Wright Was Given a Superhuman Task

George Wright was principally to blame, except for the simple fact that he was only human, faced with a superhuman task. Inspecting over 100,000 muskets and about 38,000 sabers in a couple of months time was beyond the abilities of a Hercules. Had Wright

Array of rear sights mostly on imported guns reveals complications in training caused by variety of otherwise ordinary foreign arms. Guns are, left to right, Smith carbine, Austrian converted .69 short rifle, U.S. Springfield, Enfield 1856, Thouvenin French rifle, Belgian carabine a tige, French rifle musket 1825-42-57, and stub sight on Danzig Prussian musket.

been more of an administrator, he might have hired help. Major Hagner, if assigned to the task of inspection, would almost certainly have surrounded himself with a flock of paid sub-inspectors, all drawing salaries from Boker & Company. Wright, trained as a tinsmith and self-taught as an armorer repairing muskets at Washington Arsenal, was virtually alone and friendless in not just one but a number of countries, and did not think of doing this. His own responsibility he failed to recognize. For it was actually Wright, and not Minister Sanford, nor Colonel Schuyler, nor Herman Boker, who was supplying arms to the Union from Europe; it was George Wright’s certificates of inspection, without which the arms might not be accepted and paid for.

General Ripley wrote to Wright in unmistakable terms, on December 7, 1861, that the Secretary of War directed him to “remain subject to the instructions of Mr. Sanford, United States Minister at Belgium, until all the guns ordered by him, Mr. Schuyler, and Mr. Boker are inspected and shipped to this country.” Wright had tried to discharge this duty fully. When he arrived at Liverpool 22 September, he had been met by Herman Boker’s partner, Mr. Funke, and in company with him had toured the arsenals of the Continent. He formed an affection for Funke and a respect for his integrity and, in the failure of letters from the Department to reach him promptly, was often guided by Funke’s advice, which later proved to be corroborated by Ripley’s letters, Boker’s “pipeline” from the Department to Europe being faster than official channels.
The two went to “Liege or Cologne, where I commenced duty,” as Wright put it. “I found at Cologne samples which were submitted to me of lots of guns ready for inspection,” Wright told the Commission. These were apparently at Boker’s office, for he took from the samples, presumably specimens of every type of gun available, “such as I considered might answer,” and went to Liege to inspect.

“My course of inspection,” Wright continued, “was to take up a gun from the box, requiring a box here and there to be opened for me, to feel the strength of the mainspring, the fit and spring of the ramrod, the fit and the material of the bayonet. I did not take a lock off, except once. I suppose I have taken off a dozen barrels and taken out the breech pins, to see about the rifling. I went away in such haste I had nothing to inspect a gun with except a taper gauge for caliber.”

The number of boxes Wright would open depended on the nature of the arms offered and their location. “In Vienna 25,000 .55 calibre, from the government arsenal, were examined but little; I took off no barrels and no locks, as they were in the government arsenal; and I only handled a few of them, feeling satisfied that they had been thoroughly inspected by the Austrian government.” Noting the stamping on the lockplates, of “860, 861, 862,” Wright correctly observed “These arms were made in 1860-’62. Mr. Schuyler bought a lot of the same arms from the same storehouse before, and Mr. Rhuleman had inspected them, as I heard, and I believe rejected none.
“Of the other lots of guns inspected at Vienna, I handled at least 30 percent. I do not know how many
I inspected there and I can form no estimate. I do not intend to say that I took off the locks or took out the barrels or the breech pins of any. I have visited often the shops of manufacturers in Vienna and examined barrels, locks and stocks. . . ”
One rifle noted as “the Marseilles arm” proved particularly offensive to Captain Crispin, in the sense that he felt the United States had been imposed upon. Represented as a Chasseurs de Vincennes carbine of .69 caliber, it appears Wright had little chance to really

Only Spanish-made arm with Civil War use known to author is this short two-band Enfield-style rifle, bearing arsenal mark on lock, Madrid and date 1861. Unusual rear sight allows regulating gun on test stand for any choice of bullet, then clamping sight base fingers tight and cutting stock inletting to receive sight in    new location. Style of sight (middle) is uncommon, but resembles modification of  U.S. Rifled Musket 1840-42 style shown on Pomeroy .69 gun (bottom) or Remington sight fitted to experimental Lee .50 caliber single shot musket about 1870 (top). Neat .58 caliber short rifle is adapted for socket bayonet, has brass banded ramrod similar to Brazilian sea-service “Enfield” musket rod. Workmanship on metal and wood is superior, not trade junk. Now in author’s collection, gun was obtained after checking alleged use by troops (North, South?) raised in Louisville, Ky.

see if this were true. He went to Marseilles, after having seen a specimen of the rifle in Paris. There, in the Marseilles railroad freight depot he “only opened a few cases.” Wright admitted his inspection was faulty, that he might not have accepted the rifles if he had looked at them closely enough to find the defects which Crispin observed. Crispin’s main objections were based on the failure of the rifle to be a Chasseurs de Vincennes carbine. Instead, 8,689 had been released from customs, were counted, and awaited receiving, in one of Hagner’s bulging warehouses. Criticized Crispin:
These guns, I find, are all old and have evidently seen long and hard service. They are a French model, caliber .708, and in peculiarities of shape of lock, stock and barrel, and dimensions, are about the same as the present French rifle, well known as the French carbine. They are, however, a chambered one, the old and abandoned plan of M. Delvigne, for destroying windage, using the round ball—relics of the past in the history of rifled arms.
The ramrod is cupped for the round ball, as of course should be expected.
The hausse is a simple standing sight and leaf folding on the barrel with notches for different ranges, a clumsy and inefficient sight as compared with the present model. I should judge the barrel to have belonged to the French smoothbore musket, and been altered at the time when Delvigne’s plan was in vogue. The most peculiar feature of the arms, if they are all like the samples examined, is, however, that they are lightly grooved, straight, or if any twist at all exists, it can- not be detected with the eye.
As they are grooved, but so grooved as to be incapable of giving rotary motion to the ball, I can neither call them a rifled arm nor a smoothbore musket. From the above, it would appear that the arms are old, of an abandoned model, and inferior, if anything, to a smoothbore musket in consid- eration of the chamber and the straight grooves; and in consequence, if received, should only be used in cases where the emergency of the service demanded their issue . . .
So much at variance with the terms of Boker’s order offering arms that were “new and in good condition” were these Delvigne modified short muskets, that Crispin declined to accept any on his own responsibility. Major Hagner took the responsibility, issuing his order June 10, 1862, from his desk at the Ordnance Office: “The commission direct that these arms be accepted, as having been shipped upon certificate of inspection given by George Wright; they are embraced in the number to be paid for by the United States.” He then concluded his examination and conferences with Mr. Schlesscher and M. H. Boker, Jr., and took their accounts for study.
From these records of purchases they had negotiated emerged a tabulation of 20 individual lots of arms, each lot having been purchased at a different price. Far from the $18 each which Boker had offered, the guns averaged between $5 and $7 in cost. Because of the scarcity of complete information on these Boker guns, the tabulation is given in full.
The Civil War historian must remember that these arms were the principal equipment for the Union and especially for Volunteers outfitted in the vicinity of New York, for the year 1862-63. Though far from being Springfield Rifled Muskets, their mere posses- sion by the Union gave greater confidence to the overall strategy and prevented many losses which a more retiring policy might have permitted, if weapons had been in such short supply at they were that September 5th when Herman Boker proposed to arm the North. The prices in Hagner’s list were given in French gold francs, and later translated to dollars, giving the odd fractions:
Herman Boker & Co. Firearms (Muskets  Rifles) 1861-62

Class 1	4,440 at	$5.13	$22,777.20
Class 2	600 at	5.47%	3,283.20
Class 3	1,992 at	5.70	11,354.40
Class 4	7,931 at	6.27	49,727.37
Class 5	12,332 at	6.84	84,350.88
Class 6	5,488 at	7.98	43,794.24
Class 7	4,588 at	8.66%	39,750.43
Class 8	847 at	10.26	8,690.22
Class 9	3,928 at	10.484/s	41,196.86
Class 10	6,940 at	10.71%	74,369.04
Class 11	4,100 at	11.40	46,740.00
Class 12	9,350 at	11.51%	107,655.90
Class 13	236 at	12.54	2,959.44
Class 14	3,486 at	12.82Vi	44,707.95
Class 15	21,945 at	13.11	287,698.95
Class 16	1,824 at	13.68	24,952.32
Class 17	25,247 at	14.52Vi	366,965.14
Class 18	2,272 at	14.82	33,671.04
Class 19	51,819 at	15.671/2	812,262.82
Class 20	18,689 at	16.40	306,499.60

Total, 188,054 rifles and rifle muskets to a value of $2,413,407.04
This and the other accounts of Boker for sabers was ordered paid, with the shipping charges and 2 1/2 per cent commission, and an adjustment for difference in exchange between the hard currencies of Europe and the falling value of the American dollar.