combination to a New York house with hopes of obtaining a government contract at $17. They expect to receive an answer by the mail now due, on receipt of which I hope to close a contract with them before my departure for the Continent. I offered them 47/6, but as they were not in condition to close I withdrew my offer.
In a week or so, when we get things    under    way    and can
obtain the control of the Combination I    hope    to    send
4.000    to 5,000 per week, and I will swell the amount to
6.000    and upwards when under full headway.
Our agent had secured, before my arrival, some 2,000 ready at 45/ and 46/6. There were some 2,000 more in the hands of speculators, for which they    asked    60/    to    63/,
which for the present we shall let them    hold.
Previous to the news of the want of additional troops, rifles were a drug, and manufacturers took contracts at a low price in order to work up surplus material. The speculators took advantage of it and bound them down. Now when they have to give orders for materials, prices advance, and the greater the pressure the higher the price, so we have to manage quietly, in order to get them under full headway without pressing the material makers too sharply.
Where arms are contracted for and going to New York, I have not interfered, as the sooner we get them out of the
way the better, as I have secured the services of the manufacturers. It will not do to pay over $15 in New York; if it is done, it will have the effect of speculators obtaining arms from our manufacturers. I shall not for the present give over 50/ for arms, as the speculators are so combined together that they turn over their guns into one another’s hands and thus manage to obtain the highest price.
Most of the arms made and on hand are .577 caliber, and are not of as good quality as I shall have when we get under way and shall make such changes as I can make them agree to, corresponding to our Springfield.
So far everything has worked most successfully for nearly the whole produce of this market, and it will take a little time to get it systematized and under way. I should much prefer to obtain the whole amount in this market of one kind of arms, with such as are ready made on the Continent, than to contract all over the Continent on time.
I was at the London Armoury Company on Wednesday, and they promised to give me an answer this morning how many they could furnish and the price, but they have failed to do so. I shall see them on Monday as I pass through London on my way to Liege.
My credit of £80,000 will soon be exhausted; it will not purchase over 30,000 to 35,000 arms, and if I succeed in purchasing some in Liege, where I have the refusal of a lot, I shall not have more than enough to cover one month’s purchases. Please lose no time in sending me an additional credit of at least £ 100,000, say one hundred thousand pounds same terms as before. Send by return steamer; my house in New York will send it.
The vessels from Liverpool are crowded with freight, so that goods have to be there some days before the arrival of a steamer, in order to secure their turn. I shall make a shipment next week.
Agreeably to instructions, I have detailed to you my first weeks work, and shall continue to inform you of any progress, and hope that nothing will interfere to prevent me from realizing my anticipation, say some 6,000 per week.

Yours respectfully, MARCELLUS HARTLEY

By the same mail Hartley addressed a further note to Assistant Secretary P. H. Watson, for he doubted that Stanton himself would read fully the first note, yet did not want to write more than was formally necessary in it. To Watson he clarified the story a little.
The Henderson who secured in the market at the low prices is the same man who operated for H. (owland) and A. (spinwall) last year. Everything thus far has worked splendidly, and I am only waiting for the Small Arms Company to learn by next mail that the contract they expect is among the things that might have occurred, to secure the entire product of this market. I have remained in the background, allowing our agent, Mr. Tomes, to secure the manufacturers. I have seen several who expect a friend from New York with large government contracts; Tomes, Barkalow, etc. are mentioned. You will please see that I have more credit at once. I do not want to contract beyond the £80,000, as I shall then be held personally responsible, which of course is no risk, yet under the circumstances the government should cover me promptly. I am at work in earnest; it is a laborious job. I shall leave our agent to take care of things until I obtain what are ready made on the Continent. I have the refusal of some 2,000 in Liege.
I enclose two slips cut from the Birmingham Daily Post and the London Times about shipping munitions of War to Southern States. The steamer Memphis is now loading at Liverpool with munitions of War for Nassau, or some adjacent port convenient to some Southern port; as nearly as I can find out she has about 3,000 rifles on board.
I shall do my utmost to send all arms at once, without
delay. I think I shall be able to obtain all in this market at prices varying from 45/ to 50/, unless orders from some Continental power make them advance, and in that case we may have to allow a little even with those with whom we have contracts made, for the manufacturers are a slippery set.

Respectfully yours,

MARCELLUS HARTLEY

During the nine months that Hartley remained abroad he wrote a great many letters. Unfortunately, W. J. H. in noting that these were wholly on business matters, to various manufacturers, to his agents, to his bankers, declares that they possess little interest to the reader. As the copies of these letters were in the files of Schuyler, Hartley and Graham, which remained in the hands of Marcellus Hartley when the firm reorganized as M. Hartley and Company and at the time owned a controlling interest in Remington Arms Company, they were not otherwise in existence; that is, no separate file existed in Ordnance, National Archives, or elsewhere. It is unfortunate that W. J. H. did not make more public their contents, for the type of technical information he deems of little interest is exactly the sort of detail which the student of arms history requires. More recent efforts to locate some of these letters in files of the Remington Arms Company have been without result. In the opinion of an engineering executive of Remington Arms, a gun nut type who therefore desires to remain nameless, the files which he examined, searching out just such early correspondence, had the appearance of having been selectively robbed of such documents.
Whether some unofficial hand in years gone by purloined Hartley’s letters for the secret edification of some rich gun connoisseur whose fancies and purse outweighed his scruples, or whether they were perhaps destroyed on orders of Hartley for some obscure purpose of protecting names or reputations of past associates, cannot now be more than guessed at. Perhaps as so often happens at last, such records will once again come to light. Meanwhile, W. H. J. did preserve some dozen letters filling in a good amount of detail of Hartley’s purchases abroad.

Purchases in Germany and Belgium

On October 7, 1862, Hartley was in Berlin, having spent some days in Cologne (Koln) from the armories of which he liberated quantities of arms. Liege of course was a common crossroads for his travels; each time he returned to that major arms-making city some one of the fabricants seemed to have a new lot of old arms for him to buy. Stanton had sent to date £380,000 credit, but the letters of credit expired 1 November. These sums included £150,000 just received, and Hartley would have to scramble to spend or commit it before it expired. . . . I suggest here that it is our right course to secure all arms here in Europe, in order that the South may not obtain them ... He explained that apparently the Confederate agents had been buying regardless of prices, and were very active in upsetting the price structure on Enfields which he had set up in England, some of the Birmingham makers refusing to deliver at less than 53/ when four months past they were happy with orders at 35/. I think if the South has agents purchasing arms, if I can make contracts with the manufacturers to bind them, at prices exceeding your limits, I think it my duty to prevent the arms falling into their hands. Hartley thus envisioned a two fold nature to his mission: purchase of arms for the Union, and blocking the South from buying arms by outbidding her.
At Liege I purchased ready made and entirely new arms, he reported to Stanton from Berlin that October 7: C. Dandoy, 400 French rifled muskets, 69/100, with implements and extra cones—packing boxes no charge, 37 fr.; 120 ditto, No. 2 (i.e., handmade Enfields) 43 fr. From B. M. Tambeur Freres, 2,200 ditto, ditto, No. 2, freight paid to Antwerp (packing boxes 8 fr.),—46.75 fr. From Association of Liege, 2,000 Piedmontese Rifled Muskets, extra cones, implements, freight free to Antwerp (boxes 8 fr.),—48 fr., 1,500 French rifled muskets with implements as above; freight free to Antwerp (boxes 8 fr.),—39 fr.; 800 ditto, with elevated sights—42.50 fr. From Louis Muller, 3,500 French rifled muskets, intended for the Italian Government, all ready for shipment 46 fr.
The report continued:
The above were all made and will be shipped in two weeks, as soon as extra cones and implements can be made. I also ordered 8,000 of the same kind from the Association. Dandoy and Mr. Muller to be ready by the first of November with either quality, they to inform me when the lots are ready for purchasing.
That makes in all ordered in Liege of 69/100, 18,520—all of which will leave Europe on or before, say, the fifth of November.
You will be informed from Birmingham weekly how many are shipped and the amount of drafts.
In Vienna I purchased 20,000 blue barrel with angular bayonet, leaf sight, 58/100, and 10,000 bright barrel with angular bayonet, leaf sight, 54/100—including for each case of 20 guns 10 ball screws, 20 combined wrenches, and 20 extra cones at 26 florins—say 53 francs. The arms are all entirely new, but will have to be carefully inspected and packed, as there is no dependence to be placed upon any of the manufacturers. It will take at least six weeks to ship them all.
I found on arrival in Vienna that Boker had the refusal, or, in other words, the control of the arms. I obtained possession of them by agreeing to pay him 40 kreuzers, or about $16 per gun, he paying all expenses, delivered at the railroad. He will have to pay for packing boxes, viewing (a house will have to be obtained), and banker’s commission, which is one-half per cent. All is under the supervision of my Springfield inspector. It is the best arrangement I could make, and under the circumstances very fortunate that he was there, for I should have had to employ someone—a commission house would not have done it except for a commission, and I should be afraid to trust them; my bankers could not do it, and under the circumstances it was very fortunate, as I cannot remain there.
I found that Moses & Co., London house with a Captain or Colonel Hughes [Hartley did not yet know of his antithesis in the Confederate service, Caleb Huse, or how to spell his name], had purchased 50,000 bright barrel Austrian guns, 54/100 caliber, no leaf sight, from the Austrian Government about three weeks since at 26.75 florins, and Mr. Martin of the above firm is now in Vienna attending to the shipment of

Variety of foreign guns bought by Union is shown in this display once set up in Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. Nos. 1,3,7 are French (Liege make) muskets, No. 3 being rifled with U.S. style sight; Nos. 2,4,12,13 are different makes of Carabine de Vincennes; Nos. 5,6 may be Italian pattern; are not identified. Nos. 8,11 are Austrian Lorenz Ml855 rifles;

9 is Bavarian .58 rifle musket; 10 is Italian-type conversion; 14 is iron-mounted Prussian .69.

them. They were in treaty for those I purchased and would no doubt have purchased them in a little time. The Austrian Government refused to sell any more for the present, but Mr. Truberth [sic.: actually Ferdinand Fruwirth, leading Vienna private gunmaker], the manufacturer from which I purchased the arms, the controller of all the manufacturies [i.e., chief inspector] informs me that when the different contractors make deliveries of the new arm the Government will no doubt sell more, but it will be some two or three months. He has promised to obtain from the government the refusal of the next lot and inform me.
The South purchased 30,000 in the spring and now 50,000 more. I was informed in London that samples of the Prussian guns were offered there to the South and they thought of purchasing. On inquiry I found that Hughes [Huse] was temporarily absent from Vienna, and thinking that he might be here [i.e., Berlin] I started Sunday for this place. The Government here offer 50,000 rifled Prussian guns, caliber 72/100, nipples too large—in other respects it is a good gun— at 10 Prussian thalers [about $7]. They have already three offers for them—one from Hamburg—but I cannot find out who is offering.
I have carefully inspected the guns and would not hesitate one minute if they were the proper caliber. You instruct me to purchase 69/100 if I cannot obtain smaller, but if 69/100 cannot be obtained you leave it to my judgment to purchase such arms as are serviceable. These arms are serviceable, but the bore is the objection. If I allow them to pass now, the South will have them. They can be used by the militia, and in an emergency by regular troops. The price,
10 thalers, is rather high. They are not worth, at the outside, over $6. Shall I purchase at $7 or not? I have to decide tomorrow. I am a little perplexed. They are scattered in eleven different arsenals throughout Prussia. I shall have to
have packing boxes made, employ inspectors and viewers for each place—100,000 thalers to be paid down as a guarantee, the balance at each arsenal on delivery of each lot of guns. Personally I cannot attend to all of it. My Springfield inspector has all he can attend to at Vienna. It would be impossible to have the cones altered here. It would have to be done in New York. All these things are against the arms. Yet I still think it my duty to secure them. The arms, I find, cannot be purchased except by a Prussian subject. This I may arrange with my bankers. I think it advisable to go to one or two of the arsenals—say Stettin and Magdeburg, the nearest—and see the condition they are in before I make an offer.
I now feel the want of more inspectors and trustworthy men. I do not know where to obtain them.
I do not know at present of any more arms of any amount to be obtained in Europe.
I have written to my house in Paris to call upon the French authorities and see if they can or will dispose of any, but there is but little probability of doing anything there. There are some Garibaldis in Hamburg, but they are very inferior. They no doubt will now be sent to New York on speculation.
If I purchase these 50,000 Prussians, the amount purchased by me will be, say, 18,000 in Liege, 30,000 in Vienna,
50,000 in Berlin—98,000 in all.
I send this letter tonight and will endeavor to inform you by same steamer, if possible, in regard to the 50,000.
Yours respectfully, MARCELLUS HARTLEY P.S: In reading this letter over, I refer to the Confederates being in treaty for the 30,000 purchased in Vienna, implying that as Boker had the control of them he was the party. They were in treaty with Fruwirth before Boker. Mr.
B. informed me that they, Mr. Martin of Moses & Co., had
offered them a price for some Garibaldis, but he refused to sell any arms that might go directly or indirectly to the Confederates.
Hartley took a detour via Stettin and examined, as he says, 12,000 of the Prussian rifled 72/100 guns. They are all in good order, nine-tenths of them never having been used. I have concluded to purchase them, and have made an offer of 8 Thg., 5 silver groschen.
The inspection made by Hartley consisted principally of his being led to one or more large rooms containing racked muskets. Then, as now, the common practice was to have racks two muskets high, and several arms deep. Probably the 12,000 were easily stored in one room not over 50 feet square. Under these jampacked circumstances a detailed examination of even a fair quantity of the arms was not possible, but it is practical for a buyer to make a quick glance and a practiced man such as Hartley could get a good idea of what he was looking at by many extra details.
He would see whether the armorer sergeant had any facilities nearby for routine cleaning and preserving the arms. A talk with the officer who showed him around would often produce unbiased and candid observations on the value of the arms. Two types of arms were in store, the nine-tenths never having been used most likely being the Model 1839 percussion musket, and the others earlier patterns, transformed from flint to percussion. Gradual introduction of the breech-loading zundnadelgewehr or needle-gun, as Major Mordecai not entirely correctly translated it (firing pin gun would have been a more correct translation, logically and semantically), led to the retirement of the muzzle-loaders as the new issues were made. Said Major Mordecai, Military Commission to Europe, 1854:

The alteration of the flint musket is made by inserting a cylindrical cone seat, screwed into the barrel, perpendicular to its axis, in    the place    of    the    old vent; this cone seat is
bored through    the axis,    and the    outer    end of the opening
stopped up with a screw; the cone is inserted in the top of this cylinder; the lock is altered in the usual manner; a guide or rear sight is fixed to the tang of the breech pin; the front sight is on the upper band. The bayonet of this musket is fastened on by a spring and catch. The mountings are of brass.
The new percussion musket (model of 1838) is similar to the above, with these exceptions: it has a patent breech, that is to say, a breech piece with a conical chamber, having the cone seat formed out of the same piece of metal, but placed on the right hand side of the barrel so that the hammer requires to be very little bent in order to strike the cone. The priming canal has been pierced through the cone seat perpendicular    to    the    barrel,    and the outer end
closed with a    screw as    in    the    altered    musket. The whole
arrangement of the breech piece is nearly the same that has been adopted for the alteration of our musket as recently arranged for Maynard’s primer. The front sight is brazed on the barrel, and the lower strap of the upper band is cut so as to pass over the sight. The mountings are of brass, except the buttplate, which is of iron; the caliber is the same as that of our smoothbore muskets; the weight of the arm is ten and one third pounds. These new muskets were said to be in process of alteration to rifle muskets.

The external differences of the rifle-muskets, from the preceding plain smoothbore arms, lay only in the construction of the rear sight. This was simple and efficient, similar in form to that later employed in the Mauser Model 1871, having a telescoping or extendable section of the folding leaf. Said Wilcox (op. cit.):
In 1855 the infantry regiments not provided with the breech-loading needle rifle were armed with rifle muskets having an elevating sight, which is in part fixed and in part moveable; it is lowered to its position on the barrel either to the front or to the rear. The fixed part of the sight gives lines of sight for 150 and 300 yards; the moveable part has a slide. To fire at 400 yards, erect the sight, the slide being lowered, and aim through the notch in its centre; to fire at 600 yards, aim through the notch on its upper edge; at 800 yards, aim through the notch on the upper edge of the moveable arm of the sight; and finally, to fire at 850, 900, 950, and 1,000 yards, aim through the notch on the upper edge of the slide, moving the slide so that its inferior edge shall be on a line with the figures indicating these distances.
The rifle-musket has five grooves of uniform depth and twist, of one turn in 4Vi feet; a tron-conic chamber, wedge balls; its weight, 705 grains; charge of powder, 79 grains; total weight with bayonet, 10 lbs.
Hartley may have known all these details; certainly he had at some time made himself familiar generally with the contents of Mordecai’s book; and, later, the Van Nostrand edition of Wilcox’ Rifles and Rifle Practice must have been sold through the store. Not all buttplates were iron; earlier models were brass. But he took a moment to further justify his interest in these arms which were actually rather clumsy and cumbersome, though not defective, in contrast with the Springfields or the Enfields of several nationalities which he had been commissioned to buy.
I examined their cartridge at the arsenal ... the ball which they use is not larger than our 69/100, and appeared to be lighter. The concave runs nearly to the top, thus making the ball a mere shell. They use an iron cup in the cavity, but the officers said it was of no use, as the powder expanded the ball sufficiently to fill the grooves. I send a ball by this mail, with instructions to send it to you. I am led to make these remarks from what you have written in regard to our troops disliking to shoot the old 69/100. If I remember right, the Minie ball in our cartridge for 69/100 caliber is much heavier than the Prussian 72/100 [U. S. bullet cal. .69 weighed 730 grains 1.
Hartley concluded his letter by asking the Secretary again for money, rhetorically declaring that if the arms had cost at the beginning ten million dollars, or twenty millions, it would have been worth it if such a move would have deprived the South of weapons. Very foresightedly he asked, If this War is to continue one year, or two, or more, how long will the arms they now have last them? And when they are gone, where will they obtain more? You will pardon me for referring to this again, but from the exertions they are now making here they will clean the market out, and if so, after that we should take care that they do not have any superior arms.
Hartley did not have to wait long on the Prussian
guns; his offer was accepted for 30,000 of them and he continued on to Liege froni when he again reported to Stanton on 16 October. The Association had
1,000 more French rifled ,69’s for him, and Tanner & Company had 1,500. Muller sold him 2,000 Enfields of Liege make, for the Liege fabricants had orders for the English as well as other governments for Enfield pattern rifles; August Francotte & Company was a large manufacturer, mostly using machinery, of interchangeable Enfields in Liege. B. M. Tambeur Freres offered 10,000 Belgian Government muskets, smoothbore, which they promised to rifle, and 5,000 more which they could rifle and fit with sights, presumably the leaf type with elevating slide. Tambeur also offered a rather enigmatically-named model, 2,000 Untembery (sic) government guns, rifles with sights, implements, cones, and packing boxes, at 40 francs. These we suspect must be Wurttemberg, which suffered a little as some ancient typist at Remington Arms at the turn of the century, working at the behest of Mr. J. W. H. and doubtless pecking away at an old Remington typewriter, tried to translate the late Marcellus Hartley’s manuscript scrawl into legibility for the printer.
The muskets and rifles of Wurttemberg had a distinguished descendant: the rifles of Peter Paul and Wilhelm Mauser. Perhaps on the very muskets which Hartley bought, which evidently had been bought up as smoothbores or sent up to Liege to be rifled, there shone the stamps of M of one or the other Mausers as a junior gun craftsman at the Royal "Wurttemberg Gun Factory at Obemdorf, on the Neckar river. There in a former Augustinian monastery, muskets of common Napoleonic pattern, iron mounted, were made. The transformations to percussion and rifling made them interesting; the head of the percussion hammer has a rather square shape, unlike the curve of the French-styled percussion hammer. Lockplates, after the filling of flint pan cover spring holes and having been planed flush, may still bear the marks Kong. Wurt. Fab. and on top of the barrel, from breech to muzzle, OBERNDORF. Caliber is .72; one such musket is known with the mark of W. H. Dow, 64th Illinois Vol. Infy. picked out in tiny nail heads tapped into the stock.

Activities in France 

Hartley concluded little business with the French, in this faring no better than his predecessor, Schuyler. His agent at Paris, C. W. May, was instructed to contact M. Poirier, of Poirier Freres, who has a house in New York, and who has a contract with the French Government to supply all the food and stores for the Mexican expedition, which he does from New York, and knowing the officials and the French Emperor, and being a staunch friend, he might obtain from them what a stranger could not.
In Vienna, Hartley had bought 30,000 rifles; in Berlin, another 30,000; in Liege, first trip, 18,500, and upon his return, 17,500, making 96,000, exclusive
of all Enfields which he had shipped from England. He made a very interesting resume of the arms that could be bought or contracted for in the ensuing months in England and on the Continent, in addition to the government orders which the contractors already were working upon; his estimates reflected the increase in productivity which the contractors said they could achieve if pressed with more orders:
Oct. 16, 1862
Statement of the number of arms that probably might be made at the different factories on the Continent and in England in six months:

Vienna ........................... $10.40

80.000    in 6 months at, say, 26 florins at 40 cents..    $832,000

The Government will sell no more until the

makers replace what have been sold. These arms may all be 58/100 after the first two months.

Stahl, in Germany [sic. Suhl? Probably

yes] ............................ $10.50

15.000    Enfield in 6 months, at, say 15 thalers

at 70 cents ................................................................157,500

They are now engaged on Government contracts.

They make arms equal to the English.

Herzberg [Wurzberg?] .............. $11.90

6.000    Enfields in 6 months, at, say, 17 thalers,

70 cents ......................................................................71,400

These are good arms.

Liege:

30.000    Arms, Enfields and French models assorted, at, say, 55 francs at $11 ............................330,000

The Association have contracts with the English Government and other governments until next

summer.

London:

50.000    Enfields, at, say 60/,    $14.50 ....................725,000

Birmingham:

140.000    Enfields, at, say 55/,    $13.50 ....................1,890,000

France, St. Etienne:

20.000    Enfields and French model, at, say

60 francs, $12 ..........................................................240,000

341,000    ................................... $4,245,900

17,050 packing boxes, $2    34,100

$4,280,000

The different governments of Europe have contracts out for arms. The calculation above is independent of such contacts, being what can be made besides all government contracts. The calculation is the outside amount.

Hartley Reports on Confederate Purchases

Hartley’s espionage was of value to the North. The figures above, coupled with a second memorandum on arms he conjectured would be up for sale in a short time, gave Secretary of War Stanton a close estimate of the small arms available in Europe to the forces of the South. Hartley was not infallible, but the totals he supplied were to be reached in the following years.
Though Stanton did not propose to outbid Southern arms buyer Caleb Huse in the European market, preferring to rely upon the blockade, the fact that this much firepower was available, made Union planners realize they had a fight on their hands. Hartley’s second memo supplied a:
Statement of second-hand arms that may be offered for sale in a few months:
Prussia:
Berlin ............................... $7.00
22.000    rifled 72/100 at, say, 19 thalers................$154,000
Same as the 30,000 purchased.
Darmstadt ......................... $6.30
12.000    rifled 69/100 French model say 9 thalers.    75,600
These may be offered for sale when they receive
the new arms now contracted for.
Wittenberg ......................... $6.30
9.000    rifled 69/100 French, say 9 thalers ............56,700
When they receive new arms they may be sold.
Bavaria ............................ $6.30
7.000    rifled 69/100 French model, say 9 thalers    44,100
When they receive new arms.
50.000    $330,400
2,500 packing boxes say $2    5,000
$335,400
If the party who has the refusal of the 20,000 Prussians [Boker & Co.?] does not take them, they will make the number 70,000.
The English Government has a large number of arms that it wants to dispose of, but refuses to sell any at present to any one. How many, I do not know, but 200,000 at least; they are the old English musket, smooth bore and rifled. She probably will not sell while the War lasts.
The French Government has a large number of old arms. The Emperor has always refused to sell them.
The Russian Government sold over 400,000 arms; they were purchased by a Russian in St. Petersburg. They are very inferior, comprising carbines, etc., all smooth bores and only fit for the ironmonger.

Hartley’s Overall Accomplishments

During November and December Hartley worked day and night; by December 20 he was able to report he had been pretty much on his feet for the past sixteen days straight. He had accomplished a great deal. The London Armoury Company at last began to see the light, and was willing to ship some of its fine rifles to the North. Two thousand two hundred interchangeable Enfields were sent forward at this time, plus 4,000 of an order for 10,000 he had given to Liege. Of these Enfields, Hartley stated they were better than any English-made arms, excepting those of the London Armoury Company. He had been diddled by the Birmingham Small Arms Trade group and decided to diddle them in return. Privately writing to Stanton, he alluded to the offers of BSA rifles being made to Washington by Naylor & Company, steel merchants of Sheffield, who earlier had supplied Sam Colt with raw materials, as far back as the Whitneyville Walker contract of 1847. Naylor & Company in 1861 decided to dabble in small arms. Between December 17, 1861, and July 31, 1863, they delivered Enfield pattern arms—long rifles, short rifles, artillery carbines, all .577 caliber, of No. 1 machinemade and No. 2 best handmade qualities, to a total value of $3,810,965.85!
In October 1862, at the very time that Hartley, through his man Tomes, was trying to sew up the Birmingham manufacturers for the benefit of the United States Government, at the low prices of 40-
42/-, Naylor was making a proposal to the War Department. The affair was handled by Assistant Secretary P. H. Watson, who somehow should have known better. On October 20, 1862, he accepted a proposition Naylor had made, autocratically reducing the price and thinking he had made a very good deal:

WAR DEPARTMENT 

Washington City, D. C. October 20, 1862 Gentlemen: Your offer to supply to the Government of the United States two hundred thousand of the best quality of English hand-made Enfield rifles, to be delivered in New York, subject to the usual inspection, at the rate of not less than
7.000    per week until the whole number (200,000) is supplied, at the price of seventeen dollars and a half for each gun, and sterling exchange above 123 percent added, cannot be accepted by this Department, because the price is deemed exorbitant. The Government will, however, pay for one hundred thousand of these arms, delivered as above, sixteen dollars apiece and sterling exchange above 123 percent, on two pounds fifteen shillings (the assumed cost of the arms) added.
The deliveries to commence not later than the tenth of December.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. WATSON, Assistant Secretary of War

The acceptance was addressed to Naylor’s man in Washington; by the next available packet boat it went out to London. There the acceptance was rephrased and returned, signed by the firms cooperating to fill the orders. November 7, 1862, was the date of the okay over the imprimaturs of Naylor, Vickers & Company, London, Liverpool and Sheffield, and Naylor & Company, New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. Excepting strikes and such delays, they agreed to deliver the 100,000 Enfield rifles in about fourteen weeks and a half . . . say by about 21st March, 1863. You will doubtless be gratified to learn that the
100.000    rifles will all be of the well known superior quality manufactured by the Birmingham Small Arms Trade.
Naylor enclosed a letter corroborating their efforts, signed by famed barrel maker J. D. Goodman, who had recently been elected chairman of a committee, the Committee of the Whole becoming too unwieldy in its administrations. While the history of the B. S. A. Guns, Ltd., suggests that the committee was first elected September 30, 1863, there seems to be some discrepancy in the record. Says The Other Battle, a record of industrial preparedness of B. S. A. in War Two, During the first two years of its existence, the company’s affairs were administered by a committee consisting of all its shareholders. Not very surprisingly it proved a clumsy form of control and at an extraordinary general meeting held September 30, 1863, there was elected a board consisting of Mr. J. D. Goodman, Chairman; Mr. J. F. Swinburn, Vice-Chairman; Mr. Joseph Wilson, Mr. Samuel Buckley, Mr. Isaac Hollis, Mr. Charles Playfair, Mr. Charles Pryse, Sir John Ratcliff and Mr. Edward Gem.
“By the end of the year preliminary work was begun on the company’s first big order—20,000 Enfields for the Turkish Government. This was part of a contract for 50,000 placed with the Birmingham trade and was secured through the good offices of Mr. Goodman.
Perhaps the distinction is one of corporate identity; the B. S. A. Trade Association in 1862 was negotiating, through Mr. Goodman, its Chairman, to supply 100,000 handmade Enfields to the Union. Perhaps the record is correct, needing only to be interpreted that the 20,000 Turkish Enfields were machine made arms, first to be turned out at Small Heath. The Committee members’ names are interesting: Goodman, barrel maker: Swinburn of Swinburn & Son, barrel maker; Joseph Wilson, Samuel Buckley, Isaac Hollis of Hollis & Sheath, Charles Playfair of Bentley & Playfair, and Charles Pryse, inventor of the lockwork of the WebleyPryse service revolver and partner of Pryse and Redmond. all names found on Enfield rifles as makers or parts and barrel contractors.
I expect to commence deliveries on account of the order forthwith, wrote Mr. Goodman from Birmingham on November 4, and will certainly complete the quantity within fourteen and a half weeks from 10th December.
This was the large order the Birmingham group had been so anxiously awaiting. Hartley was on the spot and with full powers from the Secretary of War, virtually a Minister Plenipotentiary to treat in the gun trade, but a New York broker was able to swing the deal with Washington. Verily the one hand knoweth not what the other doeth; robbing the public’s pockets! Watson’s deal with Naylor would have cost the Government about $100,000 more than Hartley was planning to spend on the identical Enfields.
Hartley was aware of the Naylor & Company transaction, and though he was too late to stop it, he managed to get off a note to Stanton on November 29 from Birmingham explaining some of the diddling that was going on. Hartley very reasonably suggested to Stanton, that:

. . . If you have enough arms for immediate use, would it not he as well either to stop purchasing in New York . . . or to reduce the price to, say, $14.50 to $15? I cannot see why we should not as well avail ourselves of the market as to pay the speculators and manufacturers the difference. The Small Arms Company here is up to all dodges. I should like to manage them. Before my arrival here in July a contract could have been made with them at 42/ to 45/; they asked me 65/ on the start, etc. If you do not stop now, prices will rapidly advance again. 42/, exchange at 1.23, would make the cost of guns in New York say $12.13; 45/ at same rate, $13. You pay exchange all above 1.23.

If you put the price down or stop, inform me, and I will stop purchase until I can buy at 42/ to 45/ and purchase all they have in hand, and if it is your desire to continue, I would bind them down, agreeing to take what stock they had at the above price, provided they would agree to give me all they could make in one or two months, at same price. The better plan would be to reduce the price, saying that guns can be bought and are now worth 42/, and tell Mr. Naylor that the Small Arms Company are buying at that. This information must not come from me.
I have referred to the above, as I think, if they are sharp, we should be . . .
Watson had committed the War Department to its dealings with Naylor, and that impartiality which Stanton demanded be enforced in the Holt-Owen investigations was equally at work. He did not try any monkey business with Naylor, and the Enfields piled up in Governor’s Island. There was plenty of need for them, though the contract was to run beyond that time when beginning deliveries of domestically produced arms countered the deficit.
By the end of December two last important shipments went out on Hartley’s account, to the United States. Via steamer Hammonia from Southampton he sent:
1,700 interchangeable Enfield rifles, probably London Armoury make 28,060 hand-made ditto 10,978 Austrian 54/100 and 58/100 calibers.
The steamer New York left Southampton on the day before Christmas with the last of Hartley’s bundles for America:
500 interchangeable Enfields 7,300 hand-made ditto 13,860 French rifled muskets—69/100 “The above, no doubt, is the largest shipment ever made by one party, or ever obtained at the same time, of first-class Enfields, 37,560,
he wrote optimistically to Stanton. I have used about £110,000 of the last credit. Amount of Enfields shipped to date, 110,140; total amount of arms shipped, 204,848.
Single handed, almost, Hartley had obtained arms for two hundred regiments, in a space of a few months. He relied upon his younger brother, a clergyman, trustworthy, to assist Francis Tomes.
Of the £580,000 to my credit I have drawn about £490,000, leaving a balance of say £90,000 not used . . . Monday we discovered an error of £288 in our favor, which Barings paid ... To the detailed and meticulous resume of money spent and arms shipped, Secretary Stanton observed commendingly that their record was a model accounting of fiduciary responsibility.
The War for Hartley had its light moments, though sometimes they were not to be made evident until years later. He was constantly alert to Confederate agents at work, dogging his trail or he theirs. The Birmingham Small Arms Company had been shipping arms to an intermediary who in turn delivered them to Nassau to run the blockade. Said Hartley to Stanton, I would respectfully suggest the increasing of our force in that vicinity. But with Confederate agents in Europe he could take a little more active role.
While he was in Birmingham he learned that Confederate agents had made a contract with a Continental manufacturer for several thousand rifles. J. W. H. recounts this in rather naive fashion, saying that Hartley scurried all over the Continent, at Vienna, Frankfort and Budapest he was disappointed in spying them out, but finally, at Liege, he found, to his joy, the object of his search, the firm with the Confederate contract.
Hartley was too much of an old hand at the European gun game to waste time on such a quest;

1. Belgian carabine a tige 
2. Hanover carbine
3. Mecklenberg tige rifle musket
4. Oldenberg tige rifle musket
5. Saxon tige rifle musket
6. Norwegian breechloader (not used in C.W.)
7. Swedish breechloader (not used in C.W.)
8. Prussian needle gun breechloader. (Not used in C.W.)
9. Bavarian rifle musket
10. Bavarian musket
11. Austrian carbine, Consol-Augustin lock.
12. French carabine a tige
13. French rifle musket
14. Pritchett bullet for Enfield rifle musket
15. Lorenz Austrian rifle
16. Baden rifle musket
17. Belgian rifle musket
18. Dessau rifle musket
19. Nassau rifle musket
20. Russian tige carbine (not used in US)
21. Sardinian carbine (not used)
22. Swiss Federal rifle (not used)
23. Prussian rifle musket
24. English bag-cartridge (not used)
25. Danish multiball (not used)
26. Delvigne explosive ball A (not used) 
27. Delvigne explosive ball B (not used)
28. Delvigne ball, minie form (not used) 
29. Jacobs explosive shell (not used)
30. Baden & Wiirtemburg rocket projectile or fusee, copper cased (not used CW)
31. U.S. Rifle & RM cartridge

Ammunition was also imported for foreign muskets. Ammo made here in U.S. had characteristics of standard U.S. cartridges in fabrication, differing only in bullet or charge for the different varieties of arms. Foreign ammo came in many different shapes and sizes. From Wilcox’s Rifles & Rifle Practice a plate is reproduced for the benefit of the cartridge collector, and to give comprehension of the bewildering logistic problem of ammunition supply ca. 1862.

if he heard of a Confederate contract, he went at once, directly, and by the fastest possible conveyance to Liege, if he really wanted to find out about it, for the Liege makers are famous for their traditional impartiality.
Disclosing his position as the agent of the United States, says J. W. H., though Hartley’s instructions from Stanton specifically swore him to secrecy, he offered to buy the rifles at a small advance over the price for which they had been sold to the agents of the South, and to pay for them on bill-of-lading by drafts on his London bankers. The unscrupulous manufacturers accepted his offer and the arms were turned over to the North.
Some years later Hartley was present in New York at a dinner where one of the guests was a noted banker, John Trenholm of North Carolina. A member of the Southern branch of Fraser, Trenholm & Company of Liverpool, bankers for the Confederacy, Mr. Trenholm rose to give a few words of praise at the warm friendship with which he was received when after the War he took up his abode in the North, and he spoke briefly on his exploits buying arms for the Confederacy in Europe. He observed that at times he seemed just about ready to close a deal when through some agency which he could not explain the guns slipped through his fingers, financially speaking. He remembered one such deal particularly with a rifle maker in Liege.
Their host, Mr. Charles Flint, had heard Hartley relate the tale many times and drew Mr. Trenholm’s amazed attention to the fact he was sharing the same table with that mysterious agency. Hartley rose and explained the facts and sat down amid enthusiastic exclamations at the coincidence.
Throughout the War, few knew of his critical role acting for the Union. Thus at last, in a New York salon at a dinner party, Marcellus Hartley received the acclaim due a hero.